Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Fragmentation: Trajectories of Militancy in Kashmir and Pakistan

1. Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Fragmentation: Trajectories of Militancy in Kashmir and Pakistan Paul Staniland Department of Political Science, MIT MacMillan Center, Yale University United States Institute of Peace pstan@mit.edu

2. “The public is the most powerful weapon and it is on our side” - JKLF senior leader Javed Mir, 1993 Greater Kashmir

3. “The public is the most powerful weapon and it is on our side” - JKLF senior leader Javed Mir, 1993 “the JKLF had an idea, but not a base” (interview, Kashmir, summer 2009) “by 1995, the JKLF as an armed group was no longer a force to seriously reckon with, although its agenda for a free, independent Kashmir still fired the hearts of many, if not most, Kashmiris” (Sikand 2002) Greater Kashmir

4. “not supported by a majority of Kashmiri Muslims” (Behera 2000) The Rise of Hizbul Mujahideen “the most militarily well organized of all the jehadi organizations in Pakistan and Kashmir” (Rana 2004)

5. Who Cares? Effects of Insurgent Organization • Victory and defeat in civil war • Rape and mass killing • Effectiveness of counterinsurgency strategy • Success and failure in peace negotiations

6. Questions • How do we conceptualize and measure cohesion?

7. Questions • How do we conceptualize and measure cohesion? • How do insurgent groups build themselves in the midst of rebellion against capable states?

8. Questions • How do we conceptualize and measure cohesion? • How do insurgent groups build themselves in the midst of rebellion against capable states? • What explains consequent variation in insurgent cohesion across time and space?

9. Findings • Social networks matter more than popular support or ideological appeal • Robust, pre-existing social structures underpin cohesion, not mass popularity, “the people,” or hearts and minds

10. Findings • Social networks matter more than popular support or ideological appeal • Robust, pre-existing social structures underpin cohesion, not mass popularity, “the people,” or hearts and minds • When fighting capable states, external aid bolsters insurgent cohesion • Resource-richness need not lead to loot-seeking and indiscipline

11. Research Design • Scope - ethnic insurgent civil wars in militarily capable, politically-resolved states • Cases - 19 significant insurgent organizations in: • Kashmir, 1988-2008 • Northern Ireland, 1962-2005 • Sri Lanka, 1972-2009

12. Research Design • Scope - ethnic insurgent civil wars in militarily capable, politically-resolved states • Cases - 19 significant insurgent organizations in: • Kashmir, 1988-2008 • Northern Ireland, 1962-2005 • Sri Lanka, 1972-2009 • Sub-national comparisons • Variation within the same war and society • Cross-national comparisons

13. Research Methods • 13 months of fieldwork in N. Ireland, India, Indian-administered Kashmir, and Sri Lanka • Interviews • 130+ current and former militants, politicians, government officials, journalists, academics, analysts, aid workers • Written sources • Internal documents and diaries • Memoirs and oral histories • Propaganda • Journalism • History and anthropology

14. Defining and Measuring Cohesion • Cohesion: fighters and factions obey orders and rarely launch splits or violent internal challenges • Focus on: • Internal Unrest: splits, feuds, coups, defiance • Internal Compliance: fighters and leaders respect orders, peaceful leadership successions • Measurement: examine each group over time along a variety of indicators • Frequency, Intensity, Issues, Autonomy

15. Existing Theories • Popular Support • Political Economy • State Policy

16. Explaining Insurgent Cohesion • Two key variables: • 1. Group’s social base • 2. Access to external state and diaspora support

17. Explaining Insurgent Cohesion • Two key variables: • 1. Group’s social base • 2. Access to external state and diaspora support • Distinct types of insurgent organization emerge: • Cohesive • State-Reliant • Consensus-Contingent • Factionalized

18. Social Bases • Pervasive “social appropriation” (McAdam et al. 2001) of pre-existing networks

19. Social Bases • Pervasive “social appropriation” (McAdam et al. 2001) of pre-existing networks • These are insurgent social bases

20. Social Bases • Pervasive “social appropriation” (McAdam et al. 2001) of pre-existing networks • These are insurgent social bases • Variation in social bases: • Embeddedness of insurgent leaders within local communities • Pre-existing social links between different leaders

21. Types of Insurgent Social Base • Bonding Network: robust pre-existing social relationships between local communities and insurgent leaders, and among leaders • Historically-rooted overlap of local and extra-local social ties

22. Types of Insurgent Social Base • Bonding Network: robust pre-existing social relationships between local communities and insurgent leaders, and among leaders • Historically-rooted overlap of local and extra-local social ties • Coalition Network: weak pre-existing social relationships between local communities and insurgent leaders, and/or among leaders

23. Social Bases and Organizations • Bonding Network Social Integration • Pre-existing structures of collective action hold together organization at the top and from below • Elite Cooperation • Local Incorporation

24. Social Bases and Organizations • Bonding Network Social Integration • Pre-existing structures of collective action hold together organization at the top and from below • Elite Cooperation • Local Incorporation • Coalition Network Social Division • “Median voter” or mass appeal insufficient if lacking embedded links to community and between leaders • Elite Distrust • Weak Local Incorporation

25. Effects of External Support In capable-state context, external aid crucial

26. Aid leads to military strength High organizational capacity Resource centralization Fighters and factions join and remain Effects of External Support In capable-state context, external aid crucial

27. Aid leads to military strength High organizational capacity Resource centralization Fighters and factions join and remain Lack of aid leads to military weakness Low organizational capacity Resource diffusion Fighters and factions defect and dissent Effects of External Support In capable-state context, external aid crucial

28. High External Aid Cohesive (Durable) Bonding Network Coalition Network

29. High External Aid Cohesive (Durable) Bonding Network Low External Aid Consensus-Contingent (Intermediate) Coalition Network

30. High External Aid Cohesive (Durable) Bonding Network Low External Aid Consensus-Contingent (Intermediate) High External Aid State-Reliant (Intermediate) Coalition Network

31. High External Aid Cohesive (Durable) Bonding Network Low External Aid Consensus-Contingent (Intermediate) High External Aid State-Reliant (Intermediate) Coalition Network Low External Aid Factionalized (Fragile)

32. Insurgency in Kashmir • Territory divided between India and Pakistan • Central to India-Pakistan wars and confrontations • Insurgency, 1988-Present • ~70,000 dead • Militancy has spilled out into broader subcontinent

33. Major Areas of Insurgency

34. Insurgents Fighting India in Kashmir • Comparative Cases: • 6 indigenous Kashmiri organizations • 3 Pakistani organizations • Research • 2 trips to Kashmir Valley (May ‘08 and July ‘09) • Multiple trips to New Delhi • Interviews with all sides of conflict • Primary and secondary written sources in English and Urdu

35. Two Empirical Puzzles • Highly popular JKLF was the most fragmented, while far less politically popular Hizb the most cohesive • Not a popularity contest

36. Two Empirical Puzzles • Highly popular JKLF was the most fragmented, while far less politically popular Hizb the most cohesive • Not a popularity contest • Pro-Pakistan groups varied in cohesion despite common sponsorship • Not driven solely by Pakistani machinations

37. My Argument: Varying Social Bases • Groups structurally able to mobilize different types of social networks/institutions in ‘88-’91

38. My Argument: Varying Social Bases • Groups structurally able to mobilize different types of social networks/institutions in ‘88-’91 • Groups built around coalition networks were unable to channel and control Pakistani aid effectively • JKLF, Ikhwan, MJF [Harkat, Jaish] - despite different popularity and ideologies - took broadly similar trajectories • Loss of aid contributed to further fragmentation

39. My Argument: Varying Social Bases • Groups structurally able to mobilize different types of social networks/institutions in ‘88-’91 • Groups built around coalition networks were unable to channel and control Pakistani aid effectively • JKLF, Ikhwan, MJF [Harkat, Jaish] - despite different popularity and ideologies - took broadly similar trajectories • Loss of aid contributed to further fragmentation • Groups built around bonding networks channeled command and material through robust, pre-existing social relationships • Hizbul Mujahideen [Lashkar]

41. JKLF: Social Base • Structure: no routinized access to sources of collective action in Kashmir Valley • Not linked to parties or religious authorities • Result: rapid, heterogeneous expansion • Individuals and factions merge in and out of the JKLF at will • No pre-existing social control mechanisms

42. JKLF Fragmentation • Pakistani support: 1988-1990 • State-reliant group that attracts recruits and (some) compliance due to Pakistani aid

43. JKLF Fragmentation • Pakistani support: 1988-1990 • State-reliant group that attracts recruits and (some) compliance due to Pakistani aid • Loss of external support: 1991-1996 • JKLF factionalized and internally-divided over numerous issues • Splits (up to 20), feuds, fratricide • High popular support insufficient to hold group together

44. “The JKLF had an idea, but not a base” Interview, Srinagar, July 2009

45. Hizbul Mujahideen: Social Base • Non-violent Jamaat-e-Islami cadre party • Overlap (since 1940s) of: • Traditional JI families • Local party branches and schools • Ijtimas, annual congregations, intermarriage across villages and over time • Limited popular support • “incapable of reaching out to vast numbers of ordinary Kashmiris” (Sikand 2002)

46. Forging Hizb Cohesion • Jamaat network mobilizes for war in 1989

47. Forging Hizb Cohesion • Jamaat network mobilizes for war in 1989 • High command and Shura Council dominated by Jamaatis • Key leaders almost all JI or JI-linked by 1991

48. Forging Hizb Cohesion • Jamaat network mobilizes for war in 1989 • High command and Shura Council dominated by Jamaatis • Key leaders almost all JI or JI-linked by 1991 • Local Jamaatis spread throughout Kashmir as fighters, recruiters, talent spotters • Expands without fracturing

49. Implications and Extensions • Insurgency not about the median voter: focus instead on social networks and institutions

50. Implications and Extensions • Insurgency not about the median voter: focus instead on social networks and institutions • No simple relationship between material variables and organizational outcomes • Beyond “greed” (and “narco-insurgency”)