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Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future

Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future. Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of Demography (IDEM) Higher School of Economics (HSE) Moscow, Russia szakharov@hse.ru. First International Conference on Political Demography and Social Macro-Dynamics

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Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future

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  1. Session 2:Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of Demography (IDEM) Higher School of Economics (HSE) Moscow, Russia szakharov@hse.ru First International Conference on Political Demography and Social Macro-Dynamics Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration Moscow, December 13-14, 2013

  2. Monica Duffy Toft The Demographic Demise of the Soviet Union • I strongly support the idea. Demographic differences, backed by cultural differences made ​​it impossible for the existence of the USSR. • It should be noted that Russian demographers have always talked about it. Fundamental works on the demographic problems of the USSR, even the ones that were published during the period of Soviet censorship, devoted to these issues. See, for example: A.Volkov, A.Vishnevsky (eds.) Human Reproduction in the USSR (1983). • Only need to have in mind that for obvious reasons, the Russian experts could not do political conclusions

  3. GeorgiDerluguian History and Demography in the Caucasus as a Political Minefield: The Case of the Sochi Olympics • The role of demographic factors in social change in the North Caucasus is very high. Just as proved their influence in North Africa and in other regions of the world. • The erosion of traditional values ​​and the destruction of the traditional organization of the demographic system not only leads to the emergence of the avant-garde political forces, which is important for the modernization of society, but also to the consolidation of conservative forces, who are losing their power. • Time is working against the latter. Unfortunately we live in a period of confrontation. To what extent do we have the resources and tools to reduce the negative consequences of this conflict?

  4. Jennifer Dabs Sciubba Russian Youth Movements: Hope or Hype? • Youth movements, organized and supported by power - an important channel for obtaining resources, social capital. They are an effective way to lift the career of a young person. • Can we talk about the fundamental differences with the Soviet period??

  5. V.N. Archangelskiy, J.V. Zinkina, A.V. Korotayev Russia’s Recent Fertility Increase – Why it Occurred and Can it be Sustained? • At the macro level demographic statistics we have strong evidence that pronatalistpolicy influenced period indicators of fertility. Cohort fertility indicators, taking into account the data for 2012 (outstanding increase in period fertility rates) also showed a positive reaction , albeit a weak one. • Historical trend towards lower ultimate cohort fertility in Russia apparently stopped at the level of 1.6 births per woman.

  6. Russia’s Recent Fertility Increase – Why it Occurred and Can it be Sustained? • At the same time, there is no clear evidence on the microdatalevel, namely on economic policies (in particular, the parent capital ) had a strong positive response. Until today, the econometric analysis does not give grounds for optimism. Neither the intentions nor the realization of intentions did not change principially. • Future changes in fertility under the sign of great uncertainty. While we can not say that the generations born in the 1980s will have more children than their parents . • We also worrying that fertility increased more significantly in those regions where it was above average before the policy intervention, especially in rural areas.

  7. Completed Cohort and Period Total Fertility in Russia (average number of births to a woman by age 50): birth cohorts 1841-1982 (extrapolation with fixed ASFR as of 2012), period 1897-2012 Source: Zakharov S.V. (2008). Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition. Demographic Research. Vol. 19, p.910 (http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol19/24/ ). (Updated for 2012data)

  8. Different Indicators of Total Fertility: Cohort versus Synthetic Measures, Russia, 1979-2012

  9. Cumulated Period ASFR, Russia: 1979-2012, per 1000

  10. Cumulated Cohort ASFR, Russia: Cohorts1945-1990, per 1000

  11. Differences in Cumulated cohort ASFR between base (1960) and subsequent cohorts 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985

  12. Period Parity Progression Ratios, 1979-2012(transitions to the next birth for women)

  13. Cohort Parity Progression Ratios by Age of 20, 25, 30, 35, 50: Transition 01

  14. Cohort Parity Progression Ratios by Age of 20, 25, 30, 35, 50: Transition 12

  15. Cohort Parity Progression Ratios by Age of 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 50: Transition 23

  16. Cohort Parity Progression Ratios by Age of 25, 30, 35, 40, 50: Transition 34

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