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Agricultural Public Services Delivered by Chilean Municipalities: a Free-Market approach?

Agricultural Public Services Delivered by Chilean Municipalities: a Free-Market approach?. Paul Lewin. Content. Background Agricultural Public Services in Chile What Motivates the Chilean Municipal Government? Why some Municipalities are able to produce higher-quality services? Conclusion.

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Agricultural Public Services Delivered by Chilean Municipalities: a Free-Market approach?

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  1. Agricultural Public Services Delivered by Chilean Municipalities: a Free-Market approach? Paul Lewin

  2. Content • Background • Agricultural Public Services in Chile • What Motivates the Chilean Municipal Government? • Why some Municipalities are able to produce higher-quality services? • Conclusion

  3. Background • Public services production based on: • Demand: • Needs of citizens (preferences) • Supply: • Prioritization of public goods • Taxation • Economies of scale • Consistency between Demand & Supply • Decentralized governance structure

  4. Agricultural Public Services in Chile • Chile is a unitary political system. • Public funds are arranged through market instrument. • Funding is decided upon by central government. • Municipalities don’t have Legal obligation Specific budget support to supply agricultural services • Law doesn’t compel Agricultural Agencies to coordinate their activities with the municipality

  5. Chilean Municipalities Responsibilities • They are quite broad and most of them are shared with other public entities. • Sports and recreation • Social welfare • Support low-income sectors • Allocation of monetary subsidies to poor families • Public housing • Education • Health

  6. Therefore,… • Any action performed by the municipalities to deliver agricultural services is voluntary and must be self-funded. • Questions: • Why local politicians invest their scarce resources into these programs? • Why some municipalities are able to produce higher-quality services?

  7. What motivate the Chilean Municipal Governments? • Existence of a central Government Commitment • Communication between Municipality and Central Government • Existence of Financial Gains • Raise funds from agricultural sector • Existence of Specific Stakeholder Groups • Producer organizations • Higher number of landowners

  8. Why some Municipalities are able to produce higher-quality services? • Popular participation in public decision-making processes • Bridging the information gap between government and civil society; • Creating alternative channels for the delivery of public services; and • Preventing the development of perverse incentives in government • Viable institution for the transfer of information among local actors • Incorporate the local knowledge • Take into account the particularities of each locality

  9. Conclusion • Municipal performance is related with local institutional arrangements • Local governments represent a potential for rural development • Municipalities might act as intermediaries between local farmers and central government. • Current knowledge in Chile about consensus-building mechanisms at local level need research

  10. Bibliography • Agrawal, A. y Ostrom, E. 2001. Collective Action, Property Rights, and Decentralization in Resource Use in Indian and Nepal. Politics and Society 29 (4) December 2001: 485-514. • Andersson, K. 2002. Can Decentralization Save Bolivia’s Forests? An Institutional Analysis of Municipal Forest Governance? Ph. D. Diss. Bloomington, En Indiana University (http://sobek.colorado.edu/~anderssk/Andersson%20dissertation%20CIPEC%20Final.pdf) • Andersson, K. 2003. What motivates municipal governments? Uncovering the institutional incentives for municipal governance of forest resources in Bolivia. Journal of Environment and Development 12 (1): 5-27. • Andersson, K., and Van Laerhoven, F. 2007. From Local Strongman to Facilitator, Comparative Political Studies, Volume 40, Number 9, pp. 1085-1111 • Bernard, T., M. H. Collion, A. de Janvry, P. Rondot, and E. Sadoulet. 2007. Do Village Organizations Make a Difference in African Rural Development? A Study for Senegal and Burkina Faso. Forthcoming in World Development. • Blair, H. 2000. Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic Local Governance in Six Countries. World Development 28:21-39 • Espinoza, J. y Marcel, M. 1993. Descentralización fiscal: El caso de Chile. Serie Política Fiscal, N° 57. CEPAL. Santiago. • FAO.Gasto Público Agrícola y Rural. • http://www.rlc.fao.org/es/desarrollo/gasto/presentacion.asp • Fizbein, A. 1997. Emergence of local capacity: Lessons from Colombia. World Development 25 (7): 1029-1043. • Gibson, C., y Lehoucq, F. 2003. The local politics of decentralized environmental policy. Journal of Environment and Development. January 2003. • Hayek, F. 1948. Individualism and Economic Order. Chicago (EE.UU). University of Chicago Press. • Larsson, A. M. 2002. Natural resources and decentralization in Nicaragua: Are local governments up to the job? World Development 30 (1): 17-31. • Ministerio de Agricultura.Una Política de Estado para la Agricultura Chilena Período 2000 – 2010. • Musgrave, R. A. 1959. The Theory of Public Finance: A study in Public Economy. New York: McGraw-Hill. • North, D. 1991. Institutions. The Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 5, No. 1 (winter, 1991), pp. 97-112. • Ostrom, E. 1996. Incentives, rules of the game, and development. En: Preceedings of the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995. Washington, DC. The World Bank • Ostrom, E., Gibson, C., Shivakumar, S. y Andersson, K. 2002. Aid, incentives, and sustainability; An institutional analysis of development cooperation. SIDA studies in evaluation 02/01. SIDA • Pacheco, P., and D. Kaimovitz, (eds). 1998. Municipios y Gestión Forestal en el Trópico Boliviano. La Paz, Bolivia. Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario, Taller de Iniciativas en Estudios Rurales y Reforma Agraria, y Center for International Forestry Research. • Platteau, J-P, & Abraham, A. 2002. Participatory Development in the Presence of Endogenous Community Imperfections. Journal of Development Studies, 39(2), 104-136. • Uphoff, N., & Wijayaratna, C.M. (2000). Demonstrated Benefits from Social Capital: The Productivity of Farmer Organizations in Gal Oya, Sri Lanka. World Development, 28(11),1875-90. • Vyrastekova, J. and D. Van Soest. 2003. Centralized Common-Pool Management and local Community Participation”. Land Economics. November 2003. 79 (4): 500-514.

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