Unit 11: Recent Trends in British Foreign Policy

1. Readings: Riddell Unit 11: Recent Trends in British Foreign Policy

2. Guiding Questions • Which themes shaped British foreign policy under Blair? • How did the Iraq war affect movement towards these foreign policy goals? • What were Blair’s legacies in foreign policy? • How does Brown’s foreign policy differ from Blair? • What changes are likely to result from the recent election of a Lib-Con government?

3. Introduction • Blair foreign policy centered on: • 1) Humanitarian Intervention • 2) Maintain Special Relationship with the US • 3) Re-Align the UK with the EU • All three themes are linked. • Humanitarian intervention marked a shift in British foreign policy. • Blair saw the UK as a bridge between the US and the EU • Previous governments have struggled with balancing commitments to the US and the EU. • Relationship came under tremendous strain during the Iraq war.

4. Introduction • By the 2005 election, the UK as a bridge was no longer tenable. • Iraq damaged UK/EU ties and arguably cost Tony Blair the office of PM • Many argued that Blair gave too much to the US without getting much in return. • Few changes during the Brown administration: • 1) Humanitarian intervention has taken on a more international institutional focus. • 2) Despite some initial cooling, US-UK relationship still central. • 3) Slowed movement towards further EU integration within the UK. • Cameron administration re-evaluating British foreign policy. • Conservatives typically more Atlanticist than the Liberal Democrats. • Liberal Democrats more pro-European than the Tories.

5. Blairism: Humanitarianism • Mutual dependence has created a world where sovereignty is no longer absolute. • Where states were failing to address human rights concerns within their boundaries, their sovereignty could be forfeited. • The UK and the international community have a responsibility to intervene in places where human rights are being violated. • Foreign aid, protection of human rights, and strategic use of arms sales are the basis of this new doctrine. • Banning of weapons such as land mines and torture also key. • Combined an “ethical” foreign policy with support for US/UK ties. • But what actions trigger intervention?

6. Blairism: Maintaining the Special Relationship • Blair maintained close connections with the UK during his time in Downing Street. • Modeled New Labour after Clinton’s “New Democrat” playbook. • Clinton as “mentor” until impeachment inquiry. • Blair as an equal following inquiry. • Worked to maintain strong connections to the Bush administration after Clinton’s departure. • Involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan with the US cemented British tied with the US. • But they also strained relationships with the EU.

7. Blairism: Re-Orienting the UK • Blair marked a distinct change from the Thatcher and Major years on the issue of the EU. • Traditional opposition towards German-French cooperation over ESDI ended nderBlair. • Blair believed that ESDI should not duplicate but enhance NATO functions. • This would boost European bargaining weight at the international level. • Would enhance the UK as a “pivot” power. • But Atlantic/European ideals are not always in sync. • EU constraints are greater than often admitted. • Iraq war damaged UK/EU ties; Brown attempted to reduce suspicion of the UK in the EU. • Cameron is not trusted by the EU • Clegg on the other hand is quite popular to EU leaders.

8. Blair I (1997-2001): Humanitarian Intervention • Blair’s foreign policy centered on ethics in foreign policy. • Formed in part as a response to failures to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. • Concept of humanitarian intervention first raised in a Chicago speech in 1999. • A search for a more “moral” foreign policy.

9. Blair I: Humanitarian Intervention • When should the UK intervene? • Blair laid out five questions which must be addressed: • 1) Are we sure of our case? • 2) Have we exhausted all diplomatic options? • 3) Are there military options we can sensibly and prudently undertake? • 4) Are we prepared for the long-term? • 5) Do we have national interests involved? • If the answer is yes, the UK has a right to intervene.

10. Blair I: Humanitarian Intervention • Cook: Focused on violence as a last resort; suggested that force should be used in accordance with international law and should be multilateral. • Cook: Should have UN Security Council backing whenever possible. • Willingness to use force relatively new for a Labour PM. • Used as a basis for UK involvement in Kosovo and Sierra Leone.

11. Blair I: Special Relationship • Major-Clinton relationship chilly; Blair election improved US-UK ties. • US-UK relationship central; but UK could act as a bridge between the US and the EU. • Riddell: Clinton as the “older brother” pushing Blair towards the “Third Way” • Disagreement over Kosovo; Blair pushed the US to work multilaterally through NATO.

12. Blair I: Re-Orienting the UK in the EU • Blair government more firmly in the pro-European camp than earlier Labour manifestoes. • Much more supportive of the EU than the Conservatives. • EU member states cautiously optimistic about the Blair government. • Despite a more pro-European stance, Blair obtained several opt-outs from EU treaties. • Waiver from Schengen and adoption of the euro two of the most visible.

13. Blair I: Re-Orienting the UK • Decision to avoid entry into eurozone caused irritation in Europe. • Government supported euro adoption in principle. • But it would be a tough sell domestically. • Response: Ensure that theBritish economy is more in line with the euro zone economy prior to entry. • Gordon Brown’s “five tests” • Intention was to push off adoption of euro until the second term. • Agreed to hold a referendum on entry. • This decision also irritated Brussels.

14. Blair I: Re-Orienting the UK • Sought strong agreements on European defense. • 1998: St Malo agreement placed Britain with France and Germany on the issue of ESDI. • Irritated the Clinton Administration. • Won concessions from Chirac that ESDI would not compete with NATO. • Summit concluded NATO would be primary actor for collective defense. • Blair: building up independent European capability shows resolve to Atlanticism. • ESDI can be useful in instances where the US does not wish to intervene.

15. Blair II (2001-2005): Humanitarian Intervention • Blair’s commitment to intervention strengthened in the aftermath of 9/11. • He believed that fundamental values were under threat. • Focus of intervention arguably shifted. • Away from human rights to security. • Placed UK squarely within the “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” discourse. • Central to framing the intervention in Iraq. • Possibility of WMD in Iraq used to justify intervention.

16. Blair II: Humanitarian Intervention CRITIQUES Rejoinders 1) International interdependence creates a new normative framework. 2) UN dictates are worthless if they are not enforced. 3) Failed states cannot be fixed without military components. 4) No double standard; self interest can motivate intervention. • 1) Policy is well meaning but flawed. • 2) Main objectives strong but implementation problematic. • 3) No substantive change in British foreign policy.

17. Blair II: Special Relationship • Blair-Bush relationship did not have the same elder/younger component. • 9/11 refocused Bush Administration foreign policy. • Doctrine of preventive war offered as a response to terror. • Blair determined not to let the US “go it alone” • Attempt to push the US towards international institutions.

18. Blair II: Special Relationship • Blair’s refusal to speak out publicly against perceived US unilateralism, Guantanamo Bay, led many to argue that Blair was Bush’s “poodle” • Blair knew Bush valued loyalty; refused to speak out publicly. • Blair wanted two things from the Bush Administration: • 1) That the US seek a UN resolution for the invasion. • 2) That the US recommit itself to solving the Israeli-Palestine conflict.

19. Blair II: Special Relationship • What did Blair get from the relationship? • Evidence is mixed. • 1) Bush did go to the UN; UK as a “bridge to the EU” failed to move France and Germany. • French announcement that they would veto any push towards military action gave Bush Administration what they needed to intervene. • Blair would try to win Parliamentary approval on the basis of WMD; Bush would push for regime change. • 2) Bush did come out in favor of Israeli-Palestinian roadmap for peace. • But attention came late in the administration.

20. Blair II: Re-Orienting UK and EU • 2002: Euro currency enters circulation. • Blair under pressure to adopt the currency. • Brown claimed economic conditions not met yet. • Would make a decision within two years. • 2003: UK had “made progress” on the “Five Tests” • Brown said the UK was not ready to join the euro zone. • Many in the EU doubted British resolve at this point • Believed that desire to enter eurozone no longer credible. • Commitment to referendum reinforced this idea. • Blair’s declining popularity made winning a referendum unlikely.

21. Blair II: UK/EU • Early British commitment to Afghanistan raised suspicions in the EU. • Blair derided as “too aggressive”. • Commitment to Iraq flew in the face of German and French governmental opinion. • British stance resonated amongst Eastern European states. • Split EU. • 2003: Praline Summit attempted to divorce ESDI from NATO. • Caused tension between the EU and the US and UK. • Blair continued to push for NATO as central to EU defense. • Centrality of NATO placed in the draft Constitution. • Blair: Recognition that any ESDI without UK support would be useless

22. Blair III (2005-2007): Humanitarian Intervention • Failure to find WMD in Iraq weakened Blair’s position on this issue. • Damaged the conception of humanitarian intervention. • Also prompted a review of the decision to go to war. • Stretching of British military made involvement in other conflicts Burma, Darfur, etc. unlikely. • Concept of R2P re-evaluated after Blair leaves office.

23. Blair III: Special Relationship • 2006: Speeches on roadmap for peace drowned out by British refusal to condemn Israeli incursion into Lebanon. • Some shifts in Bush’s second term attributed to British pressure. • Pushed for US engagement with Palestine. • Removal of Rumsfeld and public pressure pushed Bush to soften tone against Syria and Iran. • Blair/Merkel did win concession from Bush that global warming was “real” • 2007: US commitment to dialogue with China/India on reducing carbon emissions seen as positive.

24. Blair III: UK/EU • 2004: Decision that the UK would put the European Constitution to a referendum made in response to public pressure. • Blair supported the treaty but winning approval in a referendum unlikely. • Call for referendum caused further irritation in Brussels. • Some EU states argued that if the UK failed to adopt the constitution, the EU could adopt a “two-speed” approach. • Others suggested pressuring the UK to leave. • Decides to hold a referendum towards the end of the ratification process. • Defeats in France and the Netherlands removed political pressure on Blair to hold referendum. • European treaties require unanimity. • 2007: Government contends that the Lisbon Treaty differs from the Constitution and would not necessarily be subject to a referendum. • Method of approval would be left up to Brown. • Passed in parliament.

25. Brown: Humanitarian Intervention • Took over from Blair on 27 June 2007. • Began re-evaluating R2P: R2P should occur within an institutional framework. • Support for UN reform key under Brown. • Miliband: “To assert shared values is not enough. We must embody them in shared institutions” • No active repudiation of British involvement in Afghanistan or Iraq. • Judge withdrawal on the basis of facts “on the ground” • But acknowledged that the British military is stretched too thin to be active in future conflicts. • Tied further deployments to Afghanistan to commitments from other NATO countries.

26. Brown: Humanitarian Intervention • Evolving consensus around a new test. • Lord Malloch-Brown: • 1) Are interventions rule based? • 2) Are we willing to sustain them in the long-term? • 3) Is there adequate burden sharing? • 4) Will they actually curtail the loss of life? • Not clear that either Iraq or Afghanistan would have met these criteria.

27. Brown: Special Relationship • UK maintaining presence in Afghanistan; drawing down troops in Iraq. • Initially pulled away from Bush; spurned the term “special relationship” • Late push towards multilateralism heartened Brown administration. • Maintained centrality of special relationship. • Brown did not refer to the UK as bridge, however. • Revived relationship under Obama • More popular amongst British citizens than Bush. • Obama a bit more reserved on connections to Brown.

28. Brown: UK/EU • Was believed that Brown would be more pro-European than Blair. • In office, not so obvious this was the case. • Favored further enlargement of the EU and opposed deepening (similar to Blair). • Decision to sign Lisbon Treaty after others did was seen as problematic in Brussels. • Made political sense domestically. • Effectiveness in Brussels limited. • Not seen as “likable” • Referendum still required for euro adoption. • Never occurred.

29. Conclusions: Humanitarian Intervention • Humanitarian Intervention: • 1) Formed an initial basis for entering Iraq and Afghanistan. • 2) Iraq war made forays into other “failed states” (e.g. Burma and Zimbabwe) difficult. • 3) Maintained under Brown but with a new emphasis on international institutions and a downplaying of hard power. • Probably dead under the Con-Lib coalition • Military forces are stretched too thinly. • Liberals opposed Iraq war anyway.

30. Conclusions: Special Relationship • Special Relationship • 1) US changed tack and sought UN support for the Iraq war. • 2) Bush did get involved in the Israeli-Palestine conflict. • But late involvement limited influence. • Blair was appointed Quartet envoy. • 3) Blair arguably did push Bush on the issue of climate change.

31. Conclusions: Special Relationship • Blair paid a much higher political price than Bush did for maintaining the relationship. • Bush administration rhetoric did not help Blair’s political cause. • Brown sought to maintain the relationship. • Particularly after Obama took office. • Re-evaluation of relationship occurring under Cameron. • Cameron believes the relationship is special but should be re-evaluated. • Clegg believes the UK should focus more on the EU.

32. Conclusions: UK/EU • Re-Orienting the UK • 1) Blair’s bridge strategy failed; Iraq proved too big a bridge to cross. • 2) Brown didnot adopt this bridge discourse. • But he was also not as warm towards the EU as was anticipated. • 3) Brown did not really shift from Blair’s positions on the EU • Did not push for euro entry • Adoption of the euro unlikely under Lib-Con. • Both favor a referendum before any power is shifted to Brussels. • Liberal Democrats pro EU; Tories more euroskeptic.

33. Next Unit • Conclusions: Britain after Blair • Readings: Dunleavy CH 16 and 17