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NSLS-II Shielding Workshop. S. Buda Personnel Protective Systems March 27, 2007. Design Goals Personnel Protection System. Protects personnel from high radiation areas by preventing access and controlling radiation producing devices Linac (LPPS) Booster Ring (BPPS) Storage Ring (APPS)
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NSLS-II Shielding Workshop S. Buda Personnel Protective Systems March 27, 2007
Design Goals Personnel Protection System Protects personnel from high radiation areas by preventing access and controlling radiation producing devices • Linac (LPPS) • Booster Ring (BPPS) • Storage Ring (APPS) • Experimental Beam Lines (PSS) • RF test cell area
NSLSII Facility Hazards Linac Hazards • Accelerated electrons • Dark Current Main Ring /Booster Hazards • Radiation produced from secondary emissions in RF cavities (Both main ring and booster RF cavities) • Accelerated electrons • Synchrotron and Bremsstrahlung radiation • Oxygen Deficiency Alarm (ODH) (RF Cavity and cryo plant) Experimental Beam Lines hazards • Synchrotron and Bremsstrahlung radiation
Design Goals Personnel Protection System • Modular • Simple as possible to carry out task • Designed with testing as a key feature • Meet DOE and BNL requirements for Interlocks • Quality assurance system • Flexibility for expansion and modification • Diverse Component Selection • Ability to be upgraded with technology • Diagnostic capability
Technical Description Personnel Protection Systems • Dual chain PLC architecture (one safety rated) • Modular • Designed with testing as key consideration • Reliability and availability emphasized • Reduce wiring where possible • Use fiber optic busses for interference and security • Compatible I/O for all systems • Separate safety and command functions in beam line systems
Technical Highlights of Personnel Protection Systems • Integration of Radiation monitors with the main ring system (APPS) 40+ locations • Main ring divided into 6 separate sections for modular concept. • Main ring uses a distributed I/O system • Interface to APICS for archiving of system data • Use of safety rated PLC’s to increase reliability and diagnostic capability
Other Design Features • Interlock system must allow: • Linac operable with personnel in booster • Booster operable with personnel in storage ring • All interlock logic trees will have redundant and independent chains • The system will be fail safe for foreseeable failure modes (e.g., loss of power/pressure, open circuit, short to ground, and single component failure • Redundant circuits will not share cables and should be separated physically on circuit boards and terminal strips. Redundant systems should be configured differently.
Other Design Features (Cont.) • A rigorous configuration management program will be established to control unauthorized modifications to interlock system components • All interlock lines and components will be labeled and readily identifiable. • Testing & certification of interlock systems will be performed by independent personnel • Design for enclosure search systems will include sequenced and timed inspection stations, warning lights, audible alarms, and emergency off- switches.
SYSTEM CONFIGURATION CONTROL PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL CABLE IDENTIFICATION