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Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems. Vivek Pathak and Liviu Iftode Department of Computer Science Rutgers University. Outline. Introduction Public key authentication Existing models Motivation for Peer-to-peer authentication Other solutions

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Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

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  1. Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems Vivek Pathak and Liviu Iftode Department of Computer Science Rutgers University

  2. Outline • Introduction • Public key authentication • Existing models • Motivation for Peer-to-peer authentication • Other solutions • Byzantine fault tolerant authentication • Security model • Outline of correctness and performance • Future work Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  3. Public Key Encryption • Public-private key pair • Bootstrap shared secret encryption • Validation of digital signature Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  4. Authentication of Public Keys • Mapping identities to public keys • Trusted third parties (TTP) • Certificate authority (CA) • Web of trust • PGP Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  5. Authentication through CA • Provide public key certificate • Use secure channel for bootstrapping Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  6. Authentication through CA Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  7. Authentication through CA • Represent centralized aggregation of trust • Long lived CA keys • Single point of failure • Public key revocation • Scalability with number of certified keys Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  8. Web of Trust • Informal human authentication • PGP key rings • Levels of trust Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  9. Web of Trust • Peers take on the role of CA • Decentralized trust • No single point of failure • Key authentication depends on human connections • How to apply to autonomous systems • Sophisticated users Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  10. Outline • Introduction • Public key authentication • Existing models • Motivation for Peer-to-peer authentication • Other solutions • Byzantine fault tolerant authentication • Security model • Outline of correctness and performance • Future work Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  11. Characteristics of Peer-to-peer Systems • Heterogeneous peers • Lack of trusted third parties • Hierarchical Certificate Authorities • Large scale peer-to-peer systems • Need decentralized solution • Administrative burden on CA • Scalability of key revocation Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  12. Characteristics of Peer-to-peer Systems • Autonomous operation • Unsophisticated users • Sensors and devices • Web of trust depends on constant human feedback • Short lived public keys • Peers may be attacked and recover • Public key certificates require secure channel • Malicious peers Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  13. Other Solutions • Threshold encryption systems • Share the secret among a set of parties • Defend against a few compromised parties • Secure initialization phase • Crypto based network IDs • Choose network ID as function of public key • Depends on the routing infrastructure Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  14. Outline • Introduction • Public key authentication • Existing models • Motivation for Peer-to-peer authentication • Other solutions • Byzantine fault tolerant authentication • Security model • Outline of correctness and performance • Future work Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  15. System Model • Mutually authenticating peers • Associate network end-point to public key • Asynchronous network • No partitioning • Eventual delivery after retransmissions • Disjoint message transmission paths • Man-in-the-middle attack on Ø fraction of peers Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  16. Attack Model • Malicious peers • Honest majority • At most t of the n peers are faulty or malicious peers where t = 1-6Ø/3 n • Passive adversaries • Active adversaries • Relax network-is-the-adversary model • Unlimited spoofing • Limited power to prevent message delivery Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  17. Authentication Model • Challenge-response protocol • No active attacks • Man in the middle attack • Limited number of attacks • Proof of possession of Ka {b,a,Challenge,Ka(r)}b , {a,b,Response,r}a B A KA KA(NB) NB Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  18. D D C C B B A A E E F F Authentication Model • Distributed Authentication • Challenge response from multiple peers • Gather proofs of possession • Lack of consensus on authenticity • Malicious peers • Man-in-the-middle attack Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  19. D C B A F E Authentication Correctness • Validity of proofs of possession • {e,a,Challenge,Ka(r)}e , {a,e,Response,r}a • All messages are signed • Required for proving malicious behavior • Recent proofs stored by the peers Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  20. Byzantine Agreement Overview • Publicize lack of consensus • Authenticating peer sends proofs of possession to peers • Each peer tries to authenticate A • Sends its proof-of-possession vector to every peer • Byzantine agreement on authenticity of KA • Majority decision at every peer • Identify malicious peers • Complete authentication Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  21. Byzantine Agreement Correctness Overview • Consider proofs received at a peer P Φn on compromised path to A t malicious peers Φn on compromised path to P Set of Peers of P Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  22. Byzantine Agreement Correctness Overview • t + 2Øn may not arrive • P receives at least n-t-2Øn proofs • t + 2Øn may be faulty • P receives at least n-2t-4Øn correct agreeing proofs • P decides correctly by majority if n-2t-4Øn > t + 2Øn • Agreement is correct if t < 1-6Ø/3 n Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  23. Trust Groups • Execute Authentication on smaller Trust groups • Quadratic messaging cost • Peer interest • Trusted group • Authenticated public keys • Not (overtly) malicious • Probationary group • Un-trusted group • Known to be malicious Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  24. Growth of Trust Groups • Governed by communication patterns • Discovery of new peers • Authentication of discovered peers • Addition to trusted set • Discovery of un-trusted peers Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  25. Evolution of Trust Groups • Covertly malicious peers • May wait until honest majority is violated • Lead to incorrect authentication • Periodic pruning of trusted group • Unresponsive peers • Remove older trusted peers from trust group • Reduce messaging cost • Randomize trusted group membership • Group migration event • Probability of violating honest majority Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  26. Bootstrapping Trust Group • Authentication needs an honest trust group • Initialize a Bootstrapping trust group • Needed for cold start • Authenticate each bootstrapping peer • Size of bootstrapping trust group • Recover from trusting a malicious peer n > 3/1-6Ø Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  27. Public Key Infection • Optimistic trust • Lazy authentication • Reduced messaging cost • Cache of undelivered messages • Use peers for epidemic propagation of messages • Anti-entropy sessions eventually deliver messages • Infect peers with new undelivered messages Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  28. Public Key Infection • Use logical and vector timestamps • Determine messages to exchange for anti-entropy • Detect message delivery • Double exponential drop in number of uninfected peers with time • Number of cached messages is in O(nlogn) Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  29. Simulation • Implemented Byzantine Fault Tolerant Authentication as a C++ library • Simulation program • Make library calls and keeps counters • Study effects of • Group size • Malicious peers Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  30. Effects of Group Size • Constant Cost for trusted peers • Probationary peers process O(n2) messages • Trust graph does not affect the cost • Randomized trusted sets from Bi-directional trust Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  31. Effects of Malicious Peers • Rapid increase of messaging cost • With group size • With proportion of malicious peers • Byzantine agreement has quadratic messaging cost Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  32. Conclusion • Autonomous authentication without trusted third party • Incremental approach to security • Suited for low value peer-to-peer systems • Tolerate malicious peers • Suited for applications spanning multiple administrative domains • Scalable to large peer-to-peer systems • Eliminate total trust and single point of failure • Made feasible by using stronger network assumptions • Network adversary is not all powerful Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  33. Outline • Introduction • Public key authentication • Existing models • Motivation for Peer-to-peer authentication • Other solutions • Byzantine fault tolerant authentication • Security model • Outline of correctness and performance • Future work Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  34. Future Work • Applications • Provide key authentication capability to Open-SSH • SSH daemons can authenticate their peers • Provide a concise authentication summary to the user • Why the public key of the server is believed/not believed to be what is stated Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  35. Future Work • Applications contd. … • Spam identification through public key authentication • Existing solutions • Filtering: Machine learning to classify contents • Results in misspellings in spam messages • False positive rate independent of sender importance • Postage: Sender pays to send email • End-to-end argument • Safe sender lists • Need to authenticate sender Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  36. Future Work • Sender Authentication • Piggyback authentication protocol on email messages • Messages are signed • They can be delivered to peers indirectly • SMTP allows extension fields • Authenticate senders with existing infrastructure • Incremental deployment • Use digital signature to verify messages from authenticated senders • Allow messages from safe senders pass through • Eliminate false positives from spam filters Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  37. Future Work • Enhancements to the mechanism • Address denial of service • Keep track of work done on behalf of any peer • Peers are authenticated • Agreement on work done on behalf of peers • Use authenticated load information to prevent denial of service • Need economic model • Avoid expensive public key cryptography Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  38. Future Work • Enhancements to the model • Authenticate public keys in Ad-hoc network • Lack the network IDs assumed • Apply to vehicular computing • Does the public key belong to the car on GWB? • Working on Geographical Authentication • Study hybrid trust models • Hierarchical, peer-to-peer, web of trust Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  39. Q&A Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  40. Authentication Protocol Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  41. Objective • Security is an increasing concern • Privacy • Authenticity • Fault tolerance • Secure communication across the internet • Distributed computation with semi-trusted principals : Smart messages • Cost effective security Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  42. Privacy • Encryption • Computational cost • Energy requirements • Our approach: nearly complete privacy • Weakened keys, shortened key lifetime • Tradeoff key lifetime for computational cost at constant security • Cost effective encryption on commodity hardware Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  43. Trust • Trusted third party model • Used in most security implementations • Single-point of security failure • Our model : distributed trust • Authentication of public key is done by a vote of peers • Addition of new participants • Assumption: majority can not be corrupted Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  44. Performance • Lazy authentication protocol for updating the public keys to peers • Uses distributed trust to authenticate the new keys • Allows admission of new peers • Dynamical encryption in Linux kernel • Interrupt free processing • Choose key lifetime based on system limitations Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

  45. Status and Plan • Implemented encryption server on Linux • Preliminary point to point performance evaluation • Investigating security of distributed trust with dynamic membership • Paper in preparation • Targeting active networks and mobile agents Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication in Peer-to-peer Systems

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