ISIL

1. ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) July 2014 The contents of this unclassified report in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the United States Department of State, or the United States Government, except as otherwise noted (e.g., travel advisories, public statements). The presentation was compiled from various open sources and unclassified embassy reporting. Please note that all OSAC products are for internal U.S. private sector security purposes only. Publishing or otherwise distributing OSAC-derived information in a manner inconsistent with this policy may result in the discontinuation of OSAC support.

2. ISIL Territory Erbil Raqqah Aleppo Kirkuk Damascus Baghdad Ethno-Religious Sunni Shia Sunni and Shia Kurds KEY Capital City Captured by ISIL Retaken from ISIL Contested Basra

3. ISIL Territory Sarrin Erbil Raqqah Aleppo Kirkuk Damascus Baghdad Ethno-Religious Sunni Shia Sunni and Shia Kurds KEY Capital City Captured by ISIL Retaken from ISIL Contested Basra

4. ISIL Territory Sarrin Al-Bab Tell Rifaat Erbil Raqqah Aleppo Kirkuk Damascus Baghdad Ethno-Religious Sunni Shia Sunni and Shia Kurds KEY Capital City Captured by ISIL Retaken from ISIL Contested Basra

5. ISIL Territory Manbij Jarabulus Tell Abyad Tell Rifaat Sarrin Al-Bab Erbil Raqqah Aleppo Kirkuk Al-Thawrah Damascus Fallujah Ramadi Baghdad Ethno-Religious Sunni Shia Sunni and Shia Kurds KEY Capital City Captured by ISIL Retaken from ISIL Contested Basra

6. ISIL Territory Manbij Jarabulus Tell Abyad Tell Rifaat Sarrin Al-Bab Erbil Raqqah Aleppo Kirkuk Al-Thawrah Deir al-zor Damascus Fallujah Ramadi Baghdad Ethno-Religious Sunni Shia Sunni and Shia Kurds KEY Capital City Captured by ISIL Retaken from ISIL Contested Basra

7. ISIL Territory Manbij Jarabulus Tell Abyad Mosul Tell Rifaat Sarrin Al-Bab Erbil Raqqah Aleppo Kirkuk Al-Thawrah Deir al-zor Damascus Fallujah Ramadi Baghdad Ethno-Religious Sunni Shia Sunni and Shia Kurds KEY Capital City Captured by ISIL Retaken from ISIL Contested Basra

8. ISIL Territory Manbij Jarabulus Tell Abyad Mosul Tell Rifaat Sarrin Al-Bab Erbil Raqqah Aleppo Al-Shirqat Kirkuk Al-Thawrah Deir al-zor Baiji Tikrit Al-Adhaim Damascus Fallujah Ramadi Baghdad Ethno-Religious Sunni Shia Sunni and Shia Kurds KEY Capital City Captured by ISIL Retaken from ISIL Contested Basra

9. ISIL Territory Manbij Jarabulus Tell Abyad Mosul Tell Rifaat Sarrin Al-Bab Erbil Raqqah Aleppo Al-Shirqat Kirkuk Al-Thawrah Deir al-zor Baiji Tikrit Al-Dour Al-Adhaim Samarra Damascus Fallujah Ramadi Baghdad Ethno-Religious Sunni Shia Sunni and Shia Kurds KEY Capital City Captured by ISIL Retaken from ISIL Contested Basra

10. ISIL Territory Manbij Jarabulus Tell Abyad Mosul Tell Rifaat Sarrin Al-Bab Erbil Raqqah Aleppo Al-Shirqat Kirkuk Al-Thawrah Deir al-zor Baiji Tikrit Al-Dour Al-Adhaim Samarra Jalulah Damascus Fallujah Ramadi Baghdad Ethno-Religious Sunni Shia Sunni and Shia Kurds KEY Capital City Captured by ISIL Retaken from ISIL Contested Basra

11. ISIL Territory Manbij Jarabulus Tell Abyad Mosul Tell Rifaat Sarrin Al-Bab Erbil Raqqah Aleppo Al-Shirqat Kirkuk Al-Thawrah Deir al-zor Baiji Tikrit Al-Dour Al-Adhaim Samarra Jalulah Damascus Fallujah Ramadi Baghdad Ethno-Religious Sunni Shia Sunni and Shia Kurds KEY Capital City Captured by ISIL Retaken from ISIL Contested Basra

12. ISIL Territory Manbij Jarabulus Tell Abyad Mosul Tell Rifaat Sarrin Al-Bab Erbil Raqqah Aleppo Al-Shirqat Kirkuk Al-Thawrah Deir al-zor Baiji Rawah Tikrit Al-Dour Al-Adhaim Qaim Samarra Jalulah Anah Damascus Fallujah Ramadi Baghdad Ethno-Religious Sunni Shia Sunni and Shia Kurds KEY Capital City Captured by ISIL Retaken from ISIL Contested Basra

13. ISIL Territory Manbij Jarabulus Tell Abyad Mosul Tell Rifaat Sarrin Al-Bab Erbil Tal Afar Raqqah Aleppo Al-Shirqat Kirkuk Al-Thawrah Deir al-zor Baiji Rawah Tikrit Al-Dour Al-Adhaim Qaim Samarra Jalulah Anah Damascus Fallujah Al-Waleed Ramadi Baghdad Tarbil Ethno-Religious Sunni Shia Sunni and Shia Kurds KEY Capital City Captured by ISIL Retaken from ISIL Contested Basra

14. ISIL Territory Manbij Jarabulus Tell Abyad Mosul Tell Rifaat Sarrin Al-Bab Erbil Tal Afar Raqqah Aleppo Al-Shirqat Kirkuk Al-Thawrah Deir al-zor Baiji Rawah Albu Kamal Tikrit Al-Dour Al-Adhaim Qaim Samarra Jalulah Anah Damascus Fallujah Al-Waleed Ramadi Baghdad Tarbil Ethno-Religious Sunni Shia Sunni and Shia Kurds KEY Capital City Captured by ISIL Retaken from ISIL Contested Basra

15. ISIL Territory Manbij Jarabulus Tell Abyad Mosul Tell Rifaat Sarrin Al-Bab Erbil Tal Afar Raqqah Aleppo Al-Shirqat Kirkuk Al-Thawrah Deir al-zor Shaar Oil Field Baiji Rawah Albu Kamal Tikrit Al-Dour Al-Adhaim Qaim Samarra Jalulah Anah Damascus Fallujah Al-Waleed Ramadi Baghdad Tarbil Ethno-Religious Sunni Shia Sunni and Shia Kurds KEY Capital City Captured by ISIL Retaken from ISIL Contested Basra

16. ISIL’s Advance Halted Manbij Jarabulus Tell Abyad Mosul Tell Rifaat Sarrin Al-Bab Erbil Tal Afar Raqqah Aleppo Al-Shirqat Kirkuk Al-Thawrah Deir al-zor Shaar Oil Field Baiji Rawah Albu Kamal Tikrit Al-Dour Al-Adhaim Qaim Samarra Jalulah Anah Damascus Fallujah Al-Waleed Ramadi Baghdad Tarbil ISIL quickly captured Sunni towns in Iraq, but has been unable to move into Shi’a dominated or mixed territory, such as Baghdad. Basra KEY Sunni Shia Sunni and Shia Kurds

17. Factors Aiding ISIL’s Rise ISIL’s capability has been increasing over the past several years due primarily to two reasons: • Marginalization of Iraq’s Sunni Population. ISIL capitalized off growing Sunni resentment against the Shi’a-led government. 2013 saw dozens of anti-government protests in Anbar province in response to a government crackdown on Sunni political leadership. • Security Vacuum in Syria. The ongoing civil war in Syria has provided a permissive environment for numerous extremist groups operating in the country. ISIL has used its territory in Syria to recruit, fund, and plot attacks in Iraq, contributing to growing violence in Iraq.

18. Rising Civilian Casualties Rates As ISIL has increased its capability – by manipulating internal sectarian tensions and capitalizing off Syria’s security vacuum – violence in Iraq has been on the rise in 2013-2014. In June 2014, 2,417 Iraqis were killed in violence, including 1,531 civilians; the highest death toll recorded in Iraq since 2007.

19. Factors Permitting ISIL’s June Advance ISF Flees Advancing ISIL. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) members in Mosul, Tikrit, Kirkuk, and other towns reportedly fled as ISIL members swept in, in some cases abandoning their weapons and uniforms. ISF’s inability to repel militant incursion limited ISIL’s need to engage in combat in many cases, and the group quickly set up command and control.

20. Factors Permitting ISIL’s June Advance Sunni Assistance. ISIL’s campaign through northwest and central Iraq towards Baghdad has not come without assistance. ISIL is relying on Sunni political and militant groups, such as Baathist political leaders, tribal leaders, and the Naqshbandi Army. This network has allowed ISIL to advance into new territory as their allies control towns under ISIL’s name.

21. Activation of Shi’a Militias Due to ISF’s failure to halt ISIL, the Iraqi government called for volunteers and Shi’a militias to support Iraqi national security efforts. Shi’a militias, which have largely been on the sidelines in recent years, are expected to enforce control of Shi’a territory and have the resources and combat experience to pose a significant challenge to Sunni militants. However, the open involvement of Shi’a militias has the potential to trigger critical levels of sectarian violence across the country. Concern over the potential sectarian fallout has been highest for Baghdad, where sectarian violence and cleansing of neighborhoods soared during the Iraq war.

22. Baghdad Sectarian Breakdown This map from BBC highlights the impact of sectarian violence on Baghdad neighborhoods from 2005-2007, during the height of conflict.

23. Embassy Status On June 15, the U.S. Department of State released an updated Travel Warning addressing the current instability in Iraq, and announcing that some additional security personnel would be added to the staff at U.S. Embassy Baghdad, and other staff would be temporarily relocated – both to the U.S. Consulates in Basrah and Erbil and to the Iraq Support Unit in Amman, Jordan. The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad remains open and a substantial majority of the U.S. presence remains in place.

24. Private Sector Response Many OSAC Constituents operating in central and northwest Iraq reported ISIL’s advance towards Baghdad crossed their tripwires requiring relocation – either internally or externally. Within Baghdad, the U.S. Private Sector expressed concerns about the potential increase in terrorism and sectarian violence. Furthermore, the potential risks to Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), and ramifications for evacuation options remains a top concern. Most OSAC Constituents operating in Kurdistan and southern Iraq reported that they were monitoring the situation but not altering their operations due to the perception that ISIL would not be able to have a significant impact in these areas.

25. Drivers for Continued Violence The stoking of sectarian tensions, either by divisive rhetoric from Iraqi political or religious leaders, or by heavy handed tactics by ISIL, ISF, or Shi’a militias, could significantly escalate terrorism and sectarian violence. Meanwhile, attacks on key holy sites – such as Samarra’s al-Askari Shrine – could trigger a widespread sectarian conflict. Additional territorial gains by ISIL or increased capability to attack Shi’a dominated areas of Iraq, or heavily mixed areas, such as Baghdad, could escalate the response by the ISF and Shi’a militias, triggering greater conflict in the long-term. Lack of political cohesion, which has already become a staple of the conflict, has the potential to further complicate efforts against ISIL. Iraq’s parliament has until the end of July to elect a president and an additional 15 days for the largest alliance to name a prime minister. Current Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who has been widely criticized for inflaming sectarian tensions, has been publicly adamant in seeking a third term in office. Furthermore, increased conflict between the central Iraqi government and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), particularly over territorial and budget disputes, could permit a more pervasive environment for ISIL.

26. For Additional Information Previous OSAC Reporting on Iraq: • Update on ISIL and U.S. Embassy Baghdad Status • ISIL Seizes Control of Mosul • Syrian Scenarios: Spillover and Stasis • Syrian Conflict Escalation: Regional Implications • Iraq Violence Escalates • Al-Qa’ida in Iraq Resurgence • Travel Warning: Iraq (June 16, 2014) For Questions on this presentation or the situation in Iraq, please contact OSAC’s Analyst on the Middle East and North Africa.