A NEW DIRECTION FOR HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT?

1. A NEW DIRECTION FOR HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT? John Logsdon Space Policy Institute Elliott School of International Affairs George Washington University

2. NASA AT (ANOTHER) CROSSROADS • On February 1, 2010, with more details added in a presidential speech on April 15, the Obama administration has proposed a radical new path for future U.S. human space flight efforts. • This proposal has been met wide a very wide variety of reactions, and it is unclear at this point how much (if any) of it will be approved by the Congress. • Meanwhile, NASA is both moving (slowly) forward with the “program of record” and at the same time planning the programs to replace it. • The result is the most confused situation I have seen in more than forty years of close observation of the U.S. space program,

3. NASA HAS BEEN AT SUCH A CROSSROADS BEFORE • As President John F. Kennedy took office in 1961 • As President Richard Nixon decided on what post-Apollo path to pursue in 1969-1972 • As President George H.W. Bush proposed a Space Exploration Initiative in 1989 • As the space station was threatened with cancellation after President Bill Clinton took office in 1993 • After the Columbia accident in 2003 • As the ESAS architecture was selected to implement President Bush’s 2004 Vision for Space Exploration

4. WHAT IS DIFFERENT THIS TIME • New strategy requires cancellation of ongoing funded programs • That means that there is strong interest in maintaining the status quo • Result is intense involvement by the Congress • NASA not allowed to cancel Constellation as it attempts to plan new programs • Two authorization committees have passed incompatible bills • Congress is designing rockets!

5. THERE ARE DEEP ROOTS TO THE CURRENT NASA SITUATION • NASA was created in 1958 on the basis of two basic identities • As a science and technology agency • As an instrument of national security policy, broadly defined • JFK’s decision to go to the Moon made the NASA of the 1960s an organization built around large-scale engineering projects involving human spaceflight and serving national security goals • NASA and its supporters have tried to recreate the “Apollo approach” in subsequent decisions regarding human spaceflight • NASA over the past fifty years has been suffering both from the identity crisis inherent in its early history and the heritage of Apollo

6. THE APOLLO BUILDUP • Budget • FY 1961 - $0.964 billion • FY1962 - $1.825 billion (+89%) • FY1963 - $3.674 billion (+101%) • Personnel civil servants contractors • FY 1961 17,500 57,000 • FY 1962 23,700 115,500 • FY 1965 34,300 376,700

7. THE NIXON SPACE DOCTRINE • “We must think of (space activities) as part of a continuing process…and not as a series of separate leaps, each requiring a massive concentration of energy.Space expenditures must take their proper place within a rigorous system of national priorities. . . . What we do is space from here on in must become a normal and regular part of our national life and must therefore be planned in conjunction with all of the other undertakings which are important to us.” • President Richard M. Nixon, March 7, 1970

8. POST-APOLLO BUILDOWN • NASA leadership did not resist the 1970 decision to cancel Saturn V and Apollo spacecraft production • Why? – probably because they were already developed and NASA wanted new engineering challenges • Impacts Budget Personnel FY1969 $4.235 B 31,733 FY1973 $3.324 B(-22%) 25,955 (-18%)

10. VISION AND REALITY • This pattern of budget allocations represents a three-decade national decision on NASA’s priority compared to other activities of the Federal government • Space advocates (and NASA) have never accepted this budget reality and have always anticipated and planned for “better days.” • Strong vested interest in maintaining the Apollo-era human space flight personnel and industrial base • “NASA perfected itself in the reality of Apollo, but that success is past and the lessons from it are now obsolete, not to be flouted.” – Gary Brewer, Yale, 1989

11. Approval of Space Shuttle Was based on multiple arguments, most of which have proven to be invalid Implied a future decision to develop a shuttle-launched space station Put shuttle at the center of the U.S. civilian space program for the next 39 (?) years THE DECISION TO DEVELOP THE SPACE SHUTTLE

12. CAIB Observations on Long-Term Issues • “All members of the Board agree that America’s future space efforts must include human presence in Earth orbit, and eventually beyond. “ • “Human space program has moved forward without a guiding vision or national mandate for the past three decades. None of the competing long-term visions have to date found support from the nation’s leadership or among the general public. “ • Result –” NASA has been trying to do much with too little, and with no sense of long term direction.” • “Without a compelling reason to do so, US government has been unwilling to commit resources necessary to improving human access to space.” • The lack of a replacement for the Shuttle represents “a failure of national leadership”

13. VISION FOR SPACE EXPLORATION MAY HAVE BEEN FATALLY FLAWED FROM THE START – AND THEN NOT SUPPORTED • Plan (and budget) for the VSE predicated on ending ISS operations in 2015, but such a decision was very unlikely even in 2003 • NASA told White House that plan would require $27 billion increase in NASA budget for FY2005-2009; NASA was given much less than that • Then subsequent budgets failed to match the 2004 commitment

14. WHY THE AUGUSTINE COMMITTEE? • Obama transition team for NASA heard from many who believed that ESAS plan was flawed and not being well executed; there was an understandable desire to understand whether these criticisms were valid before Obama embraced the “program of record” • Original hope was to have a NASA Administrator designated before January 20 and have that person commission a review • When Administrator selection was delayed, White House decided to go ahead with the review • Not clear that the White House got the review it wanted, especially with respect to the desirability of a major increase in the NASA budget

15. IS THE UNITED STATES ABANDONING HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT? • NO !!! What is being abandoned is Bush goal of Moon by 2020 and the Constellation systems to achieve that goal. • U.S. is now committed to ISS operations through “at least 2020” • But a very different approach to getting astronauts to the station, making LEO transportation an area for commercial-like operations • Obama proposal also includes $10.9 billion in new technology and demonstration of new capabilities to restock the foundation for future human flights beyond LEO

16. Phased Development Strategy 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 Phase I Build the Foundation Commercial Sector, Robotic Precursors, and Game-Changing Technology Development Phase II Systems Development Design and Development of Heavy-Lift and In-space capabilities Human Exploration Missions to Solar System Destinations Phase III Sustainable Exploration of the Solar System

17. THIS IS A RISKY APPROACH • Assumes that at least one U.S. company, with NASA overseeing it , can develop a safe enough and less costly system for ferrying humans to LEO • Assumes a willingness in 3-5 years to make a national commitment to specific systems for voyages of exploration • Decisions during second Obama term, or • By a new President • Assumes that NASA can be re-invented and the Apollo era can finally be brought to a close

18. WILL THE NEW APPROACH BE ACCEPTED AND BE SUSTAINABLE? • Lots of vested interests in the status quo; change is hard • The White House and NASA lost control of message as new approach was rolled out, and has had limited success in regaining that control. This is a sophisticated strategy that must be supported over many years to pay off. • Congress authorized VSE in 2005 and 2008 and only reluctantly (if at all) is willing to accept dramatic changes in the programs it has previously approved. • This is very much a work (and strategy, and program) in process; strategic decisions were made by a few people at the last minute and without enough detail to satisfy space community

19. SO WHAT IS GOING ON NOW? • Are we in the midst of: • A fundamental disconnect in the political and space communities about the best path forward in human space flight?, or • A necessary period of policy and political turmoil before a major change in direction is agreed upon?

20. A WILD CARD • New approach calls for working with international partners to plan destinations, schedules, and division of labor • Will other spacefaring countries be willing to work intimately with the United States to this end, given the seeming instability in our commitment to exploration? • Or will they seek other partnerships or a unilateral approach to pursue their ambitions in space?