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The Responsibility to Protect chapters 3 & 4

The Responsibility to Protect chapters 3 & 4. By Rumi Toyota Konosuke Nagata Elina Wada. Overview. The Responsibility to Prevent: Conflict Prevention The 3 Essential Conditions Root Cause Prevention Direct Cause Prevention The Responsibility to React: Coercive Measures

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The Responsibility to Protect chapters 3 & 4

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  1. The Responsibility to Protectchapters 3 & 4 By Rumi Toyota Konosuke Nagata Elina Wada

  2. Overview The Responsibility to Prevent: • Conflict Prevention • The 3 Essential Conditions • Root Cause Prevention • Direct Cause Prevention The Responsibility to React: • Coercive Measures • When should it be necessary to resort to military action? • What is an “extreme case”? • Where do we draw the line?

  3. A Commitment to Prevention 3.1 The Responsibility to Protect includes the Responsibility to Prevent. • 3.2 It is the responsibility of the sovereign state to prevent deadly conflict and man-made catastrophes. • Fair treatment and fair opportunities for all citizens to prevent conflict.

  4. A Commitment to Prevention 3.3 However, conflict prevention is an international task. • Strong support from the international community in the form of development assistance. • If prevention fails, the international community must also face the consequences and costs. 3.8 It is the responsibility of larger, richer nations to support poorer nations unable to provide resources for conflict prevention.

  5. A Commitment to Prevention 3.4 The point of prevention is to eradicate the need of intervention. • Even if conflict prevention fails, by acting before conflict erupts, the international community can respond to the situation more swiftly and effectively.

  6. A Commitment to Prevention 3.7 It is more effective to devote resources to conflict prevention • Too much resources are devoted to intervention and post-conflict aid. • It is cheaper to devote resources to prevention. • Ex. $200 billion → $70 billion during the 90’s • The international community must stop expecting a situation to solve itself.

  7. A Commitment to Prevention 3.8 For effective conflict prevention, three conditions must be met. • Early Warning • Preventive Toolbox • Political Will (chapter 8)

  8. Early Warning and Analysis 3.11 Early Warning: • More action must be taken towards understanding the possible situation. • 3.12 Large organizations don’t take into consideration all the problems and facts • 3.12 On ground organizations don’t have the resources to spread the word • 3.10 “lack of early warning is an excuse rather than an explanation, and the problem is not lack of warning but of timely response.”

  9. Early Warning and Analysis • Resources should be made available to support regional and sub-regional conflict prevention initiatives. • We cannot rely on pre-existing governmental capacity to build a better early-warning system. • A special unit should be established that can receive and analyze sensitive information.

  10. Root Cause Prevention Efforts • UN Charter Chap. IX Article 55:“the United Nations shall promote: a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”

  11. Root Cause Prevention Efforts 3.19 Differentiating “root” and “direct cause” is common. Root causes include; poverty, political repression, uneven distribution of resources Root Cause: underlying, long-termDirect Case: precipitating, short-term

  12. Root Cause Prevention Efforts 3.20 Detailed knowledge and understanding, and maximum possible cooperation between helpers and those helped are necessary. • Developed countries should be aware of the cultural barriers.

  13. Dimensions 3.21 Political dimension3.22 Economic dimension3.33 Legal dimension3.34 Military dimension

  14. Direct Cause Prevention Efforts 3.25 Instruments reflect the shorter time. • The aim is to make it unnecessary to employ direct coercive measures. Root Cause: underlying, long-termDirect Cause: precipitating, short-term

  15. Dimensions 3.26 Political and diplomatic dimension3.27 Economic dimension3.28 Legal dimension3.32 Military dimension

  16. Legal Sanctions 3.28 The threat to seek or apply international legal sanctions has become a new weapon in the international preventive armoury.3.29 Establishment of specialist tribunals3.30 Establishment of International Criminal Court3.31 Establishment of universal jurisdiction

  17. Direct Cause Prevention Efforts 3.33 The move to more intrusive and coercive preventive measures should be undertaken carefully & seriously. • Such measures include threats of economic sanctions / military measures. • Direct prevention efforts can be important in eliminating the need to resort to coercive measures.

  18. Difficulties 1. The absence of cooperation between helpers and those being helped3.34 Some states are fearing the further external interference caused by the internationalization of the problem. • International policy makers should be sensitive to such fear. • The states themselves should be aware of the risk of inducing external intervention.

  19. Difficulties II. The presence of internal concerns and efforts 3.35 Political leaders facing internal conflict will be concerned of giving additional momentum to those causing their problems. • Such efforts may make the situation worse. • Recognition of and respect to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state concerned is necessary.

  20. Difficulties III. Obstacles to international coordination3.36 Effective conflict prevention depends on disparate actors working together strategically. • The capacity of conducting preventive diplomacy relies on international ability of coordinating. • Varying interests and agendas of states and non-state organizations make the coordination difficult.

  21. 3.37 Having an operational strategy is important. 3.38 It is the role of media to alert policy makers to the catastrophic consequences. 3.39 Conflict prevention must be integrated into policies at national, regional and international levels. 3.40 The information should be transformed into concrete and practical analysis.

  22. 3.42 It is necessary for the international community to change its mindset from a “culture of reaction” to “culture of prevention”. • Setting standards for accountability of member states • Establishing the prevention practices at the local, national, regional and global levels.

  23. 3.43 “The time has come for all of us to take practical responsibility to prevent the needless loss of human life, and to be ready to act in the cause of prevention and not just in the aftermath of disaster.”

  24. The Responsibility to React 4.1 The Responsibility to Protect means to be able to react to a situation quickly and efficiently • When prevention fails, it is up to the international community to react to the situation ASAP and provide humanitarian aid or intervention in order to contain the conflict.

  25. The Responsibility to React 4.1 Coercive measures like political, economic, judicial, and in extreme cases, military action, should be taken. • 4.3 Coercive measures other than military action must first be examined before relying on armed intervention

  26. Measures Short of Military Action 4.4 Sanctions that inhibit interaction with the outside world is strongly advised. 4.5 However, these sanctions must be handled with extreme care in order to prevent doing harm on civilians.

  27. Measures Short of Military Action 4.7 Sanctions in the military area: • Arms embargoes • End “military cooperation and training programmes” 4.8 Sanctions in the economic area: • Restrictions on oil, diamond, logging, and drug industries • Restrictions on access to petroleum products • Aviation bans

  28. Measures Short of Military Action 4.9 Sanctions in the political area: • Restrictions on diplomatic representation • Restrictions on travel • Suspension of membership or expulsion from international or regional bodies • Refusal of admission or membership

  29. The Decision to Intervene Overview • When should it be necessary to resort to military action? • What is an “extreme case”? • Where do we draw the line?

  30. Before we get to the Criteria • 4.11- Principle of Non-intervention • “All members of the United Nations have an interest in maintaining an order of sovereign, self reliant, responsible, yet interdependent states…” • Therefore, all sovereign states should avoid intervening or interfering in the domestic affairs of other states. • This principle protects people and cultures

  31. Hippocratic Principle • DO NOT HARM • 4.12- “The rule against intervention in internal affairs encourages the states to solve their own internal problems and prevent these from spilling over into a threat to international peace and security”

  32. BUT… • 4.13- “Yet there are exceptional circumstances in which… requires them to react all orders of a state has broken down or when civil conflict and repressions are so violent that civilians are threatened with massacre, genocide, or ethnic cleansing on a large scale.”

  33. Six Criteria for Military Intervention • Right Authority • Just Cause • Right Intention • Last Resort • Proportional means • Reasonable Prospects

  34. Just Cause • “What kind of harm is sufficient to trigger military intervention overriding the Non-Intervention Principle?” • For military intervention to be warranted, there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur.”

  35. What’s not Included What’s Included Large scalethreatened or actual loss of life Large scale loss of life with or without the intent of genocide and with or without state action. Ethnic cleansing Situation of state collapse Governments not doing there job after natural catastrophes To save its own nationals on foreign soil • Incidents without outright killings or ethnic cleansing • Populations denied a democratic right by a military takeover (unless killings occur that are justified by the past sections) Conscience-Shocking Situations

  36. 4.21 • They will not quantify “large scale” • Anticipation of large scale killing is justified since if this wasn’t the case, international community will have to wait until genocide starts. • 4.22 • They do not make any basic moral difference whether its state or non-state actors who are putting people at risk.

  37. The Question of Evidence • When military intervention may be needed, evidence needs to be presented. • An independent special “fact-finding mission” can be sent by the Security Counsil or Secretary General in order to obtain accurate information. • The case in Syria with the chemical weapons

  38. 2. Right Intention • 4.33 • Objective of military intervention should be to halt or avert human suffering. • Military intervention for a particular combatant's interest cannot be justified. • Occupation of territory, simply to overthrow a regime, etc • 4.34 • To unsure “right intention”, group intervention is better than single country.

  39. 3. Last Resort • 4.37 The responsibility to react can only be justified when the responsibility to prevent has been fully discharged.

  40. 4. Proportional means • 4.39 the scale, duration, and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure humanitarian security.

  41. 5. Reasonable Prospects • 4.41 • Military intervention can only be justified if there’s a reasonable chance of success. • 4.42 • The “application of [4.41] would… be likely to preclude military action against any of the five permanent members of the Security Council.” • This raises the question of double standard.

  42. Summary • Having sovereignty means having responsibility to protect your citizens. • The point of preventive action is to eliminate the need for intervention. • Coercive Measures should come first and foremost when conflict erupts. • Military intervention should be the last resort and must meet the Six Criteria's. • Military intervention is solely for the purpose of human protection.

  43. Thank you for listening

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