Civil-Military Interaction in EU Crisis Management

1. Civil-Military Interaction in EU Crisis Management Alexander Siedschlag Chairman, European Security Conference Initiative (ESCI) Visiting Professor of Security Research, Sigmund Freud Private University Vienna (SFU) Senior Lecturer, Munich School of Political Science (HfP)

2. Scope and objective • This presentation will introduce to selected models/concepts for to civil-military interaction in crisis management • unravel some of the terminology • embedded into a brief review of the development of relevant political-strategic conceptual frameworks in international institutions • link this with special challenges to EU crisis management as experienced in the EU political process as well as in ESDP missions/operations • establish reference to the EU comprehensive approach to crisis management with its challenges of coherence, harmonization etc.

3. Current EU missions and operations: 50% are civil-military European Security Review, no. 43, March 2009, http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2009_esr_68_esr43-mar09.pdf, p. 19

4. Back to the future • Interaction of civil/civilian and military strategic options and a comprehensive approach building on both is not new to European security • NATO Harmel equation (1967): defence + détente = security • NATO Dual Track Decision (1979) • WEU Platform on European Security Interests (The Hague, 1987): Defence, disarmament, dialogue &cooperation

5. Today:The challenge of linguistic interoperabiltiy CMCO CIMIC CIVMIL Integrated Approach EBAO Comprehensive CRCT Approach CMCoord CMC EUSR

6. Basic working distinction • 2 levels of civil-military interaction (EU model) Political-strategic level: Inter-pillar activities and comprehensive crisis management EU practice and point of view Internal interaction – challenge of coherence Civil-military co-ordination (CMCO) Tactical-operational level: Interaction in the field with the environment and other actors National practices and points of view External interaction – challenge of harmonization Civil-military co-operation (CIMIC)

7. Point of departure:Civil-military co-ordination as a (strategic) management task „Coordination is beyond function. It is a shared responsibility” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UN-OCHA)http://www.ochaonline.un.org

8. Civil-military co-operation as (tactical) mission support is piece of the puzzle “Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) is the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between military components of EU-led Crisis Management Operations and civil actors (external to the EU), including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.” Council of the European Union: Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Concept for EU-Led Crisis Management Operations. ESDP/PESD COSDP 67, Brussels, 2002, § 20, based on NATO MC411 definition: NATO International Military Staff: NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation, 2001, http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/mc411-1-e.htm, § 4.

9. Further concepts (not discussed here) • Civil-Military Relations (CIVMIL): • Civil‑military elements in national policy • “The soldier and the state” (Huntington 1957) • Relevant for national CIMIC cultures and practices and the challenge of harmonization • Of relevance for intra-institutional relations in the EU system (e.g. EUMC - CIVCOM) • Civil-Civil Co-ordin/oper/ation (CIV-CIV): • Of relevance for the challenge of coherence (across EU bodies and structures)

10. “Garbage can” phenomenon • Models for civil-military interaction in crisis management typically are no products of political or strategic design but have path-dependencies • They were developed in response to political and/or operational challenges faced in particular (types of) missions/operations and then have been re-used • They in the first place provide solutions to the problem of managing interfaces between civil and military functions, not solutions to the problem of comprehensive civil-military crisis manangement as a political-strategic task

11. Follow-up model • UN in the early 1990ies: New-generation peacekeeping and idea of following up military by civil options along theoretical phases of a conflict management cycle • UN Civil-Military coordination model CMCoord: • De-link civil and military components of mission in order to create a safe environment/humanitarian space for UNOCHA et al. work • Provide exit strategies for the military • No civil-military mixture, but military-civil succession • Model still relevant for EU, cf. EUFOR Tchad/RCA

12. Co-existence model • UN in the late 1990ies: Complex emergencies, multifunctional forces, mixed capabilities SHIRBRIG (Standby High Readiness Brigade): • Civil-military management concept for complex crisis • Not military-civil succession, but syncronous mixture • Civil and military decision-makers in the UN HQ as well as the field serve the same objectives without risiking their identity • Vertical civil-military networking under the responsibility of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), overarching political, humanitarian and military mission components/objectives; relevance for EU: EUSR model • Designed for initial entry/enabling forces (3-6 months) and in a time when civilians and military had little experience in practical cooperation; focuses on informational co-ordination

13.  UN lessons learnt • Brahimi report 2003 • Military efficiency followed by civil chaos • 50% relapse rate in a five-year scope • Need for an inter-departmental coodination mechanism in UN HQ: Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTF), e.g. set-up in the case of UNAMA (Afghanistan) • This provided a best practice for EU comprehensive approach, as will be seen later (Crisis Response Co-Ordination Team, CRCT)

14. Nordic CIMIC (PfP) model • Reflects transition from (robust) peacekeeping to nation building as main challenge, associated with establishing a long-term civil-military end-state rather than an operational military-civil succession or mixture • Establish and maintain the full co-operation of the civilian population and institutions within a commander's area of operation in order to create the most advantageous civil/military conditions • Create and sustain conditions that will support the achievements of a lasting solution to the crises: VIKING 1999 PfP exercise http://www.mil.se/pfp/viking99/conccim.html

15. NATO Response Force (NRF) model • Military-framed multi-national civil-military component system • Show force and impartiality • Support security sector reform (SSR) in civilian no-go areas • Help with functional specialists • Win hearts & minds • Similar to what EU has applied in EUSEC DR Congo

16. Comprehensiveness (EU) • EU Summit Helsinki 1999 • Crisis Management means European capabilities (in terms of credible forces) and decision-making • Prevalence of the political-strategic level • EU Summit Göteborg 2002 • Employ the full spectrum of available civil and military (EU and EU-MS) means for crisis management in a coherent and co-ordinated way • CMCO is a priority and refers to strategy and action • European Security Strategy (ESS) 2003: „Comprehensiveness“ • European level analysis, planning and strategy development • Member-state level implementation and development of capabilities

17. Comprehensiveness in context Christian Mölling: Comprehensive Approaches to International Crisis Management. Zurich: ETH Zurich, CCS Analyses in Security Policy 42: 3 (October 2008), p. 2. The challenge of (vertical) civil-military networking „CMNEW“

18. NATO Comprehensive Approach • Riga Summit (2006) • „today’s challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments, while fully respecting mandates and autonomy of decisions of all actors“. (§10) • Comprehensive Political Guidance (2006) • „the ability and flexibility to conduct operations in circumstances where the various efforts of several authorities, institutions and nations need to be coordinated in a comprehensive manner to achieve the desired results“ (§ 15 h)  Effects-based Approach to Operations (EBAO)

19. EU Comprehensive Approach • civil-military, military-military and civil-civil interaction • both within in EU system, between EU and EUMS, between EU and other parties, EUMS and other parties and “combined” • political-strategic and operational approach • flexible enough to meet operational requirements • universal enough to help enact the Union’s guiding norms (e.g. as defined in the ESS)

20. CMCO (EU): Implementation of a comprehensive approachCf. Council of the European Union: Civil Military Co-ordination (CMCO). Brussels, 7 November 2003, 14457/03, para. 1 & 4. • The EU possesses a uniquely wide array of civilian and military instruments for use in response to a crisis. This comprehensive approach leads to the need for ensuring within the EU an effective co-ordination of the whole range of such instruments. • This approach will have to take into account the fact that these instruments may be subject to different institutional and thus decision-making processes. • Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO) addresses the need for effective co-ordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of EU's response to the crisis.

21. CMCO is located at the political-strategic level, reflected in a crisis management concept (CMC) integrated at the level of the Political and Security Committee (PSC). • CMCO aims for a coherent response and coordination between all the actors - both civilian and military - who are active in a given crisis management area. E.g., EU actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina include • European Union Special Representative (EUSR) • EUFOR Althea (military crisis management operation) • EUPM (civilian crisis management mission) • EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) – regional mission (1st pillar) • the European Commission's Delegation to BiH • At the top of the list of fundamentals lies the need for a culture of co-ordination, rather than seeking to put too much emphasis on detailed structures or procedures. • CMCO is also a pre-requisite for cooperation with external actors. Retaining decision-making autonomy

22. Political and institutional challenges involved in civil-military interaction in EU crisis management • Member States are not well prepared to make the leap to a grand strategy, giving up their sovereignty for the sake of efficiency and comprehensiveness • Strategic-political capacities still appear weak and/or ad-hoc, compared to the commitment to comprehensiveness: the challenge of coherence • Principle of national capabilities and national implementation (except EC instruments) with considerable national variations: the challenge ofharmonization, strong focus on operational aspects • Link to other international actors in the field unclear CMCO CIMIC CMCOEUMC Def.

23. EU-MS CIMIC cultures and procedures • National CIMIC groups in BiH (EUFOR Althea) • Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan (OEF and ISAF)

24. Council of the European Union. The future French, Czech and Swedish Presidencies: 18-month programme of the Council. Brussels, 30 June 2008. 11249/08. POLGEN 76 • observe lessons learnt from past operations and from the operational gaps identified, with a view to improving the planning and operational conduct of both military and civilian operations • improve civil-military coordination

25. Lessons from EUFOR Althea • EU Special Representatives (EUSR), based in the field, increasingly play the role of a coordination hub for EU mission activities, linking both Brussels and the field level, and the different agencies in the field • Coordination practically rests on exchange of information between heads of field missions • Challenge of a comprehensive operational picture as a prerequisite for a civil-military end state, cf. NATO: effect-based approach to operations (EBAO) • A complex operation must be based on a coherent and coordinated civil-military plan. However, military forces must be flexible and adaptable to the very specific context and the changing realities on the ground

26. EUMS civil-military interaction in Provicial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) • GB: Integrated approach (whole of government approach) • Conflict Prevention Pool • Military forces work with their national counterparts ( CIVMIL) • Peace support, institution building, security sector reform (SSR) • DE: Interministerial approach (Foreign Ministry et al. – Defence Ministry) • Provide a safe environment for civil reconstruction, force protection • CIMIC (ZMZ)/functional specialists, community-based, DDR • DK: Concerted Planning and Action (CPA) • Comprehensive training of civilian and military personell • Joint Review and lessons learnt process • Usability for EU and CMCO • Institutional memory and information sharing • Coherence at the national/operational level

27. Towards a single civilian-military strategic planning structure for ESDP operations and missions • Civil-Military Cell(Civ-Mil Cell) in the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) • First standing EU body that takes a holistic approach to crisis management operations and integrates military and civilian experts • Enhance civil-military coherence • Develop civil/military interface knowledge • Conduct strategic advance planning for joint civil/military operations (as opposed to the approach of ad-hoc Crisis Response Co-ordination Team, CRCTs, providing rather liaison than jointness) (Cf. Report on the implementation of ESS, Brussels 2008)

28. EU system of civil-military interaction in crisis management EU political system and ESDP bodies GAERC PSC EUMC EUMS/CIV-MIL CELL CIVCOM EC INSTRUMENTS … COHERENCE (COMPRENSIVE) CRISIS MANAGEMENT CONCEPT (CMC) Integrating civil and military strategic options HARMONIZATION HARMONIZATION HARMONIZATION HARMONIZATION HARMONIZATION EU member states (EU-MS) CAPABILITIES IMPLEMENTATION FINANCING (MIL.) Mission/Operation EU-MS CIMIC cultures and procedures

29. CMCO and its critics • Despite the rhetoric of “comprehensiveness”, CMCO focuses on ex-post crisis management (≠ prevention) • Downplays the necessity of holistic analysis of requirements/capabilities for effective crisis management, thus countering strategic planning efforts • May legitimize militarization of crisis management • Neglects the creation of a stable environment as an overarching (military) task • May run counter to functional needs on the ground: Soft targets vs. mission creep • May create noncredible commitments countering the ESS feedback-loop

30. Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy (December 2008) • „Our ability to combine civilian and military expertise from the conception of a mission, through the planning phase and into implementation must be reinforced.“

31. Conclusion • Common European norms and values for crisis management need national capabilites and implementation in specific missions and may lead to divergent national responses • EU bodies should support and enhance cross-national initiatives and practices (as opposed to Europeanization/harmonization) • Increase the effects of existing potentials and instruments, rather than the amount of potentials and instruments (EBO principle) • The challenge of CMNEW: Gap between political-strategic crisis management concept (CMC) and in-theatre implementation by mere ad-hoc interlocking and liaison needs to be bridged