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The Evolution of Deterrence

The Evolution of Deterrence. The McNamara Years. Robert S. McNamara. Secretary of Defense, 1961-1968. A new approach at DoD. McNamara applied techniques from the private sector to manage, analyze, and evaluate defense programs. planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS) systems analysis.

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The Evolution of Deterrence

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  1. The Evolution of Deterrence The McNamara Years

  2. Robert S. McNamara • Secretary of Defense, 1961-1968

  3. A new approach at DoD • McNamara applied techniques from the private sector to manage, analyze, and evaluate defense programs. • planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS) • systems analysis

  4. The “Whiz Kids” • McNamara brings in a new civilian team to apply his more centralized, quantitative approach. • Cyrus Vance • William Bundy • Paul Nitze

  5. John F. Kennedy • President, 1961-63. • Critical of Eisenhower policies. • Under McNamara’s guidance, his administration develops the policy of “Flexible Response.”

  6. Flexible Response • The U.S. would develop the capacity to meet Communist encroachments with an appropriate level of force. • Included a more optimistic assessment of the U.S. economy. • Greater defense spending could actually stimulate the economy.

  7. Appropriate levels of force? • Nuclear • Conventional • Assistance to allies • Counter-insurgency

  8. McNamara and Nuclear Weapons:Two Issues • Modernize U.S. strategic nuclear forces. • Limit damage to civilians (should war occur). • Initial development of counterforce strategy for U.S. nuclear forces.

  9. McNamara rejects defense options • Included civil defense and anti-ballistic missiles (ABM’s) • Arguments against them: • Soviets could overwhelm ABM systems by building more missiles/warheads. • Such systems very expensive (about $40 billion each) • Soviets might interpret such programs as a sign U.S. thought it could survive nuclear war.

  10. The problems of counterforce doctrine • If U.S. targeted Soviet military targets after U.S.S.R. had launched a first strike, the number of such targets was exceedingly high. • The about of damage would invariably kill millions of Soviet civilians. • Developing such an ability would appear as if the U.S. was building a first strike capability.

  11. Assured Destruction • McNamara seeks to avoid programs that could be considered provocative. • Bolsters stability by emphasizing survivability of U.S. nuclear arsenal and capacity to retaliation. • Becomes known as assured destruction, also mutually assured destruction, or MAD.

  12. Such policy sought: “…the ability to deter a deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States or its allies by maintaining at all times a clear and unmistakable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor… even after absorbing a surprise first attack.”

  13. Bolstering the U.S. nuclear arsenal • The strategic “triad”: • ICBM’s • submarines with SLBM’s/FBM’s • manned bombers • Multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV’s)

  14. Another means to address nuclear weapons • Arms control: • The U.S., U.S.S.R. and U.K. sign the Limited Test Ban Treaty in October, 1963. • Agreed only conduct future nuclear tests underground. • Currently 113 signatories.

  15. The conventional side ofFlexible Response • By developing conventional forces, U.S. would be better able to deter or fight conflicts without escalation to nuclear war. • McNamara proposes a “two-and-a-half war” capability. • Of the increased funds devoted to defense, 80% goes to developing conventional forces.

  16. Conventional force development • Navy: maintains 24 carriers, updates aviation. • Army: develops air cavalry/air mobility forces (helicopters), reorganizes ground divisions.

  17. Counterinsurgency • JFK gives attention to having the Army develop its Special Forces. • Directs other agencies to enhance counterinsurgency (CI) capabilities: • CIA • U.S. Agency for International Development • U.S. Information Agency

  18. Flexible Response and NATO • U.S. pushes to develop alliance’s conventional capability • DoD analyses determine actual Soviet threat to Western Europe only 46 divisions, much lower than “New Look” estimates. • NATO forces increase from 21 to 27 divisions, up to 3,500 aircraft.

  19. Fissures in the alliance • Flexible response gave the impression that the U.S. was backing away from a commitment to use nuclear weapons in Europe’s defense. • Said impression reinforced by other U.S policies. • Cancellation of a missile program to modernize British bomber force. • Refusal to assist French development of nucealr weapons.

  20. France leaves NATO’s military organization, 1966 • Pursues independent development of atomic bomb. • Argues French nuclear forces enhance credibility of deterrence (whereas Flexible Response undermines it).

  21. Tests of Flexible Response • January 1961: Nikita Khrushchev states U.S.S.R. will support “wars of national liberation” and support socialist governments in the Third World.

  22. Bay of Pigs • April 1961: CIA arranges a landing of anti-Castro exiles, in anticipation of provoking an uprising against the Cuban regime. • Invasion botched, embarrasses Kennedy Administration.

  23. Berlin • Communists build the Berlin Wall.

  24. South Vietnam • Special Forces introduced in November 1961

  25. October 1962: The Cuban Missile Crisis

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