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LECTURE 5

LECTURE 5. BRADLEY , VAN INWAGEN AND MOORE ON INTERNAL RELATIONS. VAN INWAGEN AND G. E. MOORE GIVE DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF “INTERNAL RELATION”.

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LECTURE 5

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  1. LECTURE 5 BRADLEY, VAN INWAGEN AND MOOREON INTERNAL RELATIONS

  2. VAN INWAGEN AND G. E. MOORE GIVE DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF “INTERNAL RELATION” WE WILL CONSIDER THEM BOTH. IT SEEMS DOUBTFUL THAT BRADLEY’S ARGUMENT WORKS FOR EITHER ONE. (PERHAPS THERE IS A DIFFERENT DEFINITION OF “INTERNAL RELATION” FOR WHICH THE ARGUMENT SUCCEEDS. WE JUST DON’T KNOW)

  3. VAN INWAGEN’S DEFINITIONS • A RELATION R WHICH MIGHT RELATE THINGS X AND Y IS INTERNALIF ITS’ HOLDING (OR NOT) IS COMPLETELY DETERMINED BY THE INTRINSICATTRIBUTES OF X AND Y. • A RELATION R IS EXTERNALIF AND ONLY IF IT IS NOTINTERNAL.

  4. EXAMPLES:BEING THE SAME COLOR AS, BEING LARGER THAN, BEING 10 FT. FROM 10 FT

  5. BRADLEY’S “REGRESS” ARGUMENT WE USE VAN INWAGEN’S RECONSTRUCTION OF BRADLEY’S ARGUMENT THAT ALL RELATIONS ARE INTERNAL (IN VAN INWAGEN’S SENSE). SUPPOSE THAT X AND Y ARE RELATED BY AN EXTERNAL RELATION R. WE WRITE THIS AS: R(X,Y) BRADLEY THINKS THAT THERE MUST BE SOME EXPLANATION OF WHY R, X, AND Y ARE RELATED IN THIS WAY.

  6. CALL THE NEW RELATION R* IF R(X,Y), THEN THERE IS A RELATION R* THAT HOLDS BETWEEN R, X, AND Y, THAT MAKES THIS SO: R*(R,X,Y). BUT R* CANNOT BE INTERNAL; IT CANNOT BE DETERMINED BY THE INTRINSIC PROPERTIES OF R, X, AND Y: OTHERWISE R ITSELF WOULD BE INTERNAL. BUT NOW WHAT EXPLAINS WHY THE EXTERNAL RELATION R* HOLDS BETWEEN R, X, AND Y?

  7. CALL THE NEW RELATION R’ • IF R*(R,X,Y) IS TO BE EXPLAINED BY A RELATION R’ SUCH THAT R’(R*,R,X,Y), THEN R’ MUST BE AN EXTERNAL RELATION. OTHERWISE R* WOULD BE INTERNAL – WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY RULED OUT. BUT NOW WE ARE EMBARKED ON A VICIOUS INFINITE SERIES OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS: R,R*,R’,R”,… AND WE NEVER GET AN EXPLANATION OF WHY R(X,Y).

  8. WHAT’S THE POINT OF THIS ARGUMENT? IT IS SUPPOSED TO SHOW THAT THERE ARE NO EXTERNAL RELATIONS. IT SEEMS TO PRESUPPOSE THAT IF A RELATION IS NOT INTERNAL, THEN THERE MUST BE SOME “ADDITIONAL” EXPLANATION AS TO WHY IT HOLDS. IT CAN’T JUST BE A “BRUTE FACT” THAT EXTERNAL RELATIONS HOLD. BRADLEY SEEMS TO THINK THAT THE HOLDING OF INTERNAL RELATIONS HAS AN EXPLANATION.

  9. WE MIGHT JUST STOP WITH EXTERNAL RELATIONS THAT THE ONE SPOT IS 10’ FROM THE OTHER IS JUST A FACT. “WHY” THE RELATION HOLDS DOESN’T NEED OR HAVE A FURTHER EXPLANATION. THIS SEEMS LIKE AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO BRADLEY’S ARGUMENT. IT SEEMS MUCH MORE SENSIBLE THAN THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE THING.

  10. G.E. MOORE GAVE A DIFFERENT DEFINITION OF “INTERNAL RELATION” G. E. MOORE 1873-1958

  11. MOORE’S DEFINITIONS SIMPLIFIED A PROPERTYP IS ESSENTIAL TO A THING A IF AND ONLY IF A WOULD HAVE PIN EVERY POSSIBLE WORLD IN WHICH IT EXISTED. A RELATIONAL PROPERTY P IS INTERNALTO A THING A IF AND ONLY IF P IS ESSENTIAL TO A.

  12. MOORE POINTS OUT THAT IT IS EXTREMELY IMPLAUSIBLE TO THINK THAT ALL RELATIONAL PROPERTIES ARE INTERNAL (IN HIS SENSE). IF A IS TEN FEET FROM B, THEN IT DOES NOT SEEM TO BE ESSENTIAL TO A THAT IT HAVE THE RELATIONAL PROPERTY OF BEING TEN FEET FROM B.

  13. ON EITHER OF THESE WAYS OF DEFINING ‘INTERNAL RELATION’, IT SEEMS THAT THERE ARE EXTERNAL RELATIONS • MAYBE THERE IS MORE THAN ONE SUBSTANTIAL THING AFTER ALL!!

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