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Late 20th Century Wars of Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Humanitarian Crisis

Late 20th Century Wars of Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Humanitarian Crisis . Lsn 40. ID & SIG. Bosnia, “Chapter VI and a half,” Haiti, Kosovo, nationbuilding, peacekeeping, post Cold War environment, role of the media, Rwanda, Somalia, United Nations and peacekeeping. Agenda.

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Late 20th Century Wars of Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Humanitarian Crisis

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  1. Late 20th Century Wars of Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Humanitarian Crisis Lsn 40

  2. ID & SIG • Bosnia, “Chapter VI and a half,” Haiti, Kosovo, nationbuilding, peacekeeping, post Cold War environment, role of the media, Rwanda, Somalia, United Nations and peacekeeping

  3. Agenda • Changing World of the Post-Cold War • The United Nations • Role of the Media • Somalia • Rwanda • Haiti • Bosnia • Kosovo

  4. Post-Cold War Environment • Cold War threats were potentially catastrophic but they were also measurable and somewhat predictable • The bipolar structure and the desire to avoid superpower confrontation had provided a certain degree of order and stability • The post-Cold War period was much more ambiguous and uncertain and many new threats emerged CIA Director James Woolsey described the post-Cold War environment by saying, “We have slain a large dragon (the U.S.S.R.) — but we now live in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. In many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of.”

  5. The United Nations • The Cold War structure had kept in check ethnic divisions in many countries and limited military interventions • The end of the Cold War changed all that • UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali advocated the “legitimate involvement” of the UN in “peace enforcement” and “peacemaking” operations • President Clinton proclaimed a “National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement” • After the Cold War, the United Nations went from an average of three or four peacekeeping operations a year to 13 in December 1992

  6. UN Charter • Chapter VI • “Pacific Settlement of Disputes” • Security Council can investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute • Council can recommend action but the recommendations are not binding on its members • Chapter VII • Council is not limited to recommendations • Can take action, including the use of armed force, to maintain or restore international peace and security • Peacekeeping operations often are called “Chapter VI and a half”

  7. Limitations of the UN • No army of its own • Reliant on ad hoc contributions from its members • Can never divorce itself from the political agendas of its members • Inadequately trained staff of military professionals and managers

  8. Influence of the Media • Agenda setting • Shaping public opinion • Policy-makers Tiananmen Square, June 4, 1989

  9. Agenda Setting • “The mass media may not be successful in telling people what to think, but the media are stunningly successful in telling their audience what to think about.” • “If a tree falls in the woods and CNN doesn’t cover it, did it really fall?” • Bruce W. Jentleson, American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century

  10. Shaping Public Opinion • “Framing” • How the media casts an issue affects the sustentative judgments people make about the issue. • “Priming” • The priority the media gives to an issue affects the priority people give to the issue.

  11. Policy-makers • Policy-makers often ask themselves “What will the media think?” as they formulate a course of action • Political “spin” becomes extremely important

  12. Somalia • Drought, famine, clan violence, corruption, and inefficient government had created a humanitarian crisis in Somalia in the 1990s. • One of the main sources of power had been the control of food supplies.  • Hijacked food was used to secure the loyalty of clan leaders, and food was routinely exchanged with other countries for weapons. • In the early 1990’s up to 80% of internationally provided food was stolen.  • Between 1991 and 1992 over 300,000 Somalis were estimated to have died of starvation.  • UN relief efforts were unsuccessful, largely due to looting. • The U.N. asked its member nations for assistance. 

  13. Somalia • “And it was pictures -- of spectral women and withered children -- that launched the rescue mission in Somalia. It may have been awkward to have cameras meet the troops when they landed, but wasn't it also appropriate? In a sense it was cameras that had sent them there.” • Time Magazine, Dec. 28, 1992 This picture of a Somalian women who weighed just 46 pounds was an example of an image that drew US attention to the situation

  14. Somalia • Stark images from Somalia, transmitted to the world via satellite, helped shape public opinion and pressured the United Nations to take action • Reporter Craig Hines wrote that President Bush told him that as he and his wife, Barbara, watched television at the White House and saw “those starving kids … in quest of a little pitiful cup of rice,” he phoned Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Gen. Colin Powell, Chairman of the JCoS: “Please come over to the White House.” Bush recalled telling the military leaders: “I – we – can’t watch this anymore. You’ve got to do something”

  15. Somalia • In December 1992, President George Bush proposed to the U.N. that United States combat troops lead the intervention force.  • The U.N. accepted this offer and 25,000 U.S. troops were deployed to Somalia. • The force had a mandate of protecting humanitarian operations and creating a secure environment for eventual political reconciliation. • At the same time, it had the authority to use all necessary means, including military force. Operation Restore Hope was a US-led, UN-sanctioned operation that included protection of humanitarian assistance and other peace-enforcement operations.

  16. Somalia • Over an area of 21,000 square miles, soldiers established security, built or rebuilt roads, escorted humanitarian relief convoys, and confiscated weapons • Due to these efforts, humanitarian agencies declared an end to the food emergency, community elders became empowered, and marketplaces were revitalized and functioning

  17. Somalia • In March 1993 the U.N. officially took over the operation, naming this mission UNOSOM II. • The objective of this mission was to promote “nation building” within Somalia. • One main target was to disarm the Somali people. • UNOSOM II stressed restoring law and order, improving the infrastructure, and assisting the people with setting up a representative government.

  18. Somalia • This change of mission was a direct threat to the power base of clan leader Mohammed Farah Aidid • On Oct 3, 1993 Task Force Ranger raided the Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu to search for Aidid. • This led to a 17 hour battle in which 19 U.S. soldiers were killed and 84 were wounded. • Conservative estimates say more than 500 Somalians were killed and over 1,000 injured, but pictures of the body of a dead US soldier being dragged through the streets and the capture of a US helicopter pilot caused a public outcry against the US policy in Somalia

  19. Somalia • On Oct 7, President Clinton announced the beginning of the US withdrawal. • Marks the beginning of a period in which the US becomes very “casualty adverse” • High optempo use of the Army lessens • US did not intervene in a timely or meaningful way in Rwanda • Army not used in Kosovo

  20. Somalia • “We went into Somalia because of horrible television images; we will leave Somalia because of horrible television images.” • Marianne Means • “We had been drawn to this place by television images; now we were being repelled by them. The President immediately conducted a policy review that resulted in a plan for withdrawal over the next six months.” • Colin Powell

  21. Sudan and Somalia • “As the contrasting responses to the seemingly similar Somalia and Sudan cases suggest, media coverage can have a significant impact.” • Arnold Kanter, Intervention Decisionmaking in the Bush Administration Refugees in Sudan

  22. Rwanda • Tension and violence between the Hutu and Titsi tribal groups in Rwanda was longstanding • The Titsi had long held power even though the Hutu were the majority • In 1959, three years before independence from Belgium, the Hutus overthrew the ruling Tutsi king

  23. Rwanda • Over the next several years, thousands of Tutsis were killed, and some 150,000 driven into exile in neighboring countries • The children of these exiles later formed a rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and began a civil war in 1990 • The violence reached its peak in April 1994 in the genocide of roughly 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus Deep gashes in the skulls of victims of the Rwanda genocide evidence the violence of their deaths

  24. Rwanda • Outside powers such as the United Nations urged peace, but coming on the heels of the disaster in Somalia, there was no meaningful intervention • The world basically stood by until the bloodshed finally ran its course • “…The world must deeply repent this failure… Now we know that what we did was not nearly enough--not enough to save Rwanda from itself, not enough to honor the ideals for which the United Nations exists. We will not deny that, in their greatest hour of need, the world failed the people of Rwanda ...” (UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 1998)

  25. Rwanda • The Tutsi rebels ultimately defeated the Hutu regime and ended the killing in July 1994 • Approximately 2 million Hutu refugees, many fearing retaliation, fled to neighboring Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and the former Zaire • Many perpetrators of the genocide secretly blended into the refugee camps and escaped justice Rwandan children in the refugee camp at Ndosha, Zaire

  26. Bosnia • During the Cold War, Yugoslavia was a multi-ethnic state successfully held together by communist totalitarianism • When the strong communist leader Josip Broz Tito died in 1980, ethnic divisions became more open

  27. Bosnia • Yugoslavian republics began to seek independence • Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia broke away in 1991 • When Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence in 1992, an ethnic civil war ensued • Bosnian Serbs, with external support from Serbia, initiated an “ethnic cleansing” campaign against Bosnian Muslims Unearthed mass grave containing the bodies of some of the 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys murdered when Serbs overran the UN “safe area” of Srebrenica

  28. Bosnia • United Nations peacekeepers entered Bosnia in 1992 but were extremely ineffective • The United States was very reluctant to commit ground troops to what promised to be a messy and long-term situation • The US did begin air and naval patrols in 1993 The Serbs took UN peacekeepers hostage and chained them to potential target areas to prevent airstrikes

  29. Bosnia • Finally in 1995 President Clinton responded to mounting European pressure and, the US and NATO conducted air strikes against the Serbs and forced them to the bargaining table • The Dayton Peace Accords of November 1995 ended the fighting and authorized a NATO peacekeeping force of over 60,000 troops Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, left, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, center, and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, right, initial the DPA at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio

  30. Bosnia • The US participated in IFOR (Implementation Force) and SFOR (Stabilization Force) until 2004 when NATO passed the mission off to the European Union’s EUFOR • The military tasks associated with the DPA were completed within a year • Still SFOR was necessary as a security presence while civilian implementation took place

  31. Haiti • A 1991 military coup in Haiti ousted the democratically elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide • UN embargoes and other sanctions against the military government failed to bring about a return to the legitimately elected government

  32. Haiti • Thousands of Haitians fled to the US in fragile boats • In 1994, President Clinton ordered a 5,000- man force to occupy Haiti in Operation Uphold Democracy

  33. Haiti • A last minute diplomatic effort led by former President Jimmy Carter and including Senator Sam Nunn and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell was in Haiti on Sept 18 when elements of the 82nd Airborne were broadcast on TV departing Fort Bragg, NC • The synergy of this diplomatic-military effort motivated the junta to agree to a peaceful solution

  34. Haiti • Upon landing, the American force met almost no opposition and Aristide was returned to power in October • Token American and international forces remained in Haiti through 1998 maintaining order and conducting nation building operations

  35. Haiti • In 2004 an armed rebellion forced the departure of Aristide and violence and technical delays postponed democratic elections until 2006 • Haiti continues to be beset by a host of problems including being the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere • 80% of the population lives under the poverty line and 54% in abject poverty

  36. Kosovo • Ethnic Albanians comprised about 14% of Serbia’s population • Most of the Albanians lived in the province of Kosovo • Throughout the 1990s, Serbian military and police forces battled the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or UCK) • By 1998, the Serbs had embarked on a campaign to systematically cleanse Kosovo of its ethnic Albanian population Camp Stenkovich II in Macedonia held approximately 20,000 refugees.

  37. Kosovo • Diplomatic efforts centering around talks at Rambouillet, France broke down thanks to Serb intransigence • On March 24, 1999, NATO initiated Operation Allied Force in order to • Stop the Serb offensive in Kosovo, • Force a withdrawal of Serb troops from Kosovo, • Allow democratic self-government in Kosovo, • Allow a NATO-led international peacekeeping force into Kosovo, and • Allow the safe and peaceful return of Kosovar Albanian refugees.

  38. Kosovo • Still the West was unwilling to commit ground troops and Operation Allied Force was entirely an air campaign • An Army aviation task force was positioned in Albania but not used because of numerous difficulties • In one sense the KLA served as allied the ground force F-16s at Aviano Air Base, Italy preparing to launch in support of Operation Allied Force

  39. Kosovo • On June 9, 1999, Serbia agreed to a Military Technical Agreement that ended the 11-week war • On June 12, KFOR entered Kosovo under the authority of UN Security Resolution 1244 • Ironically, upon entering Kosovo, one of KFOR’s main duties was protecting the Serb minority

  40. Kosovo • Kosovo remains a difficult international problem • In 2008 Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence • On February 12, 2002 former Serbian President Milosevic went on trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. • He died in 2006 before a verdict was reached

  41. Kosovo • From an international law perspective, OAF got mixed reviews • It violated traditional principles of nonintervention and nonaggression • It could set a precedent for using military force for humanitarian reasons • It represented the use of force by a regional organization (NATO) without UN Security Council authorization

  42. The Legitimacy of Intervention • “Is there some threshold at which human rights violations become unacceptable and a state’s sovereignty no longer precludes intervention? Is it the 500th slain ethnic citizen or the next refugee after 10,000 have been forced to leave home that triggers intervention or makes it legitimate?” • Robert Tomes Holocaust victims in a mass grave

  43. Track Record of International Efforts • The United Nations Charter proclaims one of the UN’s principle purposes as being “to maintain international peace and security” • Sometimes the UN effectively intervened in these crises, sometimes it didn’t • Same for the United States • The US found that its status as world economic and military superpower would not necessarily equate to unchallenged world leadership • In the post-Cold War period the US would meet a host of new challenges within the UN and from non-governmental organizations as well as from new enemies

  44. Next • Final Exam

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