Deploying Army Forces Via Joint Seabasing Mr. Bill Rittenhouse Director, Joint Interdependency Coordination Division Arm

1. Deploying Army Forces Via Joint Seabasing Mr. Bill Rittenhouse Director, Joint Interdependency Coordination Division Army Capabilities Integration Center 29 September 2009

2. Strategic Foundation • 2008 National Defense Strategy • Cannot do everything/ function equally across the spectrum of conflict; must balance/mitigate risks • Focus on non-traditional/irregular challenges … U.S. predominance in traditional warfare is not unchallenged but sustainable for the medium term • Invest in hedging against loss/disruption of our traditional advantages vice parallel diversification, not overmatch • Emphasis on anti-access/area denial capabilities to restrict our freedom of action • Capstone Concept for Joint Operations • Joint operating environment • Foreseeable future an era of global persistent conflict • Future conflict still possible between governments, but equally likely within states and a wider variety of causes (i.e., religious and ethnic passions, government corruption, societal collapse) • Increased availability of advanced weaponry – including anti-access/area-denial capabilities • Diminishing overseas access requires peacetime engagement and forcible-entry capabilities • Continuing urbanization ( ≈ “the congested littorals”) • Army Capstone Concept • Because future enemies will seek to deny access to predictable staging bases and ports of debarkationby employing a range of strategic preclusion, operational exclusion (anti-access), and tactical access denial capabilities, Army units must be able to deploy to unpredictable sites, conduct forcible entry operations, and conduct and sustain offensive operations from and across extended distances. Forces must be configured to fight upon arrival.

3. Seabasing =Holistic Force Projection Bottom Line : The development of joint seabasing is an important initiative that presents an opportunity for improved strategic responsiveness and operational agility within an anti-access environment. Definition Seabasing is the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the JOA. These capabilities expand operational maneuver option and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea. -- Seabasing JIC By synchronizing the sea base with other means of projection, this capability increases strategic responsiveness, expands operational maneuver options throughout a campaign, and facilitates assured access and entry from the sea.

4. Seabasing Considerations • Access has become the “long pole in the tent” … but responsiveness (speed) is still important • Emergencies remain time sensitive: Disaster relief, consequence management, stopping/preventing genocide, humanitarian assistance, NEO • Early-entry deployment/employment of Army force capabilities that contribute to mitigating enemy anti-access/area denial challenges • Rapid reinforcement/reliefof deployed forces (e.g., forces conducting SFA) • Operational fluidity (rapid/repeated transition) inherent in full spectrum operations • Increased CONUS basing of Army forces requires longer transit times • Diplomacy / building a compelling political case for action may place a premium on rapid response • Time creates opportunities for enemy information operations • Unless/until advanced, austere-access capabilities are developed, the bulk of Army forces will need developed air and sea ports • Major ports must be secured … and will remain predictable • The sea base will need to provide necessary “strike” and “shield” capabilities • Its not just getting there … its what you need to do after you get there – must prepare for sustained operations • Seabasing is more than JFEO … it has value throughout the spectrum of operations

5. The Airborne Brigade Task Force (ABTF) Joint Forcible Entry Capabilities X 6 Airborne Brigade Combat Teams Worldwide Reach: N-Hour deployment capable (18 hours) *X-Hour allows for positioning for Air Force lift assets Rapid deployment-> Forcible Entry->Secure lodgment-> Allows for follow on forces INC Seabased forces • Strategic Capabilities For Worldwide Deployment in support of national objectives. Conducts: • Forcible Entry • Full-Spectrum combat for AIR, GROUND, and SEA Operations • Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) • Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief Operations (HA/DR) • Stability Operations • Show of Force as part of a flexible Deterrent Option • Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) X4 (BCTs) The ABTF Can serve as the ARFOR Component of a JTF in support of COCOM Campaign plan 3,500 Paratroopers Combined Arms &Joint Enablers x • FORSCOM • Aviation Task Force • EOD • Asymmetric Warfare Group TM • 555th ABN Signal CO (Combat Camera) • Linguists • JIEDDO (Joint IED Defeat • Organization), CEXC (Combined • Explosives Exploitation Cell) • XVIII ABN Corps • 18th Fires (HIMARS & M777) • 20th ENG (LARP) • 44th MED BDE (541st Forward • Surgical Teams) • 16th MP BDE (Company) • 108th ADA • 49th PAD • USASOC • 4TH PSYOP Group • 95th Civil Affairs BDE • Access to • Interagency Expertise • Rule of Law SMEs • USAID • EPRT’s • State Dept • FBI • DEA • ATF • USACE • USJFCOM • (Joint Enabler Capabilities) • ABN C4SI Platform • ALO • JTAC • CRG-E • STS • Electronic Warfare Capability • WIT (Weapons Intelligence Team) • augmentation • USTRANSCOM • USAF Airlift Capability (C17s, C130s, JACC/CP, Re-fueling Tankers) • USN Sea Lift Capability *Assumption: The ABTF higher HQ (JTF) will provide Close Air Support (CAS) and Other Joint Enabler Capabilities (e.g. ISR platforms)

6. Army Perspective – Past, Present and Future OIF • Arriving by sea is an Army core competency • Increasing anti-access / area-denial environment = less dependence on developed air and sea ports. Today Haiti, Somalia, OEF Early 1960s- Vietnam Via landing craft during early stages 1950 Inchon, Korea 1944 Normandy While SPEED is still important ASSURED ACCESS has become the key driver 1917 AEF 1898 Daiquiri, Cuba …and ASSURED ACCESS is NOT limited to JFEO … it applies throughout the operational spectrum and each campaign phase 1862 Peninsula Campaign How can Army forces be deployed without established air and sea ports? 1847 Vera Cruz Landing

7. Joint Seabasing-related “Big Ideas” Joint High Speed Sealift/ Austere Access (JHSS)* Maritime Preposition Force-Future (MPF-F) Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) (programmed) Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB)* Joint Future Theater Lift (JFTL)* * Conceptual drawings. Solutions to be determined.

8. ESG ESG F F F Deploying Army Forces: JFEO and SeabasingWhen and Why Noncombatant Evacuation Pakistan Secure Weapons of Mass Destruction Lebanon F F F F F F F F F Nigeria MVM MVM STOM F F SEABASE F STOM Support to Counter-Insurgency Nigeria Ensure Freedom of Navigation Strait of Hormuz Strait of Malacca An ‘Arc of Instability’ … marked by 15 United Nations Peacekeeping Missions 30 Current Armed Conflicts 28 Department of State Travel Warnings 10 Forbes’ Most Dangerous Destinations 35 Failed States 8 Global choke points F

9. Discussion TopicsPotential Mitigating Factors • Include a standing 24/7 requirement for Joint Forcible Entry Operations in the Joint Strategic Capability Plan (JSCP) • Should SECDEF/JCS direct dedicated assets (i.e., Air Wing, airborne C2, tankers)? • Should Army dedicate assets (i.e., support modules)? • Demonstrate the full spectrum value of joint seabasing • Work together to emphasize that joint seabasing is MORE than joint forcible entry • Advance the need for S&T / R&D funding for advanced lift (JFTL, JHSS) • Within our respective Services • With the Air Force • Elevate joint seabasing and forcible entry as national capabilities • How do we address with COCOMs? JCS? OSD? • Consider Mounted Vertical Maneuver as complementary to Ship-to-Objective Maneuver • Mitigate risk in the near term • COCOMs: Engage with allies & other friendly nations to ensure forward support bases • Navy/Air Force: Defeat anti-access/area denial capabilities • USMC Expeditionary Strike Groups + Army Airborne: Secure air/sea ports • Army: Be prepared to transition from expeditionary to sustained operations

10. Questions?

11. Backup slides

12. F F F F F F F F F F An ‘Arc of Instability…’ The “stans” Pakistan Strait of Malacca Lebanon The challenge We must balance/mitigate risks … we cannot do everything / function equally across the spectrum of conflict The drivers Responsiveness Assured access Persistent conflict Nigeria Sudan, Chad Tri-Border Area Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay … marked by 15 United Nations Peacekeeping Missions, 30 Current Armed Conflicts, 28 Department of State Travel Warnings, Forbes’ 10 Most Dangerous Destinations, and 35 Failed States 12

13. Road Network 30K Km of paved road 25K Km of gravel roads 52K Km of unimproved roads Characterized as hazardous due to pedestrian traffic and disrepair Railway Operations 3.5 Km of single line 1-meter gauge track Primarily serves agriculture, ranching and mining operations Seaports Lagos: Not LMSR capable due to shallow channel depth (25 feet) Other vessels types: Container Ships (3), JHSV (6), SEABEE and LASH Barges, and shallow draft container and RORO vessels. Port Harcourt Not LMSR Capable (Pier Berthing Depth – 23 feet) JHSV (13), SEABEE and LASH Barges, and shallow draft container and RORO shore petroleum terminals Warri – Shallow draft, infrastructure supports oil export operations (22 feet) Calabar - Shallow Draft (23 feet) Airfield Improved Airfield Unimproved Runway Length 0-1500 Runway Length 1500-3000 Runway Length 3000-6000 Runway Length 6000+ Abuji Lagos 0 100 200 300 400 Kilometer Strategic and Operational Mobility Analysis 16 USAF Surveyed Inter-Theater Airfields 19 Non-surveyed Potential Inter or Intra Theater Airfields Cross Country Mobility Ground Transportation Network 62 Airfields with Potential to Support Operations 10 3000K or less Runways with Potential Tactical Application 12 Potential C130/C17 Tactical Unimproved Airfields 50Km Operational Radius C17 C17 C5 C17 C5 C17 C17 C5 C17 MAY use tactical tracked vehicles and lightly armored vehicles (LAV) or foot travel C17 C17 Only 24% of Nigeria within 50Km of an airfield (C130/C17 capable) C5 REQUIRES tactical 4X4 and tracked vehicles or foot C17 C17 IMPASSABLE by vehicle – dense rain forest; jungle; or mountainous with steep cliffs C17 C17