Success or Failure?

1. Success or Failure? A Critical Evaluation of the Transnational Strategies Used to Combat Mexican Drug Cartels Dan Somerfield - MA TOC - Dissertation Presentation - Jan/12

2. Outline of Presentation Introduction…………………………...................................................3 Drug Trafficking as Transnational Crime……………………………..4 History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & Mexican-U.S. Relations……12 1914-1947...................................................................................13 1947-1985 …………………………………………………………..18 1985-2000…………………………………………………………...22 2000-Present………………………………………………………..31 Analysis of Mexican-U.S Strategies to Combat Drug Trafficking....39 Dissertation Research………………………………………………….51 Sources……………………………………………………………….....53 2 2 2 2 2 2

3. Introduction This presentation examines drug trafficking from Mexico to the United States. My interest in this topic is a personal one as I have visited Mexico on many occasions and my wife is from Saltillo, Coahuila, in northern Mexico. There, I have witnessed masked soldiers of the Mexican army patrolling the streets in pickup trucks mounted with .50 calibre machine guns and have heard fear in the whispered voices of those who dared speak of the Zeta drug cartel. I have examined various aspects of drug trafficking and Mexican drug cartels in my courses in Staffordshire University’s M.A. Transnational Organized Crime program. It is now the subject of my dissertation. First, drug trafficking is introduced as a transnational crime. Second, the history of drug trafficking in Mexico and U.S.-Mexican relations are explained. This is followed by some analysis of the strategies used to combat drug trafficking. Finally, some questions for my proposed research are identified. 3 3 3 3 3

4. Drug Trafficking as Transnational Crime Efforts at controlling drugs on an international level have existed for more than a century. International conventions tend to reflect the values of the more powerful states and the drug control conventions are no exception. The U.S. has been a dominant force in drug control from the beginning and has been a leading proponent of prohibition based on a crime control model. “This stringent position has reflected the desire and capacity of the U.S. to impose its drug-related norms on the rest of the world” (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006: 45). 4 4 4 4 4

5. Drug Trafficking as Transnational Crime Drug trafficking is defined as “the illegal movement, across one or more national frontiers, of psychoactive substances controlled under three instruments of international law known as the drug control conventions” (Chawla & Pietchmann, 2005: 160). Transnationality is an unavoidable and essential element of the definition as drugs from source countries are moved to other countries where the illicit drugs are in demand. Drug trafficking did not exist as a crime until the early twentieth century when the international conventions determined which drugs were legal and illegal (ibid: 160). 5 5 5 5 5

6. Drug Trafficking as Transnational Crime Although drug trafficking is transnational in nature, early efforts to control it were not. Most attempts at controlling drug trafficking were on a national level since the international drug control system was primarily geared to controlling the licit trade in drugs (ibid: 176). For example, the Harrison Act of 1914 was a unilateral action by the U.S. to curtail drug trafficking and consumption (Recio, 2002: 39). While it “drastically reduced the consumption of narcotics in the U.S.” (Lyman, 2011: 47), it also had the unintended consequence of increasing drug trafficking from Mexico. 6 6 6 6 6

7. Drug Trafficking as Transnational Crime The ratification of the Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs in 1936 put drug trafficking on the international level for the first time. Its purpose was “to stem the illicit drug traffic and harshly punish traffickers through criminal sanctions” (Sinha, 2001: 15; Chawla & Pietchmann, 2005: 161). In spite of its lofty objectives, this treaty had a negligible effect on drug trafficking as few countries ratified it with others, including the U.S., considering bi-lateral treaties with like-minded states to be the better option (McAllister, 2000: 123). However, it did make one important contribution to the international drug control regime. “All of the previous treaties dealt primarily with the regulation of ‘legitimate’ drug activities whereas the 1936 Trafficking Convention now made such activities an international crime subject to penal sanctions” (Sinha, 2001: 15-16). 7 7 7 7 7

8. Drug Trafficking as Transnational Crime With drug control under the auspices of the United Nations (U.N.) in 1946, the international community began consolidating the various drug control treaties. The result of these negotiations was the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. This convention replaced all of the previous existing drug control treaties except one. The 1936 Trafficking Convention was not included as there was a lack of agreement regarding which provisions to include in the Single Convention (McAllister, 2000: 207-208). With the Trafficking Convention remaining in force, little attention was paid to this aspect of drug control in the Single Convention. Section 35 of the Single Convention encourages cooperation between states including the use of extradition and Section 36 requires signatories to develop adequate punishments for drug related offences including trafficking and designates them as punishable offences (Sinha, 2001: 21; Chawla & Pietchmann, 2005: 176). 8 8 8 8 8

9. Drug Trafficking as Transnational Crime The administration of the international drug control treaties was transferred to the newly created International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) of the U.N. in 1968 (Sinha, 2001: 23; Neuilly, 2010: 375). President Richard Nixon’s declaration of war on drugs in the late 1960s focused attention on the international drug control conventions. In order to expand control over a greater number of drugs, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances was passed so that drugs such as LSD, amphetamines and barbiturates were controlled. The convention was formulated in response to the increased use of these drugs during the 1960s (Thoumi, 2009: 78). The resulting Single Convention Protocol in 1972 “strengthened the functions of the INCB by clearly stating that they included the prevention of illicit trafficking in drugs” (ibid: 31-32). 9 9 9 9 9

10. Drug Trafficking as Transnational Crime In addition, efforts led by the U.S. government resulted in the Single Convention Protocol in 1972 which “strengthened the functions of the INCB by clearly stating that they included the prevention of illicit trafficking in drugs” (Sinha, 2001: 31-32). The international community became concerned in the early 1980s about the limited attention to trafficking in the existing international drug conventions and the U.N. began working on a convention to address this issue. The 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances brought various precursor chemicals used to manufacture drugs under international control and sought to “reduce the incentives for drug trafficking by increasing risks such as imprisonment as well as reducing benefits through the confiscation of profits” (Chawla & Pietchmann, 2005: 160 & 177). It was ratified in 1990 and re-established the focus on fighting international drug trafficking that first began in1936 (ibid: 177 & 180). 10 10 10 10 10

11. Drug Trafficking as Transnational Crime The 1988 Trafficking Convention, designed as an instrument of international criminal law (Sinha, 2001:33), elevated drug trafficking to a criminal offence unlike the 1961 Single Convention’s reference to it as a punishable offence (Neuilly, 2010: 374). “It acknowledged that huge profits from drug trafficking allowed transnational criminal organizations to contaminate and corrupt governments, business and society” (Carstairs, 2005: 62). Therefore, drug trafficking clearly belongs in the realm of transnational organized crime. 11 11 11 11 11

12. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations Drug trafficking in Mexico can be traced to the early twentieth century. Astorga (2002: 8) describes its development over four periods: “1) 1914-1947 which witnessed the birth of drug trafficking and its connections to political power; 2) 1947-1985 where the army and the police are created as structural mediations between the political power and the drug traffickers; 3) 1985-2000 where the one party monopoly on power begins to lose power over its mediating institutions and there is greater pressure from the U.S. than in previous times; 4) 2000 to the present where political power shifts from Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) to the opposition party, Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) and the significant changes in the relations between the political power and drug trafficking.” 12 12

13. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 1914-1947 A divergence in laws around the prohibition of drugs in the two countries acted as a catalyst for drug trafficking. Opium and its derivatives, morphine and heroin, were strictly controlled in the U.S. through the enactment of the Harrison Act of 1914 and by 1922, these drugs were totally prohibited (Recio, 2002: 26). This was not the case in Mexico. According to Craig (1978: 108), Mexican “opium was only grown for personal use prior to World War I but trafficking to the U.S. began during the war when the traditional world trade was interrupted.” Marijuana and the opium poppy were legal substances in Mexico until 1920 and 1926 respectively (Astorga, 2002: 10). Therefore between at least 1914 and 1926 what was considered drug trafficking in the U.S. was considered legal enterprise in Mexico (ibid: 4). In spite of the divergence in law, there was some early cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico in drug interdiction. For example, collaboration resulted in the capture of opium shipments between Chihuahua, Mexico and El Paso, Texas in 1912 (Recio, 2002: 33). 13 13 13 13

14. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 1914-1947 Mexico continued to import opium despite being a signatory of the 1912 International Opium Convention. However, given that this convention did not come into force globally until 1919, it was legally not in contravention of it. Since this was during the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1920, Mexican leaders were more concerned about their political survival than controlling opium (ibid: 3). Political uncertainty caused by the revolution was advantageous to drug traffickers. For example, it allowed Colonel Esteban Cantú, the governor of Baja California, to take advantage of his political autonomy and distance from Mexico City to create ‘the kingdom of Cantú’ where from 1915 to 1920 he profited from drug trafficking and the bootlegging of alcohol to the U.S. (Sandos, 1984: 208). The U.S. government was aware of Colonel Cantú’s activities and pressured the Mexican government to take action.

15. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 1914-1947 This early relationship between political power and drug trafficking following the Mexican Revolution would become a characteristic of Mexican governance for more than seven decades. In essence from its inception, drug trafficking was “watched over, administered or controlled by the political power, forming a special field in the illegal economy whose most profitable aspects were subject to the goodwill of the governing class” (Astorga, 2002: 9). Taking advantage of the prohibitionist atmosphere in the U.S. and the lucrative black markets that resulted from it, drug traffickers in the 1920s began planting opium in several states (Recio, 2002: 39). Drug traffickers also became more organized during these years. In response to Mexico’s more stringent drug laws, drug traffickers rearranged their distribution routes and took advantage of improvements in transportation by using trains and airplanes to transport their products within Mexico and to the U.S. (ibid: 40-41). 15 15

16. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 1914-1947 There is conflicting information in the literature regarding the amount of drug trafficking during the interwar years. On one hand, Astorga (1999: 4), indicated that marijuana production was significant and drug traffickers amassed fortunes smuggling opium in the 1930s whereas on the other, Craig (1978: 108) said “traffic in Mexican opium abated during this time and was revived in 1939”. What is certain is that links between drug traffickers and politicians were common. Reports abounded about drug traffickers being protected by politicians as well as by the police whose function was to combat drug trafficking (Astorga, 2002: 11). 16 16 16 16

17. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S. Mexican Relations: 1914-1947 Mexico’s anti-drug policy was the responsibility of the Health Department until 1947 when it was transferred to La Procuraduria General de la República (PGR), the Attorney-General Department (Astorga, 2002: 12). That same year, another important element in Mexico’s drug control policy was also formed. The Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS), Federal Security Department, was an intelligence agency that was responsible to the President and had the authority to intervene in anti-drug policy (ibid: 12). However, the U.S. was aware that its leaders had links to the drug trade (ibid: 12).

18. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 1947-1985 Mexico began ‘La Campaña Permanente’ (The Permanent Campaign) in 1948 as a nation wide response to drug trade consisting mainly of occasional raids on marijuana and opium cultivation and the interdiction of drugs (Craig, 1978: 108). La Procuraduria General de la República (PGR), the Attorney-General Department, was responsible for La Campaña Permanente. A portion of the Mexican army was permanently assigned to the PGR and their primary function was the eradication of opium poppies and marijuana plants. However, “limited resources in personnel and equipment, as well as corruption hampered their efforts” (Craig, 1978: 116-117). The acquisition of aircraft and other equipment in the early 1960s dramatically increased eradication results but these results were short lived once traffickers developed counter-strategies (ibid: 109). Drug interdiction was the responsibility of the Federal Judicial Police (FJP).

19. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 1947-1985 President Richard Nixon was elected on his platform of a declaration of war on drugs in 1968. Throughout the 1960s, Mexican heroin and marijuana continued to enter the U.S. unabated and the U.S. government grew increasingly frustrated with what seemed to be half-hearted efforts against drug trafficking by the Mexican government. American criticisms against La Campaña Permanente were numerous and included: a lack of seriousness due to inadequate funding, failure to send forces to key areas, failure to extradite Mexican traffickers, corruption, and a failure to use defoliants (ibid: 122-127). As a result, the Nixon administration launched Operation Intercept on September 21, 1969 without advising the Mexican government. It involved “the physical searching of every person, regardless of status, that crossed the 1945 mile border as well as intensified land, air and sea surveillance (Craig, 1980a: 566). 19 19 19 19

20. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S. Mexican Relations: 1947-1985 The rationale behind Operation Intercept was threefold. Publicly, its intention was to stop the flow of drugs from Mexico but its hidden agenda was to promote the war on drugs and to pressure the Mexican government into compliance (ibid: 556). It was poorly planned and had some unintended consequences. Operation Intercept lasted twenty days and while some drugs were intercepted, it negatively affected the economies of both countries and created a serious diplomatic incident (ibid: 567-573). Despite the significantly negative consequences, Operation Intercept achieved its objectives. High level talks between the U.S. and Mexico smoothed relations and resulted in Operation Intercept changing to Operation Cooperation (ibid: 577). 20 20 20 20

21. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 1947-1985 Operation Intercept was considered a success by the U.S. government primarily due to the Mexican government’s renewed zeal for their lagging Campaña Permanente (ibid: 579). The U.S. was particularly concerned about the amount of heroin entering the country. Successful anti-drug efforts in Turkey in the early 1970s resulted in Mexico becoming the U.S.’s primary source of heroin (Reuter & Ronfeldt, 1992: 93). This shift can be explained by the balloon effect. Just as “squeezing a balloon forces the air to move to another area so it is with drug trafficking where increased enforcement efforts shift drug trafficking operations to weaker jurisdictions and force greater organizational sophistication” (Lyman, 2011: 136). Given that the amount of drugs interdicted by the FJPfrom 1973 to 1976 was described as being particularly impressive (Craig, 1978: 120), this must have alleviated U.S. government concerns somewhat. While the Operation Intercept debacle had a positive outcome, it also had a significant impact on future Mexican-U.S. relations. It was the “unilateral imposition of Operation Intercept that ended Mexico’s special relationship and introduced drug trafficking as a new issue on the bi-lateral agenda” (Chabat, 1996: 373-374). 21 21 21 21

22. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 1947-1985 Mexico’s revitalized Campaña Permanente led to a period of success against drug trafficking. A significant shift in Mexican drug control policy occurred in November 1975 when the Mexican government addressed a major U.S. criticism by immediately reversing a previous decision against the use of chemical defoliants (Craig, 1980b: 346). As a result, eradication was expanded to a year round basis and increases in funding, greater cooperation between various levels of government within Mexico and with the U.S. government as well as seriously addressed corruption and the use of modern technology resulted in a very successful 1975-76 anti-drug effort that was known as Operation Condor (ibid: 347). 22 22 22 22

23. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 1985-2000 The election of President José López Portillo in 1976 resulted in an even greater commitment and successes against drug trafficking. In January 1977, Operation Condor was directed against the opium poppy fields of Sinaloa, the core of Mexico’s heroin industry, and although there was violent resistance by the traffickers, a significant number of opium fields were eradicated (ibid: 351-358). While Craig (1980b) portrayed Operation Condor as a highly successful anti-drug campaign, Astorga’s (1999) depiction was noticeably less favourable. The social costs of Operation Condor were not considered. While many lives, including high level drug traffickers, were disrupted by being forced to flee to other states, those who suffered arrest, jail and torture tended to be low level players in the drug trade (Astorga, 1999: 10). Overall, the mid 1970s was a successful period for Mexican anti-drug efforts. U.S. drug enforcement officials were delighted to see significant reductions in Mexico’s share of the American drug market from1974 to 1979. Mexican heroin and marijuana accounted for 30% and 20% respectively of the U.S. drug market in the late 1970s (Craig, 1980b: 358-359; Reuter & Ronfeldt, 1992: 94). However, the successes in Mexico’s anti-drug efforts did not last and U.S.-Mexican relations also suffered.

24. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 1985-2000 The U.S. government took a harder stance against drug trafficking in the 1980s and much of the attention was focused on Mexico. Initially, the U.S. government assumed that Mexican efforts against drug trafficking were sufficient under La Campaña Permanente but by the mid 1980s they began to have serious doubts of this assessment (Chabat, 1996: 399). There are several reasons for this. First, by the mid 1980s drug exports rebounded and drug traffickers developed counter-strategies that made aerial spraying of defoliants less effective (ibid: 107). Second, successful interdiction efforts in the Florida-Caribbean region against Columbian drug cartels led to a balloon effect with Mexico becoming the primary transportation corridor for cocaine (Lyman, 2011: 136 & 287). This opportunity benefited Mexican drug cartels. 24 24

25. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 1985-2000 Over time, the Mexican cartels demanded cocaine instead of cash as payment and by the end of the 1980s they were firmly entrenched in the wholesale cocaine market dominating the Western half of the U.S. (ibid: 13-137). Marijuana from Mexico also replaced Columbian marijuana due to the closing of the Caribbean corridor (Chabat: 1996: 377). Third, the U.S. government was outraged by the abduction, torture and subsequent assassination of Enrique Camarena, a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent in Guadalajara, Mexico on February 7, 1985 by drug traffickers that was done with the complicity of several high ranking FJP and DFS officials (Walker III, 1996: 395). 25 25 25

26. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 1985-2000 As a result, there was increased pressure on Mexico to do more against drug trafficking. The Mexican government responded by disbanding the DFS (Astorga, 2002: 15). The U.S. government launched a second Operation Intercept ten days after Camarena’s murder as a response (Chabat, 1996: 378). This was followed by another significant drug interdiction effort on the U.S.-Mexico border in 1986. According to Lemus (1996: 423), Operation Alliance was in direct response to the shift to Mexico as a primary drug source following the successful interdiction efforts in the Florida/Caribbean region. Fourth, the U.S. government escalated the war on drugs in the 1980s. President Ronald Regan’s amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act in 1982 militarized the war on drugs by allowing military involvement in civilian law enforcement (Grayson, 2003: 151-153). He then declared the drug trade to be a threat to national security in 1986 (Walker III, 1993: 39; Reuter & Ronfeldt, 1992: 110). 26 26 26

27. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 1985-2000 That same year, the certification process as a drug control strategy was implemented. As a result, the U.S. President was “legally obligated to inform Congress annually about which drug producing or drug transit countries had fully cooperated with U.S. drug control efforts during the previous year in order for them to avoid a series of aid and trade sanctions” (Storrs, 1998: 1). Certification is based on the following criteria: “1) a budget dedicated to fight drug trafficking, 2) seizures and eradication of shipments, 3) the number of arrests, 4) legal and institutional reforms aimed to strengthen the fight against drugs, 5) the signing of international drug agreements, and 6) acceptance of U.S. collaboration” (Chabat, 2002: 7). Although Mexico was fully certified every year from the beginning of the program, it was a source of tension between the two countries. Mexico considered the certification process as a challenge to sovereignty (Walker III, 1993: 41) and the granting of full certification to Mexico was not without its critics in Congress (Storrs, 1998: 2). 27 27 27

28. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 1985-2000 Also in 1986, the DEA retaliated for the Camarena killing by sponsoring the kidnapping of René Verdugo Urquidez who was involved in this crime (Chabat, 1996: 378). This was an obvious violation of Mexican sovereignty. U.S.-Mexican relations were normalized in 1988 with the elections of Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and U.S. President George H. Bush (ibid: 389). President Salinas declared drug trafficking as a national security threat that same year. Its purpose differed from that of the U.S. since the Mexican military was involving in combating drug trafficking from the 1940s. Rather, it seemed to be for political reasons in order to rally support for the government’s efforts (Reuter & Ronfeldt, 1992: 111 & 115). A longstanding and important issue for the Mexican government has been the issue of sovereignty. Relations between the two countries deteriorated again in 1990. The DEA’s sponsored rendition of Dr. Humberto Alvarez Machain, a suspect in the Camarena killing, and a 1992 ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court that rendition was an acceptable method to ensure prosecution even if it violated international law further tested relations between the two countries (Storrs, 1998: 5; Chabat, 1996: 382; Walker III, 1993: 50).

29. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 1985-2000 The Mexican share of the U.S. drug market increased during the 1990s. In 1991, Mexico was responsible for 33% of the heroin, 70% of the foreign grown marijuana and more than 50% of the cocaine in the U.S. (Storrs, 1998: 2). The demise of the Columbian cartels was a factor in Mexican drug cartels becoming more powerful in the mid 1990s (Finckenauer, Fuentes & Ward, 2001: 3). From 1995 to 1997, Mexico’s share of the U.S. drug market was between 20 to 30% for heroin, 80% for marijuana, between 50-60% for cocaine and 80% for methamphetamine precursor chemicals (Storrs, 1998: 2). The increase can be attributed in part to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which came into force in early 1994. “The explosive growth in transborder commercial activity under NAFTA and the increase in human and merchandise traffic” provided more opportunities for drug cartels to smuggle their products into the U.S. (Miro, 2003: 3). Mexican cooperation with the U.S. in anti-drug efforts was renewed following the election of Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo in 1994. Under his administration, the army took on a new role in addition to its eradication work, that of law enforcement, to fight drug traffickers (Chabat, 2002: 5). 29 29 29

30. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 1985-2000 Although there were an increasing amount of drugs entering the U.S. in the 1990s, the U.S. government was confident that President Zedillo was sincere about combating drug trafficking. For example, Mexican eradication efforts during this period yielded greater results than earlier in the decade (Storrs, 1998: 3). While the U.S. viewed these efforts as positive, critics continued to be concerned with the level of corruption within Mexico. In order to increase collaboration in anti-drug efforts between the two countries, a High Level Contact Group for Drug Control was established in 1996 to address such issues (Finckenauer, Fuentes & Ward, 2001: 15). During this period there was also a gradual shift in Mexican politics at both the state and federal levels with the ruling party losing government posts to the opposition thus reducing the power of the government and its power over drug traffickers (Astorga: 2002: 16). 30 30

31. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 2000-Present Mexico began a new political era in 2000 with the election of President Vincente Fox of the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) thus ending Partido Revolucionario Institucional’s (PRI) seventy-one year rule. Although the various Mexican PRI administrations made efforts to combat drug trafficking it appears that they were more selective than comprehensive. There is consensus in the literature that the PRI government tolerated and protected drug trafficking in some areas while making arrests and eradicating drug crops in others, suggesting an overall policy of accommodation (Beittel, 2011: 4). U.S.-Mexican relations improved significantly with this shift by President Fox’s administration. Fox’s campaign platform promised a “war without mercy on organized crime” (ibid: 3) which represented a significant change in Mexican government policy towards drug trafficking. The transfer of power from “PRI to PAN, changed the Mexican government’s stance from acquiescence and even tacit support for the drug trade to confrontation with the traffickers” (Williams, 2009: 2).

32. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 2000-Present The election of President Felipe Calderón (PAN) in 2006 resulted in a significant escalation of the Mexican government’s war on drugs because of his strategy of direct confrontation. It has been implemented by deploying 50,000 military and federal police for anti-cartel operations in various locations, often replacing local police due to fears of corruption. Some examples are: Operation Secure Mexico (2005) sought to combat drug violence and police corruption in specific cities; Northern Border Initiative (2006) involved the deployment of 800 federal police to Neuvo Laredo as well as Platform Mexico Initiative (2008) which was designed to improve communication between various levels of law enforcement and to create a nationwide database on drug cartels (Cook, 2008: 15). As a consequence, drug violence has escalated to an unparalleled level as the cartels engage in “turf” wars and use various methods to target police, military, politicians, public officials and civilians. These methods include “massacres of young people and migrants, the killing and disappearance of journalists, the use of torture, beheadings, and car bombs” (Beittel, 2011: 1). The latest Mexican government data indicated that there were 47,515 drug related deaths from December 2006 to September 2011 (BBC: 2012).

33. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 2000-Present According to various sources, eight major drug cartels are currently operating in Mexico although discrepancies exist between sources (Miro, 2003; Cook, 2008; BBC, 2011b; Beittel, 2011). These discrepancies are likely due to cartels forming from loose networks with new groups and resulting splits within organizations or by shifting alliances among cartels. The differences in the maps (BBC, 2011a; BBC, 2011b) listed below illustrate how fluid Mexican drug cartels are and demonstrate inter-cartel conflict through changes in territory controlled. Mexican drug cartels evolve as necessary either to counter new government strategies or to seize new opportunities to increase profit. In 2001, they were considered to “work almost exclusively in the drug market” (Finckenauer, Fuentes, & Ward, 2001: 5) yet within the past ten years, “Mexican drug cartels have become poly-criminal organizations engaging in a wide variety of criminal activities in addition to selling illegal drugs” (Beittel, 2011: 6). The two most powerful groups are the Sinaloa and Zetas cartels (Associated Press, 2011). The former is older and reportedly controls 45% of the drug trade in Mexico (Beittel, 2011: 8). The latter originated in the late 1990s and was associated with the Gulf cartel as enforcers but separated to form an independent cartel in 2009 (ibid: 10). 33 33

34. Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 2000-Present (BBC News, 2011a: February 1) 34 34

35. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 2000-Present (BBC News, 2011b: August 26) 35 35

36. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 2000-Present A strategy of decapitation, the targeting of leaders, has also been used in an attempt to weaken the cartels (Miro, 2003: 4). The Mexican government has since “replaced this strategy with one that focuses more on networks rather than just the leaders” (Felbab-Brown, 2010, 2). In addition, the Calderón government has used a strategy of focusing on specific cartels at different times. The reason for this is “to break the cartels into smaller more manageable pieces in an effort to change them from a national security threat into a local security problem” (Rios & Shirk, 2011: 18). Mexico is also taking steps to deal with corruption. Attempts to counter corruption within the police include: ballistic checks on weapons, purging of 284 federal police commanders, reforming hiring practices including regular financial checks, drug and psychological testing, and better police salaries (Cook, 2008: 13).

37. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 2000-Present President Calderón’s government has displayed “an unprecedented willingness to collaborate with U.S. on joint counter drug issues” (Beittel, 2011: 18) and this is demonstrated in part by the extradition of numerous drug cartel leaders to the United States (Cook, 2008: 3-4 & 16). Although U.S.-Mexican relations were quite good, they were not without their problems. For example, following President George W. Bush’s decision to build a fence along the border President Calderón said “it complicated U.S.-Mexican relations and denounced it at the Organization of American States” (Ribando Seelke, 2011: 10). While this fence may give the U.S. a sense of security, it seems to be a false one. Drug cartels are using tunnels to smuggle drugs across the border as a counter-strategy. The U.S. government’s level of trust in the Mexican government has progressively increased following the elections of Presidents Fox and Calderón due to their aggressive strategies towards the drug cartels. As a result, financial aid for Mexican counter narcotics operations for the period 2007 to 2012 through the State Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account totals $947,976,000 (Just the Facts, 2011: 2).

38. History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican Relations: 2000-Present In 2007, the Mexico and the U.S. governments agreed on a counter-drug and anti-crime assistance package consisting of equipment and training from 2008 to 2010. Known as the Merida Initiative, it had four goals: 1) “break the power and impunity of criminal organizations; 2) assist the Mexican government in strengthening border, air and maritime controls; 3) improve the capacity of Mexico’s justice system; 4) curtail gang activity in Mexico and diminish drug demand in the region” (U.S. Committee on Foreign Relations, 2010: 3). In response to rising drug violence in Mexico, the Office of National Drug Control Policy updated the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy in June 2009. This document differed from the previous version by placing a greater emphasis on reducing the flow of drug profits and weapons across the Southwest border (National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, 2009: 25 & 34). Beyond Merida, enacted in 2011, “broadens the scope of bilateral security efforts and focuses more on institution building than on technology and equipment transfers” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2010: 4). Like its predecessor, it is based on four pillars: 1) “disrupting organized crime groups; 2) institutionalizing the rule of law; 3) building a 21st century border; 4) building strong and resilient communities” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2010: 4; Beittel, 2011: 19). 38 38

39. Analysis of Mexican-U.S. Strategies to Combat Drug Trafficking The Mexican government’s current strategy of direct confrontation has resulted in an increase in the levels of violence towards government and civil society (Rios & Shirk, 2011: 18). For example, there were 8901 drug-related killings in six years under President Fox’s administration compared to 34,550 in the first four years of President Calderon’s administration (ibid: 1). The nature of the drug-related violence has more to do with staying in business than turning Mexico into a failed state as some would suggest. The state is no longer supporting drug traffickers and the violent backlash by the cartels is “about the control and protection of the illegal drug business rather than an attempt to overthrow the state” (Williams, 2009: 3). Although the Mexican government has “successfully removed key leaders in all the cartels, this is misleading as their replacements may be more violent than their predecessors” (Carlsen, 2010: 1; Beittel, 2011: 1 & 18). While the Mexican government regrets the violence, it also sees it as an indicator of success. The U.S. government also shares this view. 39 39

40. Analysis of Mexican-U.S. Strategies to Combat Drug Trafficking However, critics cite the rise of human rights abuses from using the military to perform police functions in addition to the mounting drug violence (ibid: 3). Human Rights Watch completed a two year investigation this past November into the Mexican army abuses in the fight against drug trafficking and found numerous cases of extra-judicial killings, disappearances and torture (BBC: 2011a). In spite of the human rights abuses, the Mexican army continues to have the support of most Mexicans. Currently, 83% of Mexicans endorsed the government’s use of the army to fight drug traffickers and this figure has been fairly consistent in 2010 and 2009 (Pew Research Center, 2011: 16). When asked if the army had a positive impact on Mexico’s situation, those who agreed were 76% in 2002, 76% in 2007, 77% in 2009 and 62% in 2011 (ibid: 14). Given the amount of corruption in Mexico, the public was less confident in the police. Survey results were only 35% in 2009 and 30% in 2011 (ibid: 15). 40 40

41. Analysis of Mexican-U.S. Strategies to Combat Drug Trafficking The continual drug violence has left Mexicans unsure of who is winning the war on drugs. A March 2010 poll in the Milenio newspaper indicated that 59% believed that the drug cartels were winning compared to 21% who thought the government was (U.S. Committee on Foreign Relations, 2010: 2). As a result, it was thought that the Mexican government will have a more difficult time convincing the public that it is winning the war on drugs as the body count grows. In spite of this concern, data from a 2011 poll indicated that “45% of Mexicans thought President Calderón’s government was making progress in its campaign against drug cartels whereas 29% said the government was losing ground (Pew Research Center, 2011: 1).

42. Analysis of Mexican-U.S. Strategies to Combat Drug Trafficking It was also thought that President Calderón’s unprecedented level of cooperation with the U.S. could also be a contentious issue for Mexicans. “While the dramatic surge in violence is an expected upshot of the aggressive campaign against drug trafficking organizations, the risk is that political support for expanded cooperation with the U.S. may not survive the daily news reports of brutal homicides and kidnappings” (U.S. Committee on Foreign Relations, 2010: 3). However, this concern does not seem to have been realized as recent data suggests that continued cooperation with the U.S. continues to be seen as positive. While the majority of Mexicans are supportive of U.S. assistance through training, supplying money and weapons, only a minority would support the deployment of U.S. troops in Mexico (Pew Research Center, 2011: 17). Not surprisingly, sovereignty continues to be an important issue for Mexico.

43. Analysis of Mexican-U.S. Strategies to Combat Drug Trafficking In spite of escalating violence and drug related killings, public support for the president and national government has generally increased until this year. This suggests that Mexicans may be growing weary of the escalating violence. 2010 was a particularly violent year in terms of drug related homicides. Statistics show that “killings related to organized crime increased by more than 40% from 9, 614 in 2009 to 15,273 in 2010 (Rios & Shirk, 2011: 8). President Fox was viewed as having a positive impact by “66% of Mexicans in 2002 and for President Calderón, the figures were 70%, 75% and 54% for 2007, 2009, and 2011 respectively (ibid: 14). Public support for the national government as a whole has generally been less. Only 64% in 2002, 70% in 2007, 72% in 2009, and 54% in 2011 of Mexicans believed the national government was having a positive influence on Mexico’s situation (ibid: 14).

44. Analysis of Mexican-U.S. Strategies to Combat Drug Trafficking Mexico’s strategy of periodically targeting specific cartels over others has led to criticism that the government is colluding with other cartels to remove some of the competition (Cook, 2008: 11-12). Mexican police deny these accusations. Although this strategy weakens the targeted cartel, it also creates opportunities for rival cartels to expand their territory and to take over trafficking routes (Freeman, 2006: 9). The strategy of removing the cartel leaders has shifted Mexican army resources from eradication duties thus resulting in higher cultivation and production of illicit drugs (Beittel, 2011: 18). Broader issues for Mexicans than the number of killings is the fear that is instilled in the general population and the disruption caused to civil society by the drug-related violence. Drug cartels seem to operate with impunity resulting in a fear by innocent citizens becoming collateral damage (Freeman, 2006: 6). Cartels have also killed journalists thus silencing the media through intimidation (ibid: 6-8; Rios & Shirk, 2011: 14). Civil society has been disrupted with a general mistrust of the police due to Mexico’s pervasive corruption and a silencing of the media about drug trafficking (Freeman, 2006: 4-8). 44 44

45. Analysis of Mexican-U.S. Strategies to Combat Drug Trafficking Although collaboration with the U.S. has benefited the Mexican government by injecting massive amounts of financial aid into the economy, the Mexican government has criticized U.S. counternarcotics efforts for failing to seriously address the trafficking of arms and drug profits entering Mexico as well as Americans’ demand for illicit drugs (Cook, 2008: 18). Illegal firearms have fuelled the drug violence and profits from drug trafficking are used to pay corrupt officials on both sides of the border. More than 62% of the 80,000 illegal firearms seized by Mexican authorities originated in the U.S. and only 1% of the estimated $20 billion dollars in drug profits is smuggled into Mexico (Beittel, 2011: 21). These issues were ignored in the Merida Initiative (Council on Foreign Relations, 2010: 3). In an attempt to address these criticisms, the U.S. government revised its Southwest Border Strategy in 2009. It now benefits both governments by dealing with arms smuggling and money laundering issues as well as offering greater protection against drugs entering the U.S. While the Merida and Beyond Merida Initiatives deal with important issues such as institutionalizing the rule of law and reforming the justice system to assist Mexico in dealing with drug cartels, it must be remembered that their goals will take years, if not decades, to implement successfully (Beittel, 2011: 23). 45 45

46. Analysis of Mexican-U.S. Strategies to Combat Drug Trafficking Criticism of U.S. drug control policies go beyond limiting the flow of arms and drug profits into Mexico. In 2009, Mexico and other countries involved in the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy concluded that “the U.S. led international drug control regime emphasizing the criminalization of drug production and use has largely failed” (Ribando Seelke, Wyler & Beittel, 2011: 24). In fact, it seems that this model of drug control policy has contributed to the problem. “Drug prohibition in the U.S. stimulates and nourishes organized crime, both within and beyond U.S borders” (Freeman, 2006:2). Plan Columbia, on which assistance to Mexico is based, failed because drug production remained the same and corruption increased (Carlsen, 2010: 1). Since Mexico has experienced the same results, the American anti-drug efforts represent yet another failure. 46 46

47. Analysis of Transnational Strategies to Combat Drug Trafficking The Mexican government is also concerned about the U.S. reducing demand for illicit drugs. However, this issue is not likely to be seriously acted upon given the history of U.S. involvement in the international drug prohibition regime. Concerns over domestic abuse became the impetus for American involvement in negotiations for the 1912 International Opium Convention (Nueilly, 2010: 35). The U.S. government has consistently advocated for “punitive control systems in all countries” (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006: 49). It seems that the U.S. has at least made a token gesture in this regard as there is “an increased focus on reducing U.S. drug demand in the 2010 National Drug Control Strategy” (Ribando Seelke, Wyler & Beittel, 2011: 30). U.S. assistance from the Merida and Beyond Merida Initiatives consist of long-term goals. In particular, those related to institutionalizing the rule of law and building stronger and resilient communities will not be accomplished any time soon but will likely take decades to achieve. These initiatives are also limited in focus. For example, the U.S. aid intended for police reform is only directed at the federal level. The financial aid basically ignores the more than 2000 state and local police forces throughout Mexico, where greater problems with corruption, insufficient training, compensation and equipment exist (U.S. Committee on Foreign Relations, 2010: iv). 47 47

48. Analysis of Mexican-U.S. Strategies to Combat Drug Trafficking The strategies employed by the Mexican and U.S. governments thus far have been ineffective in dealing with the problem of Mexican drug cartels. Mexican drug cartels have become so powerful that they are regarded as a “threat to the Mexican state” (Cook, 2008: 15) and “the greatest organized crime threat to the U.S.” (U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 2010: 9). Their share of the American drug market continues to grow. Mexico is a major supplier for heroin, marijuana and methamphetamine to the U.S. In addition, 95% of the cocaine used in the U.S. enters through Mexico (U.S. Dep’t of State, 2011: 383). A number of alternative strategies have been suggested. For instance, a reduction in American drug demand could be achieved by providing drug prevention/treatment programs (Freeman, 2006: 17; Carlsen, 2010: 2). There could also be a strengthening of the regulations concerning the sale of guns in the U.S. to make it more difficult to acquire firearms (Freeman, 2006: 19). Money laundering laws could be strengthened to reduce drug profits returning to Mexico to support cartel activities (Carlsen, 2010: 2). The least likely alternative strategy to be considered by the U.S. is to end its policy of drug prohibition (ibid: 2). 48 48

49. Analysis of Mexican-U.S. Strategies to Combat Drug Trafficking It has been suggested that the Mexican government needs a new strategy that will win public support (Rios & Shirk, 2011: 20). A recent announcement by the President’s National Security Spokesman who stated that “Mexico’s drug policy is not a “war” against drug cartels but a comprehensive strategy of the federal government to dismantle criminal organizations while at the same time strengthening institutions” may be indicative of such a shift (Romo, 2011). Perhaps a more effective strategy would be to treat drugs and organized crime as separate issues (Astorga & Shirk, 2010: 39)? Mexicans are becoming increasingly less tolerant of their government’s efforts against drug cartels (Miglierini, 2011). Mexico’s future as a viable country depends on whether or not the Mexican government has the political will and the public’s support to continue its struggle against the drug cartels. Drug trafficking and the government’s response to it will surely be prominent election issues when the next Mexican president is chosen later this year. 49 49

50. Analysis of Mexican-U.S. Strategies to Combat Drug Trafficking 20,000 protest against drug violence in Mexico City (Miglierini, 2011). 50 50