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COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE, MUMBAI - 400 001  15 th Naval Higher Command Course December 2 nd 2002

COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE, MUMBAI - 400 001  15 th Naval Higher Command Course December 2 nd 2002 CHINA’S STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION : AN ANALYSIS OF ITS GLOBAL STRATEGIC IMPACT Dr. W.LAWRENCE S.PRABHAKAR, Ph.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE, MUMBAI - 400 001  15 th Naval Higher Command Course December 2 nd 2002

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  1. COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE, MUMBAI - 400 001  15th Naval Higher Command Course December 2nd 2002 CHINA’S STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION : AN ANALYSIS OF ITS GLOBAL STRATEGIC IMPACT Dr. W.LAWRENCE S.PRABHAKAR, Ph.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE MADRAS CHRISTIAN COLLEGE CHENNAI.

  2. Influences of SunZi, Confucius, Menicus on Chinese Strategic Thought: Strategic Culture – The most viable method to understand Chinese Strategic Thought. - Civilizational Antiquity - Unique Historical Dynamics - Unique Geo-Strategic Location - Unique Lingual Cultural Heritage Sustenance of Strategic Culture over 5000 years - SunZi, The Art of War - Confucius, The Analects - Predominant Strategic Paradigm of China: Confucius – Menicus Pragamatism Concept of Absolute Flexibility Concept of The Three Heavens Concept of The Middle Kingdom

  3. Salient Principles of Chinese Strategic Thought: - Deception – The Essence of all Warfare Subtlety, Sophistication, Maneuver, Covert Operations and the Indirect Approach - Centrality of Armed Forces Political and Praetorian Purposes Political Power Flows from the Barrel of the Gun - Human Dimensions of Conflict Primacy of Man Over Material Primacy of Spirit and Life Energy Over Matter - Essence of Counter Strategy Significance of Winning Over the Adversary by negation of his Strategy Primacy of Spirit and Life Energy Over Matter - People’s War – Total War (MaoTseTung) People’s War Under Hi-Tech Conditions (Limited War: Conventional and Nuclear Forces) - Primacy of Human Force Over Technology Motivation, Resilience, Élan Vital

  4. China’s Changing Strategic Doctrines - Dominant Elite in the Post 1949 Era: MaoTseTung; DengXiaoPing; Jiang Zemin MaoTseTung – Revolutionary & Radical Militarism; People’s War; Nuclear Weapons – Paper Tigers DengXiaoPing: Pragmatic Flexibility; Four Modernizations; Primacy of Economy and Technology Five Changing Paradigms: - Debate of Ideologue Vs the Technocrat (MaoTseTung) - Integration of Defence and Development (DengXiaoPing) - Struggle against Nuclear Hegemony (US and Soviet/Russian Domination) - Shift from Disarmament to Nonproliferation - New Paradigms of Chinese Nuclear Activism

  5. Strategic Determinants of Chinese Behaviour in the Modernization Period - Pursuit of Comprehensive National Power Economic Technological Strength: Basis for Strategic Power - Sovereignty Concerns Taiwan Reunification; Disputes in the South China Sea; Conflict over Resources in the Region Zealous preservation of vital National Interest - Regime Maintenance: Preservation of Political Power; Monopoly of Communist Party: Consolidation of Economic Strength under Authoritarian Regimes - Dissatisfaction with Current International Order China – Dissatisfied Power; Penchant for Power Expansion; Anti-Hegemonic Defiance of US Hegemonic Power Quest for Multi-Polarity or Align with US as peer Partner - Sino – US condonmium

  6. Factors Affecting Chinese Strategic Behaviour - Acculturation to International Order Assumption that China would reform to International Order; Induction of China into WTO would “soften” their aggressive behaviour - Democratization: Spread of Liberal Democracy – Hub for Political Reform; Rule of Law, Economic Liberalization, Free Markets, Structural Reform - Future of the PLA – Vanguard of the Regime; Bolster the Regime in event of Crisis of Governance Dynamics of PLA Modernization - PLA Strategic Strengths Sizeable Conventional Forces 2.8 million compared to 1.4 million US; 1.2 million Russia Man power Reduction and Technological modernization Induction of New Weapon Systems: Technology intensive drive - Strategic Nuclear Capability: ICBMs DF-31 (10-20) IRBMs & MRBMs (DF-4, DF-5, DF-3) - MIRV capability – GPS/GLONASS/Twin Star

  7. Nuclear Naval Arsenal - Xia Class SSBNs; Han Class; Ming Class; Song Class Nuclear SSNs Julang Class SLBMs; JL-1; JL-2, Modified Xia Class tipped with JL-2 - Chemical & Biological Weapons China signatory of 1972 Chemical & Biological Conventions; Clandestine C&B Warfare Capabilities Creation of Anti-C&B Warfare Units - Surface to Surface Missiles Substantial Chinese Inventory of SSMs: Missiles – Weapons of Quick Resort; Intimidation Tactics; Icons of Chinese Commercial Military Sales Missile Modernization; Improved Payloads; Increased Accuracy; GPS Guidance; Variable NBC Payloads Geographical Terrain - China’s Geographical Terrain suited for Guerilla Warfare – People’s War High Levels of Attrition against Invading force - Causality Tolerance; Willingness to absorb High Causality; Korean War – 300,000 to 1 million

  8. PLA – Strategic Weakness - Obsolete Equipment; Ex-Soviet Vintage Mig19’s (J-6), Mig21’s (J-7), T-54,T-55, Ex-Soviet MBT – Chinese Type 59, Type 62 MBTs PLA Navy Warships, Ex-Soviet Riga Type frigate - Jianghu Class Frigate: Ex-Soviet Whiskey, Romeo Class SS adapted in Chinese Models - Poor Logistics Obsolescent Air and Naval Logistical Capabilities; Defensive Nature of Military Campaign; Improvements in the anvil; Procurement and Buildup of Logistical Air & Naval Craft - Command, Control & Communications Deficiencies Lack of Hi-speed, Hi-bandwidth redundant communication system; Geographical Spread – Infrastructure weakness, Obsolescent Equipment Advancement in C4I2SR Capabilities as a result of RMA Chinese RMA – Quantum Leap in this Sector - Poor Quality of Personnel & Training: Less Premium on Personnel training, Less Time on Simulated Combat Operations; Lack of Joint Service Training

  9. Pathways in China’s Military Modernization - Two Pathways of Military Modernizations – Procurement from Foreign sources – Various Technologies; Limited Means; Divergent Operating Platforms Operational Difficulties; Problems of Maintenance & Training; Complications of Hardware Induction; Problems in License Production – Attempts to Reverse Engineering - Home Grown Technologies – Mass Production of Licensed Technologies, Mixed Results, Problems of Quality Control; Technological Lag; Attempts to Hybridize Technology - Nuclear Weapons: Initial Soviet Assistance; Self-reliance & Indigenous Technological Innovation - Ballistic Missiles: Range of Chinese Ballistic Missiles; Chinese Specialization in IRBM & MRBM production and Mass Export DF-11 (SRBM) to DF-51(ICBM); Development of Solid propellants; MIRV Capabilities; - Cruise Missiles primarily antiship variety Ex-Soviet

  10. - HY-1 First Chinese Cruise Missile based on SS-N2A STYX YJ-1 or C-801 Solid Propellant Booster, 40 Km Range based on French Exocet – Similar Design YJ-2 or C-802 Solid Propellant Sustainer, 120 Km Range YJ-2 Land Attack Version/GPS equipped 180 Km with TERCOM capabilities; Induction of SS-N-22/23 M80 SUNBURN/MOSKIT equipped on Russian supplied Sovremenny Class destroyers - Nuclear Submarines: 5 Han-Class SSNs; 1 Xia-Class SSBN; Type 093 SSN modeled after Ex-Soviet Victor III SSN & Type 094 SSN - SAMS: HQ-2 Medium to High Altitude, Radar Guided Ex-Soviet SA-2; HQ-7 Low to Medium Altitude Radar Guided; Ex-French Crotale; HN-5 Shoulder Portable Infra-Red Ex-Soviet SA-7; QW1 Advanced Shoulder Portable Infra Red Ex-US FIM-92 Stinger; HQ-61 Low to Medium Altitude; LY-60 Low to Medium Altitude; HQ-9 Advanced All Altitude – SA-10; PAC Patriot - New Fighter Attack Air Craft: Current PLAAF J-10 High Performance Single Engine FGA produced with Israeli & Russian Assistance; High-Low Mix Preference

  11. - Future Generation FGA-XXJ of SU27 and F-15 Class IOY – 2015 Others Strategic Programs - Chinese Space Launch Capabilities: Wide Variety of Space Payloads: Meteorological, Communications, Surveillance; New Generation of Photo Reconnaissance FSW-3 Series with 1 m Resolution; Linkages with US Landsat; French SPOT; Israeli EROS and Russian Remote Sensing Satellites; Chinese Participation in Iridium, Globalstar Satellite Communication Systems; Partnership in US GPS/ Russian GLONASS System - Directed Energy Weapons: New R&D into High- Powered Micro Wave Weapons and Lasers; Advance Research into Electronic Counter Measures - Information Warfare: Secret Chinese Efforts in Offensive & Defensive Strategies in IW

  12. SEA POWER PERSPECTIVES OF CHINA: SPECIFIC CONTEXT TO IOR, INDIA AND SOUTH ASIA • PLA Naval Modernization and expansion: • Brown water to Green water capability: Future Projections to Blue Water Capability: Offshore Defense Concept. • Sino-South Asian Maritime links : Provides China’s link to East Africa and Straits of Hormuz • Port Calls; Karachi, Colombo, Chittagong. • Economic aid, technical assistance,military hardware supplies for low budget South Asian States/allies on concessional terms • Sustained covert transfer of WMD technologies to Pakistan • Pakistan Myanmar anchors for China in the South Asian Region - striving to neutralize India • Karachi, Gawadar in Pakistan ; Hainggyi Katan islands Great Cocos in Myanmar. • Role of COSCO in PLAN activities • Future potential to base PLAN nuclear subs in the Arabian Sea SSN/SSGN access to Pakistan

  13. PLA NAVAL STRATEGY: SPECIFIC CONTEXTS TO IOR, INDIA & SOUTH ASIA • Naval diplomacy: Port calls, joint naval exercises in the region • Naval basing facilities: Access to Gawadar in Pakistan, Yangon Hainggyi Akyab Mergui, Great Coco islands off Andaman Sea. SIGINT/ELINT facilities. • Chinese arms transfers : Massive military hardware supplies to Myanmar and Pakistan. • China is comfortable with the authoritarian regimes in Pakistan and Myanmar: • Bolsters them with arms transfers for political security reasons • Objective: Tilt regional balance against India with tactical alliances and gain naval access in the region / Regional Naval alliance • Control of Seagates: Beijing’s objective is to control the critical sea straits: Taiwan straits, Straits of Malacca, Singapore Straits and possibly uninterrupted access to the Straits of Hormuz. • Apparent intent; Rapid surge into the Indian Ocean via Straits of Malacca access to Myanmar and Pakistan. • Integrated Sea Control Strategy Offshore Defense Concept: Limited Sea control and Sea Denial capability through assortment of limited numbers of high performance surface combatants and submarines. • Possible deployment of SSNs and SSGNs in the region.

  14. SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS: IN BEIJING’S INTEREST • April 2001 Pakistan-Bangladesh joint naval exercises followed by a Pakistan naval squadron visiting Yangon • Pakistan’s naval flotilla the first ever foreign naval flotilla to visit Yangon precedes Gen.Pervez Musharaff’s visit to Yangon • Implications of the new Pakistan - Bangladesh naval ties: • Recent sour in India-Bangladesh relations/ Border skirmishes. Bangladesh military’s traditional hostility to India. • Future possibilities: Pakistan’s naval ships could dock in Myanmar waters during a possible conflict with India. • Pakistani naval surveillance of Indian Naval activities in the Eastern / Far Eastern Naval Command • Sino-Pakistani monitoring of telemetry data of Indian missile tests from Balasore Chandipur Missile test ranges.

  15. Source: Reported Chinese Arms Purchases: RAND Research Report MR-1082-AF

  16. THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: THE FUTURE SUPER POWER - Multi-Dimensional Regional Competitor - Regional Aerospace Dominance - Regional and Off-Shore Naval Power Projection - Increased Defense Spending - Emphasis on Quality Vs Quantity - Mature Defense Industrial Base Rationalization of Defense - Industrial Production Selective Integration of Foreign High Technology Development of Technology Work Force Long Range Strategic R&D Vision - Regional Hegemony; Enhanced Global Status - Enhanced Chinese WMD Warfare Capabilities - Ambitious Space Faring Power - Determined Long Range Power Projection

  17. CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGIES: CHINA AND US: >Chinese perceptions of its emergent power status. >Emphasis on the development of Comprehensive National Power(CNP) >Emphasis on development of RMA technologies. >Chinese strategies of Cooptation and Prevention: Dual policies vis-à-vis US. >Economic engagement with US: China’s constant endeavor to weaken US Bilateral relations >China’s entry to WTO: facilitation by US >Post 9/11 developments: US-China convergence. >New US Strategic perceptions of China in post-Quadrennial Review Report 2001

  18. CHINA and INDIA: • Sino-Indian relations: A contest of the Asian Balance of Power. • China’s Strategic domain has overwhelming influence on India: domestic & external realms. • Strategies of Engagement: CSBMs; Trade;Counter terrorism. • Indian Deterrence & Power: Response to Chinese renewed aggrandizement.Nuclear and Missile postures.:Limitations are inherent. • Multilateral Grand Strategic Alliances: US, EU, Russia, Japan. • India‘ Expanded ties with ASEAN: Counter balance PRC’s influence.

  19. China & Russia: Bilateral Issues: Contentious, overspill could aggravate tensions. Military-Technological Cooperation: Positive signs; Sino-Russian Strategic alliance counter to US NMD, unilateralism. Scenarios of Change: I China succeeds Reforms; Transforms into hegemonistic power.Russian interests affected. II.China’s reforms collapse: instability/ local wars. III Sino-Russian alliance against a hegemonistic US. Sino-Russian Strategic Understanding 2001.

  20. China & ASEAN: Economics & Security:forces of unity and divergence. Pragmatism and Realism: Hallmarks of ASEAN-PRC relations ASEAN concerns of PLA Modernization and Regional security. Local wars and Strategic Symbolism of PLA force postures: Missile reality ASEAN Engagement of PRC in regional peace stakes Good Regional Atmospherics. ASEAN & PRC Multilateral security framework.

  21. China & ASEAN: Economics & Security:forces of unity and divergence. Pragmatism and Realism: Hallmarks of ASEAN-PRC relations ASEAN concerns of PLA Modernization and Regional security. Local wars and Strategic Symbolism of PLA force postures: Missile reality ASEAN Engagement of PRC in regional peace stakes Good Regional Atmospherics. ASEAN & PRC Multilateral security framework.

  22. CHINA & RMA. Asymmetric Warfare;CNP, Economic-Technological quantum leaps; New Technologies and Weapons systems: smart weaponry and nano-technology Space combat;Radiational combat;Paralysis combat; Cyber warfare;Robot combat Intelligent warfare: Assassins Mace

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