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Low-Rate TCP-Targeted Denial of Service Attacks (The Shrew vs. the Mice and Elephants)

Low-Rate TCP-Targeted Denial of Service Attacks (The Shrew vs. the Mice and Elephants). Aleksandar Kuzmanovic Edward W. Knightly. Rice Networks Group http://www.ece.rice.edu/networks. Background. Traditional view of DoS attacks

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Low-Rate TCP-Targeted Denial of Service Attacks (The Shrew vs. the Mice and Elephants)

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  1. Low-Rate TCP-Targeted Denial of Service Attacks(The Shrew vs. the Mice and Elephants) Aleksandar Kuzmanovic Edward W. Knightly Rice Networks Group http://www.ece.rice.edu/networks

  2. Background • Traditional view of DoS attacks • Attacker consumes resources and denies service to legitimate users • Ex. traffic floods, DDoS • Result: TCP backs off • Observe: statistical anomalies that are relatively easily detectable • Due to attacker’s high rate

  3. Thesis: TCP is Vulnerable to Low-rate Attacks • Shrew: low-rate TCP-targeted attacks • Elude detection by counter-DoS mechanisms • Able to severely deny service to legitimate users • Goals • Analyze TCP mechanisms that can be exploited by DoS attackers • Explore TCP frequency response to Shrews • Evaluate detection mechanisms • Analyze effectiveness of randomization strategies • Methodology: modeling, simulations, Internet experiments

  4. Shrew • Very small but aggressive mammal that ferociously attacks and kills much larger animals with a venomous bite • Reviewer 3: “only some shrews are venomous and the amount of venom in even the venomous species is very mild.”

  5. TCP: a Dual Time-Scale Perspective • Two time-scales fundamentally required • RTT time-scales (~10-100 ms) • AIMD control • RTO time-scales (RTO=SRTT+4*RTTVAR) • Avoid congestion collapse • RTO must be lower bounded to avoid spurious retransmissions • [AllPax99] and RFC2988 recommends minRTO = 1 sec

  6. TCP Timeline • Timeline of TCP congestion window • AIMD control

  7. The Shrew Attack (1/3) • Pulse-induced outage – multiple losses force TCP to enter RTO mechanism Short outages (~RTT)force TCP to timeout All flows simultaneously enter this state

  8. The Shrew Attack (2/3) • When flows attempt to simultaneously exit timeout and enter slow-start… • Shrew pulses again and forces flows synchronously back into timeout state

  9. The Shrew Attack (3/3) • Shrew periodically repeats pulse • RTT-time-scale outages inter-spaced on minRTO periods can deny service to TCP • Flows synchronize their state to the Shrew

  10. Shrew Principles • Shrews exploit protocol homogeneity and determinism • Protocols react in a pre-defined way • Tradeoff of vulnerability vs. predictability • Periodic outages synchronize TCP flow states and deny their service • Slow time scale protocol mechanisms enable low-rate attacks • Outages at RTO scale, pulses at RTT scale imply low average rate

  11. Creating Outages in the Network • Shrew: square-wave stream (l~RTT, T~minRTO) • Optimal pattern in paper • Low-rate “TCP friendly” DoS  hard to detect • Counter-DOS mechanisms tuned for high rate attacks • Detecting Shrews may have unacceptably many false alarms (due to legitimate bursty flows)

  12. Outline • Shrew attack • Simulation and Internet experiments • DoS detection mechanisms • minRTO randomization

  13. The Shrew in Action • How much is TCP throughput degraded? • DoS stream: • R=C=1.5Mb/s; • l=70ms (~TCP RTT)

  14. The Shrew in Action • Shrews induce null frequency near RTO • Shrew has low average rate  .08C • Analytical model accurately predicts degradation

  15. Challenges for Shrews • Aggregation • Vulnerable due to Shrew-induced flow synchronization • RTT heterogeneity • Shrews are high-RTT pass filters • DoS peak rate • Less-than-bottleneck bursts can damage short-RTT flows • Short-lived TCP flows • Web browsing • Internet experiments • Can Shrews be successful on the Internet?

  16. Shrews vs. Short-lived TCP Traffic • Scenario: Web browsing [FGHW99] • Average damage to • a mouse (<100pkts) =400% delay increase • an elephant (>100pkts) =24500%delay increase

  17. Shrews vs. Short-lived TCP Traffic • Scenario: Web browsing • Larger files more vulnerable • most suffer • some benefit

  18. Internet Experiments: Scenario • Scenario: victim on a lightly loaded 10 Mb/sec LAN • Attacker on same LAN, nearby LAN, or over WAN • WAN path: • EPFLETH, 8 hops (10/100/OC-12)

  19. Internet Experiments: Results • Shrew average rate: 909 kb/sec • R = 10 Mb/sec, l = 100 msec, T = 1.1 sec • TCP throughput • 9.8 Mb/sec without Shrew • 1.2 Mb/sec with Shrew, 87.8% degradation

  20. Outline • Shrew attack • Simulation and Internet experiments • Counter DoS mechanisms • Robust TCP variants (NewReno, Sack…) • Router detection mechanisms (RED, RED-PD, …) • minRTO randomization

  21. Detecting Shrews • Shrews have low average rate, yet send high-rate bursts on short time-scales • Key questions • Can algorithms intended to find high-rate attacks detect Shrews? • Can we tune the algorithms to detect Shrews without having too many false alarms? • A number of schemes can detect malicious flows • E.g., RED-PD: • use the packet drop history to detect high-bandwidth flows and preferentially drop packets from these flows

  22. Router-Assisted Mechanisms • Scenario: 9 TCP Sack flows with RED and RED-PD • RED-PD only detects Shrews with unnecessarily high rate • Reducing RED-PD measurement time scale results in excessive false positives

  23. Outline • Shrew attack • Simulation and Internet experiments • Counter DoS mechanisms • minRTO randomization

  24. End-point minRTO Randomization • Observe • Shrews exploit protocol homogeneity and determinism • Question • Can minRTO randomization alleviate threat of Shrews? • TCP flows’ approach • Randomize the minRTO = uniform(a,b) • Shrews’ counter approach • Given flows randomize minRTO, the optimal Shrew pulses at time-scale T=b • Wait for all flows to recover and then pulse again

  25. End-point minRTO Randomization • TCP throughput for T=b time-scale of the Shrew attack • a small  spurious retransmissions [AllPax99] • b large  bad for short-lived (HTTP) traffic • Randomizing the minRTO parameter shifts and smoothes TCP’s null time-scales • Fundamental tradeoff between TCP performance and vulnerability to low-rate DoS attacks remains

  26. Conclusions • Shrew principles • Exploit slow-time-scale protocol homogeneity and determinism • Real-world vulnerability to Shrew attacks • Internet experiment: 87.8% throughput loss without detection • Shrews are difficult to detect • Low average rate and “TCP friendly” • Cannot filter short bursts • Fundamental mismatch of attack/defense timescales

  27. Open Questions • Can filters specific to Shrews be designed without excessive false positives? • Can end-point algorithms be sufficiently randomized, so that • attackers cannot exploit their known reactions • performance is not sacrificed • Reconsider “TCP friendly” definition

  28. Backup Slides

  29. Aggregation • Homogeneous TCP aggregates are vulnerable • Shrews induce flow synchronization • Analytical model accurately predicts degradation Scenario: 5 TCP flows, homogenous RTTs

  30. DoS Peak Rate • Less-than-bottleneck bursts can damage short-RTT flows • Scenario: 4 TCP flows + DoS • 1 short-RTT & 3 long-RTT flows • DoS outage ~ RTT of the short-RTT flow

  31. DoS Peak Rate • Long-RTT flows inadvertently collaborate in the attack • DoS flow is masked with long-RTT TCP flows

  32. TCP Variants • TCP Reno is the most fragile • NewReno? Sack? • Scenario: • TCP variants • Reno • New Reno • Tahoe • SACK • DoS stream • Burst rate equals the bottleneck capacity • Burst length:30ms, 50ms, 70ms, and 90ms

  33. TCP Variants • Burst length = 30ms • TCP Reno is the most fragile

  34. TCP Variants • Burst length = 50ms • TCP is the most vulnerable in 1-1.2 sec time-scale region due to slow start

  35. TCP Variants • All TCP variants obtain the same profile • Sufficient pulse width ensures timeout • Windows remain small

  36. TCP Variants • Burst length = 90ms • When burst length is severe enough -> all TCP stacks are equally fragile

  37. The Role of Time-Scales • Scenario: R=2 Mb/s; T=1 sec; l~50-450 ms

  38. The Role of Time-Scales • RED-PD detects l=300 ms shrews • Recall that 30 ms enough for DoS • A fundamental mismatch • If shorter time-scales are used => • high false alarm probability (bursty TCP flows)

  39. Shrews vs. Heterogeneous RTTs • Hypothesis: Shrews are high-RTT-pass filters • Service is denied to short-RTT flows

  40. Flow Filtering • Shrews damage short-RTT flows the most • Scenario • 20 TCP flows; RTT ~ 20-460 ms • Cut-off time scale ~ 180 ms

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