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February , 2017 Washington D.C.

Evaluation and Prospects of International Situation in East Asia after the Fifth Nuclear Test of DPRK. February , 2017 Washington D.C. Prof. Sung-wook Nam Dean, Graduate School of Public Administration Chair, Dept. of Unification and Diplomacy Korea University. CONTENTS.

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February , 2017 Washington D.C.

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  1. Evaluation and Prospects of International Situation in East Asia after the Fifth Nuclear Test ofDPRK February, 2017 Washington D.C. Prof. Sung-wook Nam Dean, Graduate School of Public Administration Chair, Dept. of Unification and Diplomacy Korea University

  2. CONTENTS I. Introduction: Changing East Asian Order II. Major Issues in East Asia: Cooperation and Conflict 1. China’s Rising Power 2. US Pivot-to-Asia and Japan’s Interest 3. Trends of New Cold War in NE Asia 4. North Korea: Nuclear weapon Test III. Prospects of NK Regime Collapse and Survival IV. Closing Remarks

  3. I. Introduction: Changing East Asian Order

  4. The Asian Century • World’s largest piece of land • Home to 60 percent of the world’s population • GDP (PPP) now at 40 percent of the world economy • But: • Even if the area command enormous economic, political and military power, • Asian countries failed to address income inequality, financial instability and environmental problems • Cooperation among Asian countries difficult

  5. NE Asian regional order: cooperation and conflict • Cold War bipolarity since WW II until mid 1970s • Since early-to-mid 1970s, bipolar tensions eased and globalization trends ensued • Results: • Increased regional economic interdependence • Regionalized multilateralism • A reduced focus on regional military power projection • : Blurring of prior dichotomies between “friends” and “foes”

  6. Rapid Changing Order • US-led order challenged by the rise of China • Emerging order in East Asia is more multipolar and shaped by balance of power impulses • With China’s rise, the US is no longer the only major great power in the region • The specific features and organizing logic of the new order remains unclear

  7. II. Major Issues in East Asia: Cooperation and Conflict 1. China’s rising power 2. US Pivot-to-Asia and Japan 3. The Trends of New Cold War in NE Asia 4. North Korea’s Nuclear weapon

  8. 2.1 China’s Rising Power:Perceptions of an Assertive China China’s soaring current account surplus, the largest in the world, and its foreign assets have significantly boosted not only its domestic autonomy but its power in influence in international politics • Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) • One Belt, One Road • Chinese yuan joined IMF to gain global reserve status • No more “quiet rise”

  9. 2.2 US Pivot-to-Asia: Balancing China In his speech in the Australian Parliament on Nov 17, 2011, Former President Obama announced a policy of giving ‘top priority’ to military presence in Asia Pacific. • Sec. Def. Leon Panetta: Atlantic/Pacific military presence from 50/50 to 40/60 by 2020. • But increasing domestic weariness of overseas troops and financial insufficiency

  10. 2.3 The Trends of New Cold War:China, Russia, NK vs. US, Japan, ROK • 1. US and ROK vs. North Korea’s Nuclear Threats • NK nuclear capacity nearing ‘completion stage’ • ROK’s Beijing diplomacy nullified, returning to dependence on US strategic deterrence • Reaffirmation of US-ROK alliance deepens the Chinese-NK security dilemma on the Korean peninsula

  11. The Trends of New Cold War:China, Russia, NK vs. US, Japan, ROK • 2. US and ROK vs. China: THAAD Deployment • Prof. Mearsheimer suggests that China’s rise is not peaceful and that US will contain it, while US’ allies balance against it • US penetration into East Asian RSC is welcome by ROK, which depend on US’ extended deterrence against NK nuclear threat • NK belligerence attracts US military which hurts China

  12. The Trends of New Cold War:China, Russia, NK vs. US, Japan, ROK • 2. US and ROK vs. China: THAAD Deployment • US and ROK’s agreed plans to deploy THAAD system in Korea prompted fierce opposition from China • For ROK, THAAD system is a minimum measure against NK • * ROK’s companies have seriously been damaged by China’s economic sanctions since 2016 • For US, it serves as a stern message against NK (and China) • For China, it is a damage to its strategic security interests

  13. The Trends of New Cold War:China, Russia, NK vs. US, Japan, ROK • 3. US versus China and North Korea: Peace Agreement (Old repertory) • NK proposed peace treaty with US repeatedly since 1974 • US insists denuclearization as a condition for any talks • In Feb 2016, China proposed a peace treaty negotiations with Pyongyang in tandem with denuclearization talks “Denuclearization first” “a parallel tracks of denuclearization and peace talks”

  14. The Trends of New Cold War:China, Russia, NK vs. US, Japan, ROK 4. US and Japan versus China: Territorial Dispute • When UN Convention of the Law of the Sea took effect in 1994, territorial disputes of NE Asia arose in sea territories surrounding islands • In 2013, China declared ADIZ over East China Sea including Senkaku (Japan) / Diaoyu (China) triggering Japan’s (and US’) condemnation • China also disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea where it continues to set up naval military bases on artificial islands

  15. Obamalaid flowers in Hiroshima (May 27) : Xi,RiTalks(June 1, 2016) : Typical balance of power in East Asia • 한미동맹으로 사드 배치 결정 • 북핵 4차 핵실험과 6차 장거리미사일 발사로 한국의 안보위협이 • 심각해짐 • 중국과 러시아의 반발 • 중국은 북핵 문제가 아닌 북한 및 동북아 역학구도로 사태 • 한중관계가 악화 가능성이 높음 => 이어도 인근 해양 무력시위 • 오바마 히로시마 방문 ’

  16. III. Analysis on Recent North Korea • North Korean Nuclear weapon and Missiles : the biggest concern • - Black swan (unpredictability) : be extremely difficult to predict and bring about catastrophic ramification • - Three attributes : a) lie outside the realm of regular expectations • b) give rise to an extreme impact • c) be explainable and predictable • - Cases : 911 terror, dissolution of the Soviet Union, high Inflation rate of Zimbabwe • The Black Swan (2007) by Nassim N. Taleb • financial crisis

  17. NK’s Fourth and Fifth Nuclear Test On September 9th, 2016 the 68th Anniversary of the founding of its government, North Korea conducted its fifth Nuclear test, boasting of a weapon light and small enough to be mounted on a ballistic missile. “Nuclear warhead that has been standardized to be mounted on” (KCNA official statement) ,Yield: 10kilotons, most powerful test so far Earlier on January 6th, North Korea conducted its fourth Nuclear test, which the regime claimed was the successful detonation of a hydrogen bomb

  18. 1. Kim Jong Un 2017 New Year’s Address • Main Points: How to deal with Trump’s new govt • IntercontinentalBallisticMissile(ICBM) test launch preparation “in its final stages” • Trump’s response: Itwon’thappen! • “very dangerous and very unacceptable”and very late(Feb 23) • Power Succession officially complete • Testing US Trump • Risk Takingly Bold

  19. 2. Latest Missile Provocation • Latest missile test on 12th February, 2017. • First provocation in Trump administration • Three new developments: • Solid-fuel propelled engine means faster and mobile launch preparation • Cold-launching (mid-air ignition) similar to SLBM • On tracked wheels • Bukguksong-2 described as “Korean style new type strategic weapon system” • Greater mobility and Faster launch preparation is designed to display capability to evade US preemptive/preventive strikes

  20. 3. Kim Jong Nam Assassination • On 14th February, one of Kim Jong Un’s half brother Kim Jong Nam assassinated on airport in the morning • One North Korean, One Indonesian, One Vietnamese suspects arrested • Four North Korean suspects fled: VX gas attack

  21. 3. Kim Jong Nam Assassination • Kim Jong Un possibly intended to eliminate potential rival to regime’s leadership • Also to challenge US and China’s ‘regime change’ card and • prevent ‘post-Kim Jong Un preparation’ • Malaysia airport: good place for warning message toward China and U.S.A

  22. IV. The Effects of UN Sanctions and Inter-Korean Relations

  23. UN SC Resolution 2270, 2321 • The Strongest-ever UN sanctions against North Korea • Stronger than oil and financial sanctions imposed on Iran • 90% of NK’s trade volume is with China • Beijing’s cooperation is crucial but its enforcement is yet to be seen • UNSC Resolution 2270, 2321 • ARMS EMBARGO TIGHTENED • SANCTIONS BLACKLIST • EXPELLING DIPLOMATS • CARGO INSPECTIONS/BAN ON PORT CALLS • EXPORT BAN • FINANCIAL/BANKING SANCTIONS • BAN ON LUXURY GOODS

  24. “The world is watching to see if China enforces the sanctions.” “Sanctions would not alone curtail Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions without “sustained diplomacy”’

  25. 1. Cash Flow into NK: China • North Korea depends almost entirely on China for its overseas trade • Pyongyang’s total exports have been shrinking in recent years • Further, China is under pressure to join US-led sanctions on NK • Chinese banks in the border areas begun to freeze NK assets Dandong, linked to the NK city of Sinuiju through a sing-track rail bridge, serves as the major coin nuit for nearly three quarters of all trade between the two countries

  26. 2. Cash Flow into NK: Gaesung • According to the Unification Ministry, about $560 million has flowed to the regime via the joint industrial park, with $120 million last year • President Park claimed that a hefty chunk of wages paid to workers was funneled to its leadership, for its nuclear and missile programs The ROK govt shut down the factory in response to North Korea’s recent nuclear test and long-range missile launch. North Korea’s state media claimed Gaesung shutdown will not affect its nuclear development

  27. 3. Cash Flow into NK: Overseas workers • Between 50,000 and 60,000 North Korean workers in about 50 countries remit up to $200 million home a year, twice as much as the 54,000 workers in the now-closed Gaesung Industrial Complex earned • 70~90% of their wages are sent to the secretariat of the Workers’ Party, or Office 39, which is the hard cash for nuclear and missile projects and also buying luxuries for Kim There are reportedly 20,000 NK workers in Russia, 19,000 in China, and around 8,000 in Arab countries, employed mainly in mining and construction

  28. 4. Cash Flow into NK: Others • North Korea makes about $10 million a year from 130 overseas restaurants in 12 countries • Seoul has instructed its citizens to avoid going to North Korean restaurants abroad • ROK has also suspended provision of all humanitarian aid too Last year, a group of 13 North Koreans working at a restaurant in China defected to South Korea. A govt spokesperson said that “as the new sanctions were put into effect, the North Korean restaurants in foreign countries were known to be affected”

  29. Main points • Kim dynasty knows too well that the nuclear weapons and missiles are the key to its survival • Also, that any opening of its economy will cause the system to collapse • His double-take policy of nuclear and economic development is unrealistic • It is a classic ‘Catch-22’ for North Korean regime

  30. Main points • Run-out Options: • As for Negotiations, there little (if any) reason to believe that NK will give up its best guarantee of survival • Tougher Sanctions are limited because China is reluctant to completely unplug NK of its lifelines • China should gradually reduce the quantity of energy provided through Dandong to Shineju • a lifeline, annual petroleum of 500,000 tons

  31. Denuclearization Differences between Iran and North Korea A. Experience of capitalism and democratic society , Yes : No => The economic sanctions have an effect in Iran and not in DPRK B. Regime survival of hereditary dynasty , No : Yes C. Existence of China, neighboring superpower that hopes stats quo, No : Yes => U.N security council unanimously agree sanction and do not in DPRK D. The intention of nuclear test, Interim Policy : Final Destination => No nuclear test (13 years) in Tehran : 5 times test in Pyongyang since 2006 E. The connection between Tehran and Washington, London, The human network between Western countries and Pyongyang, No

  32. IV. Closing Remarks

  33. Closing Remarks • 1. Trilateral Deterioration in the Face of Competing Nationalism • And Geodynamics in NE Asia: • US and China have become “frenemies” – contending on security matters while economically interdependent. • External shifts in geopolitics and geoeconomics have opened up political-economic space for NE Asian countries • Recent wave of nationalisms have derailed any trend toward cooperation between China, Korea and Japan • The uncertainty of Trump’s diplomacy will contribute to the unpredictability in East Asia’s New Cold War

  34. Closing Remarks • President Trump’s Effect on East Asia • Uncertainty unleashed by Trump’s diplomacy puts both allies and adversaries to consider alternate plans to US-led order • ROK should seek reassurance of deterrence against NK • If US decreases its military presence, China will quickly fill the vacuum while others also will scramble for security • US’s active engagement will require Washington to take sides, but disengagement will trigger an arms competition and shifting alliances that lead to war

  35. Concluding Remarks • NK’s fifth nuclear test poses an imminent threat to Northeast Asian security and ROK survival • It is only a matter of time before NK increases its nuclear arsenal and miniaturize its weapon for missile delivery with increasing range and accuracy • NK is expected to make 100 warheads by 2020 and secure BM technologies sufficient enough to reach US mainland

  36. Concluding Remarks • N.K Nuclear weapon and Missile threat • It is time to call a spade a spade. • NK said it has become a nuclear state and it has matched its words with action. • Any doubt has been proved otherwise with the latest nuclear test. • Pyongyang has made significant progress in the miniaturization of nuclear warheads. Sixth nuclear test to mark its completion is looming.

  37. Prospects for North Korea 4. 2017 Forecast • Threshold for preemptive strikes lowered with Trump administration and still remain high damage • Large scale annual US-ROK military exercise and NK provocations will demand actions to be taken

  38. Prospects for North Korea 5. 2017 Forecast In case of fruitless deal between N.K and U.S ICBM test / 6th Nuke test of N.K will be expected in second half of 2017

  39. Prospects for North Korea • 6. US and ROK Options: • Persuading China that ‘One Korea’ is no threat to China (non-nuclear, no US troops beyond the 38 parallel) • Defense and deterrence with fortified Anti-Missile Systems • Military strike on NK nuclear and missile sites (risks military retaliation on South Korea) • Pre-emptive Surgical Strike when threats are ‘imminent’ (but intelligence may not be clear and early enough)

  40. Prospects for North Korea 7. Preemptive/Preventive Strike Options/Talks • Trump to deal “very strongly with North Korea” • Perhaps NK is one of the easier tasks at hand to claim achievements in first term • Talks may be also simultaneously considered • It is high time for us to do and not to think of strike or negotiation • A matter of the highest priority

  41. Thank You For Your Attention

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