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One-parameter mechanisms, with an application to the SPT problem

One-parameter mechanisms, with an application to the SPT problem. The private-edge Shortest-Paths Tree (SPT) problem.

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One-parameter mechanisms, with an application to the SPT problem

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  1. One-parameter mechanisms, with an application to the SPT problem

  2. The private-edge Shortest-Paths Tree (SPT) problem • Given: an undirected graph G=(V,E) such that each edge is owned by a distinct player, and a source node s; we assume that player’s private type is the positive cost (length) of the edge, and her valuation function is equal to her negatedtype if edge is selected in the solution, and 0 otherwise. • Question: design a truthful mechanism in order to find a shortest-path tree rooted at s in Gt=(V,E,t).

  3. More formally… • F: set of all spanning trees of G rooted at s • For any TF • f(t,T)= argmindT(s,v) where║e║ is the set of source-nodepaths in T containingedgee = arg minte║e║ eE(T) TF TF vV On the other hand, ve(te,T)=-te if eE(T), 0 otherwise (this models the multicast protocol) f(t,T)argmax  ve(te,T) non-utilitarian problem! TF eE(T)

  4. One-parameter MD problems • Type owned by each player i is a single parameter ti • The valuation function of player i is vi(ti,o)= ti wi(o) where wi(o)≥0is the workload for i w.r.t. output o. Notice that for the sake of simplifying the notation, we are now assuming that the valuation function is positive, and so in the following we will invert – and +, and maxwith min

  5. The SPT problem is one-parameter • First of all, the typeowned by each player is a single real-valuenumber • Second, the valuationfunction of a player w.r.t. to a tree T is: • ve(te,T)= i.e., ve(te,T)= tewe(T), where te if e  E(T) Multicast protocol 0 otherwise 1 if e  E(T) we(T)= otherwise 0  The SPT problem is a one-parameter problem!

  6. A necessary condition for designing OP truthful mechanisms Theorem (R.B. Myerson, 1981) A mechanism M=<g,p> for a minimization one-parameter problem is truthful only if g is monotone, i.e.,  player i, wi(g(r-i,ri)) is non-increasing w.r.t. ri, for every r-i=(r1,…,ri-1, ri+1,…,rN).

  7. One-parameter mechanisms For the sake of simplifying the notation: We will write wi(r) in place of wi(g(r)) We will write pi(r) in place of pi(g(r)) Definition: A one-parameter (OP) mechanism is a pair M=<g,p> such that: • g: is anymonotone algorithm for the underlying one-parameter problem ri • pi(r)=hi(r-i) + ri wi(r) - ∫wi(r-i,z) dz 0 hi(r-i): arbitrary function independent of ri

  8. Truthfulness of OP-mechanisms Theorem 2: An OP-mechanism for an OP-problem is truthful. Proof: We show that the utility of a player ican only decrease when i lies Payment returned to i (when she reports ri) is: ri pi(r) =hi(r-i) + ri wi(r) - ∫ wi(r-i,z) dz 0 Indipendent of ri We can set hi(r-i)=0 (notice this will produce negative utilities)

  9. wi(r-i,x) x Proof (cont’d) ti ti • ui(ti,g(r-i,ti))= pi(r-i,ti)-vi(ti, g(r-i,ti))= tiwi(r-i,ti)-∫ wi(r-i,z) dz-tiwi(r-i,ti)=-∫ wi(r-i,z) dz • If i reports x>ti: • Her valuation becomes: C= tiwi(r-i,x) • Her payment becomes: P= xwi(r-i,x) - ∫ wi(r-i,z) dz  ui(ti,g(r-i,x))= P-C i is loosing G 0 0 x 0 The true utility is equal to this negated area The payment is equal to this negated area wi(r-i,ti) -P G wi(r-i,ri) C ti

  10. Proof (cont’d) ti 0 • ui(ti,g(r-i,ti))=-∫ wi(r-i,z) dz • If i reports x<ti • Her valuation becomes C= tiwi(r-i,x) • Her payment becomes P=xwi(r-i,x) -∫wi(r-i,z) dz ui(ti,g(r-i,x))= P-C i is loosing G x 0 The payment is equal to this negated area -P G wi(r-i,x) Player i has no incentive to lie! wi(r-i,ti) C wi(r-i,ri) x ti

  11. On the hi(r-i) function Once again, we want to guarantee voluntary participation (VP) But when player i reports ri, her payment is: ri pi(r) =hi(r-i)+ ri wi(r) -∫ wi(r-i,z) dz 0 ∞ ∫ wi(r-i,z) dz, the payment becomes: If we set hi(r-i)= 0 ∞ pi(r) =ri wi(r) + ∫ wi(r-i,z) dz ri  The utility of player i when reporting the true becomes: ∞ ui(ti,g(r)) =∫ wi(r-i,z) dz ≥ 0. ti

  12. Summary: VCG vs OP • VCG-mechanisms: arbitrary valuation functions and types, but only utilitarian problems • OP-mechanisms: arbitrary social-choice function, but only one-parameter types and workloaded valuation functions • If a problem is both utilitarian and one-parameter VCG and OP coincide!

  13. A one-parameter mechanism for the private-edge SPT problem

  14. The one-parameter SPT problem • F: set of spanning tree rooted at s • For any T  F • f(t,T)= argmindT(s,v) =  te║e║ • ve(te,T)= i.e., ve(te,T)= tewe(T), with vV TF eE(T) te if e  E(T) Multicast protocol 0 otherwise 1 if e  E(T) we(T)= otherwise 0

  15. A corresponding one-parameter mechanism • MSPT= <g,p> • g: given the input graph G, the source node s, and the reported types r, compute an SPT SG(s) of G=(V,E,r) by using Dijkstra’s algorithm; • p: for every e  E, letae denote the player owning edge e, and let r(e) be her reported type. Then, the payment for ae is: ∞ pe(r)=r(e)we(r) +∫we(r-e,z) dz so that VP is guaranteed. r(e)

  16. MSPT is truthful MSPT is truthful, since it is an OP-mechanism. Indeed, Dijkstra’s algorithm is monotone, since the workload for ae has always the following shape: 1 Өe : threshold value • whereӨeis the valuesuchthat, once fixed r-e: • if ae reports at most Өe, then e is selected in the SPT • if ae reports more than Өe, then e is not selected in the SPT

  17. On the payments • pe=0, if e is not selected • pe=Өe, if e is selected 1 Өe : threshold value r(e) r(e) ∞ pe=r(e) we(r) + ∫ we(r-e,z) dz = 0+0 = 0 r(e) ∞ pe=r(e) we(r) + ∫ we(r-e,z) dz = r(e)+ Өe -r(e)= Өe r(e)

  18. On the threshold values for the SPT problem Let e=(u,v) be an edge in SG(s) (with u closer to s than v) • eremains in SG(s) untileisused to reach v from s  Өe=dG-e(s,v)-dG(s,u) Example r(e)=1 r(e)=3-ε r(e)=3+ε s s s 1 1 1 Өe = 3 u u u 2 2 2 e e e 1 3+ε 3-ε 6 6 6 v v v 2 2 2 3 3 3

  19. A trivial solution to find Өe e=(u,v) SG(s) werun the Dijkstra’salgorithm on G-e=(V,E\{e},r) to finddG-e(s,v) Time complexity: k=n-1 edgesmultiplied by O(m + n log n) time: O(mn + n2 log n) time The improvedsolutionwillcostasmuchas: O(m + n log n) time

  20. Definition of Өe s u x e f v y dG-e(s,v)= min {dG(s,x)+r(f)+dG(y,v)} f=(x,y)C(e)

  21. Definition of Өe (cont’d) • Computing dG-e(r,v) (and then Өe) is equivalent to finding edge f* such that: f*= arg min {dG(s,x)+r(f)+dG (y,v)} f=(x,y)C(e) = arg min {dG(s,x)+r(f)+dG (y,v)+dG(s,v)} f=(x,y)C(e) = arg min {dG(s,x)+r(f)+dG(s,y)} Since dG(s,v) is independent of f f=(x,y)C(e) call it k(f) Observation: k(f) is a value univocally associated with edge f: it is the same for all the edges of SG(s) forming a cycle with f when f is added to SG(s)

  22. Definition of k(f) s u x e f v y k(f) = dG(s,x)+r(f)+dG(s,y)

  23. Computing the threshold • Once again, webuild a transmuter (w.r.t. SG(s)), wherenowsinknodes are labelled with k(f) (instead of w(f) as in the MST case), and weprocess the transmuter in reversetopologicalorder • At the end of the process, everyedgee  SG(s) willremainassociated with itsreplacementedge f*, and Өe= (k(f*)-dG(s,v)) - dG(s,u) • Time complexity: O(m (m,n)), once thatdGare given dG-e(s,v)

  24. Analysis Theorem MSPT can be implemented in O(m + n log n) time. Proof: Time complexity of g: O(m + n log n) (Dijkstra with Fibonacci Heaps) Computing all the payments costs: O(m (m,n))=O(m + n log n) time Since (m,n) is constant when m=(n log log n)

  25. This is the end My only friend, the end… (The Doors, 1967) Thanks for your attention!

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