1 / 21

Chinese state in crisis 1966.

Chinese state in crisis 1966. By Daniela & Lucia. Towards the confrontaition. Tensions between Mao and some of the party members were growing. Mao became frustrated by his inability to bend bureaucracy to his will.

aliza
Download Presentation

Chinese state in crisis 1966.

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Chinese state in crisis 1966. By Daniela & Lucia.

  2. Towards the confrontaition. • Tensions between Mao and some of the party members were growing. • Mao became frustrated by his inability to bend bureaucracy to his will. • Maos proposals of changing the post-GLF policies were not really taken into account. • Many senior leaders continued to support the post-GLF policies ad were reluctant to alter them.

  3. Mao’s conclusion to this… • DANGER OF REVISIONISM!!!! • He started to think that revisionism was happening among some party members. • He tried to overcome this by launching campains. • When that didn’t work he thought that arousing the masses from below into a Cultural Revolution could ovrcome this.

  4. Mao’s power base. • By 1964 the basis began to be created for an assault on the Party establishment. • This base was going to be made of three important elements: 1.The People’s Liberation Army (PLA). 2.The radical intellectuals. 3.The masses.

  5. The PLA. • Lin Biao haddevoted particular attentiontorevivingpoliticalwork in themilitaryapparatus. • Thesucessful performance of te PLA in the 60s letto Mao toidentifythe Pla as a modelforcivilianbureaucraciestofollow. • Politicaldepartmentsbasedonthose of the PLA wereformwithinthegovernmentbureaucracy. • ThisgaveLin Biao more influenceoverciviliansafairs. • February 1966 a conferenceon cultural matterswasheldhaving a greatimpactoncivilian culture circles.

  6. The intellectuals. • The person assembling these propagandists and writer was Mao’s wife, Jian Qing. • She developed contacts with two main groups the frist one she contacted with the help of Chen Boda, included: Guan Feng, Qi Benyu, and Lin Jie. • The second one contacted with the help of Ke Qingshi which included: Zhang Chunqiao (director fo the bureau), and Yao Wenyuan.

  7. As the confrotation between Mao and the Party establishment grew, the radical intellectuals turned to more political themes. • Their power would increase as Mao found that theri skills at propaganda were a useful tol in his assault.

  8. The masses. • This was conform by China’s youth especially students from highschool and college. • They formed the Red Guard movement. • The educational policies in the 1960s produced srious divisions among students. • By the eve of the Cultural Revolution what became more important for student’s ernollments was the class backround and political behaviour. • When the Cultural Revolution broke the collective resentments as well as individual divisions formed the emotional fuel for the Red Guard movement.

  9. Luo Ruiqing. • He was Lin Biao’s Principal rival. • Minister of public sequirity • Because on Lin’s illnes Luo always expected to become the minister of defense. • Luo and Lin Biao started to have problems which led the Central Commitie to carry an investigation. • After Luo’s self-criticism was rejected he tried unsuccessfully to kill himself. • And and he was dismissed from the Party.

  10. WU HAN & PENG ZHEN • Mao turned to problem of dissent amongst intellectuals • Hai Rui dismissed from office – by Wu Han (deputy mayor of Beijing) • Depicting unjust dismissal during Ming dynasty… it’s totally criticizing the purge of Peng Dehuai!! • Two-pronged approach • 1.- Assigned problem to Five-Man Group • Difficult position of responsibility for Peng • He focused on historical issues, not allegorical content • 2.- Yao Wenyuan (Jiang Qing )to prepare criticism too 5MG: 1964 – oversee beginnings of CR. Headed by Beijing Mayor Peng Zhen.

  11. WHAT HAPPENED? • Peng Zhen & Party Propaganda Department • February Outline – ‘Reason by seeking truth from fact’ • Radicals (Yao Wenyuan, Jing Qing, Lin Biao) • Article against Wu Han • Forum Summary • Cultural life in shambles, class struggle, attacked leadership • Meeting of Party Secretariat 9-12 of April 1966 • Peng attacked by Peng Zhen, Chen Boda, even Deng Xiapoing and Zhou Enlai • 5MG disbanded, establishment of new cultural group • …Liu Shaoqi away

  12. THE MAY POLITBURO MEETING • 4-18 of May 1966 • To decide fate of LuoRuiqing and Peng Zhen • Impromptu speech by Lin Biao • Lin Biao accused them of a conspiracy of a military coup • Fascinated with military in politics • Sycophantic portrayal of Mao

  13. THE RESULTS • May circular • Revoked the February Outline • Blamed Peng Zhen, dissolved 5MG & created new group to answer solely to Mao • Cultural issues AND party members (purge of revisionism) • Reorganization of Beijing Municipal Party Committee, Party Propaganda Department, and Party Secretariat • Mao determined to have his way • Mao supporters – strengthened purge against revisionism • Cultural Revolution Group (CRG): • Headed by Chen Boda, advised by Kang Sheng, membership by Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Qi Benyu, Wang Li & Guan Feng.

  14. THE FIFTY DAYS SITUATION • Mao left conduct of efforts on Liu Shaoqi • Mao SUSPICIOUS of him (revisionist, people of the Khrushchev brand) • Liu in serious dilemma! (June 1966) • Have to be on Mao’s side, but… • Still had to preserve control • Radical students and teachers began to mobilize • Dazibao (wall poster at Peking University) criticizing University • Mao opposed decision to suppress this, leadership changed • Legitimized spontaneous mass protest

  15. THE FITY DAYS • Inflammatory editorials in China’s Daily • Dazibao began to appear everywhere. Educational + revisionist issues. Encouraged by CRG • Authority on campuses collapsed, discipline eroded, CHAOS • Liu Shaoqi concerned! • Suspension of uni enrollment – reconsideration of examination system and curriculum • Work teams! 400 teams, 10,000 members… totally not controversial

  16. MORE FIFTY DAYS • Liu’s undoing came from INSTRUCTIONS of teams • Told to criticize bureaucratic officials and faculty • Ministry of finance 90% criticized, Ministry of Culture, 2/3 of officials dismissed • University administration and faculty attacked! TERROR • Told to re-establish party leadership over student movement • Demobilization of radical students • Extremes: no rallies or dazibao, expulsions from Youth League and labor reform. • Normality semi-restored, but… polarized remaining activists • Secret organizations “Red Guards” opposed work teams

  17. MORE THE FIFTY DAYS • Suppression of radicals became controversial • July 1966: case of Kuai Dafu (Qinghua University) – subject of meeting • Leading radical students. Liu Shaoqi accused him as a troublemaker • Kang Sheng defended right to criticize revisionism in Party • LINKED: Kang & CRG connected to most activists, and Liu’s wife leader of work team! • Mao Zedong saw repeated mistakes from Socialist Education Campaign in 1960s • Work teams again • Again, lower-level officials attacked and mass mobilization restricted. No recognition of revisionism

  18. BEFORE THE ELEVENTH PLENUM • Mao came back from Hangzhou… but stopped for a swim at the Yangtze river! – New China News Agency propaganda • Mao demanded withdrawal of work teams • Work teams immediately replaced by “Cultural Revolution small groups elected by teachers, students and staff at each school”

  19. THE ELEVENTH PLENUM • August 1966 • Personal matters: Promotion of Mao’s supporters and demotion of those who resisted or misread him • Policy matters: Plenum endorsed Mao’s position in ALL issues of 1960s (10 points, 23 articles) • Cultural Revolution: 16 Point Decision • To struggle & overthrow capitalist authorities, to repudiate and criticize bourgeois academics, and to transform education, literature and art to correspond with communism. “To change the mental outlook of the whole of society” • Mobilization of the masses

  20. THE RESULTS • Personal matters • Liu Shaoqi stripped from vice-chairmanship and demoted from 2nd to 8th Party hierarchy • Replaced by Lin Biao • Cultural Revolution’s 16 Points • Highly ambiguous on degree of disorder tolerated • Prohibited reprisals against students • (Zhou Enlai): Prohibited use of coercion and force • Attempted to ‘control’ CR • Mao’s dazibao • Outside of meeting room • Accusation to ‘some leading comrades’ AKA Liu and Deng

  21. THE SIGNIFICANCE • Legitimized a broad attack against the Party and the intellectual community at the personal initiative of Mao Zedong • This entailed a high degree of mass mobilization and an intense degree of political struggle

More Related