tobaccocontrol

1. TC Online Presentations www.tobaccocontrol.com This presentation has been supported by a grant to Tobacco Control from The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation

2. TEENAGERS, SMOKING ANDTRANSNATIONAL TOBACCO CORPORATIONS Evidence from tobacco industry documents

3. Perry CL. The tobacco industry and underage youth smoking: tobacco industry documents from the Minnesota litigation. Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med 1999;153:935–41. • ASH UK. Danger! PR in the playground. London: ASH UK and the Cancer Research Campaign, 2000. http://www.ash.org.uk/html/advspo/html/prmenu.html. • Pollay RW. Targeting youth and concerned smokers: evidence from Canadian tobacco industry documents. Tobacco Control 2000;9:136–47. • Cummings KM, Morley CP, Horan JK, et al. Marketing to America’s youth: evidence from corporate documents. Tobacco Control 2002;11(supplI):i5–17. • Carter, SM. From legitimate consumers to public relations pawns: the tobacco industry and young Australians. Tobacco Control 2003;12(suppl III):iii71-78

4. TEENAGERS and TOBACCO CONTROL • Transition to regular smoking typically occurs well before age 18 • Half of smoking teenagers become lifetime smokers • Half of lifetime smokers die prematurely from smoking related illnesses • Protection of teenagers from corporate wiles is thus a natural theme for advocacy

5. TEENAGERS and THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY • Industry documents, observational studies and advocacy have exposed a history of deliberate industry targeting of young teenagers in research and marketing • Transnational tobacco corporations (TTCs) now have a major image problem, particularly in their older markets • TTCs are criticised for their international expansionism • TTCs know that teenagers are a “hot topic” in tobacco control advocacy and a major issue for policymakers and stakeholders

6. INDUSTRY RESPONSE? • Transition from marketing strategies to issues management/ public relations (PR) strategies • “Voluntary marketing codes”, “Youth smoking prevention” (YSP) and “youth access programs” now part of TTCs’ PR platforms • These programs intended to buy legitimacy, particularly in highly restricted markets • Teenagers aggressively targeted with marketing the moment they turn 18, even in highly restricted markets

7. THE EVIDENCE Transnational tobacco corporations targeting teenagers in marketing and research

8. Apples connote goodness and freshness and we see many possibilities for our youth oriented cigarette with this flavor… It’s a well known fact that teenagers like sweet products. Honey might be considered. Project report to Brown & Willamson Sept 1972BATES 170042014

9. Study of prevalence of smoking a pack a day in 12-17 year olds. Philip Morris March 1973BATES 2041761792-1796

10. Interviews with 1050 under-24 year olds, including 620 with under-18 year olds Studied brand image and brand preferences Research report for Philip Morris Incorporated by the Roper Organisation Jan 1974BATES 1002646151/6185

11. Our marketing objective [is] to increase our young adult franchise. To ensure increased and longer-term growth for CAMEL FILTER, the brand must increase its share penetration among the 14-24 age group which have a new set of more liberal values and which represent tomorrow's cigarette business. RJReynolds Jan 1975BATES 505775557

12. In my opinion, the decline in Marlboro’s growth rate is due to four factors: • Slower growth in the number of 15-19 year olds • The recession • Price increases in 1974 • Changing brand preferences of younger smokers… • My own data… shows [high] market penetration among 15-17 year olds • Philip Morris USA • May 1975 BATES 1003285497-5502

13. The brands which … beginning smokers accept and use will become the dominant brands in future years. Evidence is now available to indicate that the 14 to 18 year old group is an increasing segment of the smoking population. RJR-T must soon establish a successful new brand in this market if our position in the industry is to be maintained over the long term. RJR Tobacco (USA) Research Department report March 1976 BATES 500251940/1959

14. Kim is clearly regarded as an entirely different offer to Alpine. It seems to be positioned in a younger age segment (16-23 years). While this finding on the surface would seem to have negative implications in terms of the brands ability to attract the 'older' Alpine smoker, it is felt that a real opportunity exists to hone in on the younger age group and in the longer term cut off the source of supply to Alpine… A research programme is... recommended prior to the Queensland/NSW launch which will explore the life style of the 16-23 year old woman smoker: her needs, motives, fears etc... Kim diagnostic research report Dec 1976 WD&HO Wills Australia

15. The Australian Tobacco Industry 1976 Bates 502814751/4756

16. Canadian market research with 16-17 year olds: project 16 and project plus/minus • Why do young people start smoking and how do they feel about smoking • Most “serious efforts to learn to smoke” occur between ages 12 and 13 • Students distance themselves from advice against smoking • Students want to stop but can’t Research for Imperial Tobacco Canada 1977 and 1982BATES 566627751/7824

17. The base of our business is the high school student Lorillard document Aug 1978 BATES 03537131-03537132

18. RJReynolds research report examining trends in smokers as young as 14 July 1980 BATES 500794841/4843

19. ‘It is important to know as much as possible about teenage smoking patterns and attitudes. Today’s teenager is tomorrow’s potential regular customer, and the overwhelming majority of smokers first begin to smoke while still in their teens...It is during the teenage years that the initial brand choice is made...The smoking patterns of teenagers are particularly important to Philip Morris...’ Philip Morris USA report March 1981 BATES 1000390803/0855

20. Lorillard research report examining trends in smokers as young as 13 Nov 1981 BATES 03926040-6042

21. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 Brown and Williamson analysis of age of starters with data commencing age 12 Oct 1983 BATES 670579884/9946

22. Younger adult smokers have been the critical factor in the growth and decline of every major brand and company over the last 50 years. They will continue to be just as important to brands/companies in the future for two simple reasons. The renewal of the market stems almost entirely from 18-year-old smokers. No more than 5% of smokers start after age 24. The brand loyalty of 18-year-old smokers far outweighs any tendency to switch with age. Thus, the annual influx of 18-year-old smokers provides an effortless momentum to successful "first brands". RJR Strategic Research Report Marketing development department Feb 1984 BATES 501928462-501928550

23. The 1982-83 round of price increases … prevented 600,000 teenagers from starting to smoke … 420,000 of the non-starters would have been PM smokers… we were hit disproportionately hard. We don't need to have that happen again. Philip Morris USA Sept 1987 BATES 2022216179/6180

24. Philip Morris International define 18-25 year olds as their “key target group” May 1989 BATES2500114197/4202

25. In response Leo Burnett conduct an extensive international study of the age group to find out who they are, “what’s hot” and “what’s not” August 1989 BATES2500137354/7455

26. Asks sales representatives to identify stores “heavily frequented by young adult shoppers… can be in close proximity to colleges [or] highschools… the purpose of this exercise is to … try to keep premium items in [these] stores at all times.” Young adult market RJ Reynolds Jan 1990 BATES 682817261

27. Overview Marlboro Red In markets where Marlboro Red's share of young adult smokers has declined, share of starters was also down. Thus, the ability to attract new smokers and develop them into a young adult franchise is key to brand development… In Marlboro Red's growth markets, the key indicators - share of starters, share of young adult smokers, young brand profile and high image - are all positive and contributing towards building a strong franchise. Philip Morris International Worldwide Marlboro Monitor 1992 BATES 2044895379/5484

28. THE EVIDENCE A case study of selling to teenagers: Marlboro vs Winfield in Australia

29. How Marlboro led the pack Mar 1994 British American Tobacco Bates No. 502570351/0387

30. THE PROBLEM Rothman’s brand Winfield, introduced in 1976, became the brand of choice for new smokers, seriously damaging Marlboro’s market share Philip Morris (Australia) Limited Nov 1986. Bates 2500131194/1213.

31. Discussion of the Marlboro Problem in Australia Philip Morris International May 1984. Bates 2023265684/5686

32. Marlboro vitality was lost to Winfield 25s in 1976 because [of, among other things,] rejection of the Australian Marlboro country imagery by first time smokers… Since 1976 Philip Morris has attempted to re-introduce vitality to the Marlboro brand among new smokers with no success. Philip Morris International Advertising brief for Leo Burnett July 1984 BATES2023265680/5683

33. To PM management the fundamentals of the task are as follows… Marlboro Country as a campaign does not appeal to non smokers with a future disposition to smoke when they are forming brand preferences… without new smokers the product category is… declining by 6%. This is clearly unacceptable. Philip Morris International Advertising brief for Leo Burnett July 1984 BATES2023265680/5683

34. The agency is requested to consider advertising concepts that are capable of competing with Winfield during the critical 2-4 year period where brand selection is made by people who are disposed to smoke later. Philip Morris International Advertising brief for Leo Burnett July 1984 BATES2023265680/5683

35. Dec 1984 BATES2023265662/5664

36. Report on exploratory Marlboro strategic research in Australia by Leo Burnett USA for PMI NY Feb 1989 BATES2504057280/7368

37. Report on exploratory Marlboro strategic research in Australia by Leo Burnett USA for PMI NY Feb 1989 BATES2504057280/7368

38. Report on exploratory Marlboro strategic research in Australia by Leo Burnett USA for PMI NY Feb 1989 BATES2504057280/7368

39. Attempted solutions between 1980 and 2000 • PM Corporation closely involved • PMI took over advertising • focused on increasing the flow of teenage starters to the brand • US soft packs imported • pack size decreased (from 25s to 20s ) • advertising and blend changed • original 20s re-launched as a cult, individualistic, ‘‘Fully imported from the USA’’ brand • price decreased

40. THE EVIDENCE Teenagers as public relations pawns

41. A program to discourage teens from smoking (an adult decision) might prevent or delay further regulation of the tobacco industry. US Tobacco Institute April 1982 Bates 03673753-03673762

42. Children are the most over-protected of all consumers… [they] are being used as a major weapon in the anti-tobacco groups’ fight to remove tobacco advertising and make smoking socially unacceptable—their aim is a smoke-free generation by 2000, or to put you and your companies out of business. John Dollisson (Tobacco Institute of Australia) Oct 1984. BATES 503887595/7604

43. PMI emphasises that smoking is for “adults only” and that youth smoking is not their fault Throughout the world, youth experimentation with tobacco remains a little understood phenomenon. Critics claim that brand advertising of such products is responsible, despite irrefutable evidence that there are as many if not more youthful consumers of such products in nations where they are not advertised at all… The prestigious Children's Research Unit in London, after a recent exhaustive study of youth smoking in five nations... concluded that advertising plays a miniscule role in the initiation of smoking by the young. Philip Morris International Corporate Affairs Issue Briefs April 1985 Bates 2501444256/4272

44. No tobacco company sets out to deliberately sell or advertise its products to children - that would be irresponsible, and would also be an inefficient use of marketing resources... Anti-smokers deliberately bring children into the advertising and smoking initiation debate as part of their strategy. The force of the anti-smoker's allegation is not whether it is true of not (the evidence shows it is not) but that it carries considerable emotive weight. Despite claims to the contrary, advertising has not been shown to play any significant role in the decision of the individual to start smoking. Mar 1990 BATES 511992397/2403

45. US Tobacco Institute Jan 1991 Bates TIMN0164422-0164424

46. US Tobacco Institute Jan 1991 Bates TIMN0164422-0164424

47. As we discussed, the ultimate means for determining the success of this program will be: 1. A reduction in legislation introduced and passed restricting or banning our sales and marketing activities; 2. Passage of legislation favourable to the industry; 3. Greater support from business, parent, and teacher groups. Joshua Slavitt Philip Morris USA regarding the US TI Youth Initiative noted on previous slide Feb 1991 Bates 2500082629

48. Wirthlin Group for Philip Morris Australia Ltd. Apr 1993 Bates 2025837529/7579

49. Public affairs management plan for Australia Jun 1993 Bates 2504200125/0143

50. Taking into consideration the emerging adverse legislative climate in the region, we have an opportunity to create good will for the tobacco industry by going public with a campaign to discourage juvenile smoking. Philip Morris International Corporate Affairs Latin America Sept 23 1993 Bates 2503016523-2503016524