Political Changes in Post- Soviet Russia Vladimir Gel’man (EUSP/University of Helsinki)

1. PoliticalChanges in Post-SovietRussia Vladimir Gel’man (EUSP/University of Helsinki) Penn State University, lecture 6, October 18, 2017 Russian Politics: Prospects for Tomorrow

2. Prospects for Tomorrow • Present-day state of the art in Russian politics: • Electoral authoritarian regime (formally competitive but not free and unfair elections); • Increasing state control over economy, media, culture, and education amid sluggish economic growth; • High level of popular support of political leadership despite rise of public protests; • Aggressive anti-Western foreign policy (restoration of Russia’s status as one of global “oligarchs”)

3. Prospects for Tomorrow What we might expect for the future? Scholars are notoriously bad in predictions (even for electoral forecasts, let alone long-term trends); Most of political forecasts (not only on Russia) are projections of the current tends for the future – status quo bias; Sometimes scholars offers right forecasts based on wrong grounds… … and non-scholars are much better in predictions (Tom Clansy predicted Russian-Ukrainian war and annexation of Crimea in his 2013 novel, but scholars failed to do so)

4. Prospects for Tomorrow • “Black swans” – unpredictable exogenous shocks, which may change the whole picture (such as 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks for international security); • … but these shocks are relatively rare, and not always affect everything equally; • No way for full-fledged predictions, but the scenario-based approach is a viable alternative; • Scenario-based approach is focused on possibilities and “critical junctures” rather than on predictions of factual events

5. Prospects for Tomorrow • Some coming structural challenges for Russia (objective features of country’s development): • Sluggish economic growth (up to 1-2% annually) – the risk of lagging behind more dynamic economies (average global growth rate is about 3%); • Demographic problems – high mortality rate vis-à-vis relatively low birth rate (would immigration be a substitute?); • Infrastructural problems – poor state of public housing, hospitals, roads, pipelines amid major decline of public expenditures for health, education, etc.;

6. Prospects for Tomorrow • Some actor-driven challenges for Russia: • Increasing tensions on international arena (US, European Union, Ukraine, Syria, North Korea, etc.) and non-cooperative responses; • Domestic “politics of fear”, the rise of threat perceptions among rulers, and Kremlin’s attempts to prevent any political changes; • Ageing of political leadership against the background of generational changes (“fathers vs. sons” problem);

7. Prospects for Tomorrow • … but how Russia may respond to these challenges? • Four major scenarios: • “political decay”; • “iron fist”; • “regime collapse”; • “creeping democratization” • Which ones (or their combination) are more relevant

8. Prospects for Tomorrow • “political decay” – attempts to preserve status quo without major changes (“Will Putin’s system survive until 2042?”), similarly to efforts of the Soviet leadership in the 1960-70s; • Continuity of current tendencies until the physical extinction of the current generations of Russia’s rulers (93-years-old Robert Mugabe is still the president of Zimbabwe); • Selective repressions, further stealing of the state, conservative fiscal and financial policies, muddling through in domestic and international affairs; • BUT! – limited chances for dynastic leadership succession (Brownlee, 2007) and decline of positive incentives for loyalty over time

9. Prospects for Tomorrow • “iron fist” – increasing perceptions of major threats among the rulers, turn towards more aggressive repressions domestically and self-isolation internationally; • Pavel Chikov – after 2018 presidential elections expects Russia’s exit from the Council of Europe, ban on free foreign travel of Russia’s citizens, total control of security services over the Internet, tough repressions toward any protests, further empowerment of security apparatus etc. (anti-utopian developments) – no major resistance is expected; • BUT! - use of mass repressions contributed to the rise of tensions within the state apparatus and further decline of the quality of governance: to what extent these developments may be viable?

10. Prospects for Tomorrow • “regime’s collapse” – abrupt end of the current regime due to unforeseen circumstances (death of leader? major natural or technological disaster? something else?): episodes like that are not unique in both Russian and international history; • To what extent an effective leadership succession may leave political regime nearly the same? • BUT: to what extent the potential power struggle may contribute for further democratization or even tougher authoritarianism? • “As any order is better than any disorder, any order is established” (Przeworski, 1991: 86)

11. Prospects for Tomorrow • “creeping democratization” – a protracted battle between authoritarian regime and pro-democratic opposition: a series of episodes of clashes and setbacks (similar to Poland 1980-89, Brazil 1974-85, South Korea 1980-87, Mexico 1988-2000, etc.); • Considered in the literature as the most effective yet protracted path towards democratization, especially if and when there is an agreement between elites and counter-elites (“pacted transitions”); • BUT! the degree of public discontent in Russia is relatively low at the moment, international environment is not so likely, and the risks of shift from the current model of authoritarianism to another one are serious…

12. Prospects for Tomorrow • Q: which of the scenarios of Russia’s future political development you consider most realistic (or unrealistic) and why?