Author: Paraskevi Papasimakopoulou Maritime Economist – MBA TQM

1. Mandatory and voluntary measures taken to deter attack of Somali Based Pirates in the high risk area and their effectiveness Author: Paraskevi Papasimakopoulou Maritime Economist – MBA TQM DPA –CSO at Oceanfleet Shippinng ltd

2. Purpose of the research To take into account all measures currently in place for combating Somalia based piracy in the high risk area and evaluate their effectiveness in the long run.

3. Piracy Activity in the high risk area • The High Risk Area is an area bounded by Suez and the Strait of Hormuz to the North, 10South and 78 East. Pirates’ attacks have taken place at most extremities of the high risk area. • The level of pirate activity varies within the High Risk Area due to changing weather conditions and activity by Naval / Military forces. • Pirates’ activity generally reduces in areas affected by the South West monsoon, and increases in the period following the monsoon. When piracy activity is reduced in one area of the High Risk Area it is likely to increase in another area • According to official statistics, since 2009 to date, 123 vessels have been seized by pirates in a total of 549 attacks.

4. Indian Ocean High risk area source www.mschoa.org

5. How did the Somali based piracy start? • the root cause of the Somali based piracy was the presence of illegally placed foreign fishermen in the Somali coast since the early nineties. • Increasing number of Somali fishermen started to sail further offshore and begun to chase away illegal foreign fishing vessels. After the year 2005, Somali attacks took a different form and began to go after any vulnerable vessel (fishing or not) that moved in Somali waters. • The eagerness of the earliest victims to pay rising ‘fines’ helped encourage the rising trend of 'ransom piracy', reaching record levels around 2008/2009. 

6. Why piracy in the Somali region is different? • Pirates attack the ship, mainly to capture it and its crew for ransom, but also for robbery of belongings and equipment onboard. Thus any successful acts of piracy will inevitably result in a protracted period of captivity for the crew onboard. • Somali pirates consider the act of piracy as a business, and recognize that unnecessary harm or injury to the crew is counter-productive and may harm their negotiations or the amount of ransom received. To date, the level of violence against ships crews is relatively low when compared to other regions around Africa.

7. Company and Master planning procedures according to the Best Management Practices • The latest version of “Best Management Practices 4”, dated August 2011, contains all the Suggested Planning and Operational Practices for Ship Operators and Masters of Ships Transiting the High Risk Area.

8. Prior to transit the High Risk Area, ship operators and Masters should carry out a thorough Risk Assessment to assess the likelihood and consequences of piracy attacks to the vessel, by considering mainly the following factors: • Vessel’s freeboard • crew safety • speed • Sea state

9. Company planning procedure • Registration with the MSC HOA prior to vessel’s transit • Review of Ship security Assessment (SSA) and SSP by the CSO • provide guidance to Master with regards to the recommended route, plan and “Ship protection measures” to be taken.

10. Ship’s Master planning procedure prior to entering the high risk area • Crew briefing on security measures and their duties, • conduct of security drill and ssas testing • preparation of an emergency communication plan • cross checking with the company that the vessel movement registration form is submitted to the MSC HOA.

11. Ship’s Master planning procedure upon entering the high risk area • it is mandatory to ensure that a UKMTO ‘Vessel Position Reporting Form’ - Initial Report is sent by Master. • Vessels are strongly encouraged to report daily to the UKMTO by email at 08:00 hours GMT whilst operating within the High Risk Area • maintenance and engineering works should be reduced to minimum and any work outside of accommodation should be strictly controlled

12. Gulf of Aden transit and the use of International Recommended Transit Corridor • In case of transiting through the Gulf of Aden, It is strongly recommended that ships navigate within the IRTC, where Naval/Military forces are concentrated. The IRTC consists of east bound and west bound corridors. The East bound corridor starts at 45° East between 11°53’ & 11°48’North and terminates at 53° East between 14°23’ & 14°18’ North. The West bound corridor starts at 53° East between 14°30’ & 14°25’ North and terminates at 45° East between 12°00’ & 11°55’ North.

13. International recommended transit corridor sourcewww.shipping.nato.int

14. Gulf of Aden Group transits • Group Transits have been developed after analysis of GOA pirate activity and are designed to exploit the additional protection and assurance that can be gained from grouping vessels together

15. Ship protection measures according to the Best Management Practices • Increased watch keeping and enhanced vigilance • Enhanced bridge protection • Control of access to bridge accommodation and machinery spaces • The use of physical barriers such as razor wire • The use of water spray and foam monitors • In case of attack evasive maneuvering at increased speed • The establishment of a safe Muster point- CITADEL

16. The use of Privately contracted unarmed and armed security Guards • The use, or not, of Private Maritime Security Contractors onboard merchant vessels is a matter for individual ship operators to decide following their own voyage risk assessment and approval of respective Flag States • Since 2012, the use of Privately Contracted Security Guards either armed or unarmed remains the most popular additional measure to prevent vessels from being hijacked. According to statistics, those measures taken by ship operators together with the increasing presence of EU NAV forces in the area were proven to be effective as the number of vessels being pirated has been significantly reduced in 2012 only to 5 vessels against 25 vessels in the previous year

17. Table 3: Somali based Piracy statistics source www.eunavfor.eu

18. Suggested selection criteria of Security Company • The vessel operator in order to select a reliable company and thus mitigate the risk of unnecessary escalation should take into consideration first of all the profile of the members of security team: they should preferably have ex navy and Special Forces military background and great experience. They must be well trained with regards to the use of weapons and to the implementation of the isps code and duly certified with regards to STCW, yellow fever and first aid.

19. Suggested selection criteria of Security Company • Most flag administrations also require that the selected private security services provider operates according to an operation manual approved by the flag state. • The selected company should be also able to provide evidence that the weapons used are legally bought and used • Flag administrations request that a Private Maritime Security Company has a clear policy and set of rules on the use of force consistent with an international model set of standards and has issued specific operating procedures, as agreed between the PMSC, ship-owner, and Master, to PCASP operating for them on the use of force.

20. Major Conclusions • Nowadays the shipping industry is in recession and under huge cost pressure. Ship operators pay high insurance premiums every time a vessel is transiting the high risk area. • The most effective counter-measures against Somalia based pirates have proven to be the use of physical barriers (such as razor wire), evasive maneuvering, speed, the use of Citadels and last but not least the presence of armed security guards • there have been many unreported incidents where armed guards thought of local fishermen for pirates and attacked them. Therefore, it is of utmost importance the selection of a reliable security company to avoid unnecessary use of force and attacks to innocents.

21. Major Conclusions • The reduced number of seized vessels does not guarantee future reducing trend either, as the pirates keep evolving: they are changing their tactics, have increased their fire power, they attack in larger groups and in case targeted vessel’s anti piracy measures are proved to be weak, they are more persistent in order to capture the vessel • Root cause must be understood and addressed in order for the Somali based piracy to be successfully combated. The use of all previously mentioned measures actually faces the consequence but the previously referred root cause still remains and should be eliminated in order to resolve this problem.

22. Thank you for your attention!