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Fidel Castro Rise to Power

Fidel Castro Rise to Power. Castro overthrew Batista – who was Batista?.

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Fidel Castro Rise to Power

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  1. Fidel CastroRise to Power

  2. Castro overthrew Batista – who was Batista? • Army General - Batista had interfered in / influenced Cuban politics since 1933, when he led an army coup against the unpopular Machado dictatorship (unpopular because of election fraud, corruption, patronage, state terrorism..) • Batista turned over govt. to the liberal Autentico Party, led by Prio – (the US govt. and US business interests were opposed to this new govt. because it tried to restrict foreign investment.. but FDR didn’t interfere this time…and then repealed the Platt Amend in 1934)

  3. He encouraged the new govt. to introduce moderate reform.. inc. labor reform, limited land re-distribution, a fairer tax system….although corruption in govt. continued • Batista watched from the wings – was considered as somewhat of a Populist / Reformer at this stage (he was President from 1940-1947) • In 1946, Cuba experienced a Post WW II Economic Depression with the collapse of overseas sugar sales – led to unemployment and unrest among lower classes, and dissatisfaction among foreign (esp. US owned Bethlehem Steel) and Cuban businessmen with what they felt was the Priogovt’s / Autentico’s “insatiable corruption or expensive populist programs” (Keen, Haynes).

  4. Before the election of 1952 could be concluded, Batista, in Feb., staged another coup, with tacit US support, overthrowing Prio’sgovt, and installing himself as Dictator • After this coup he banned the Cuban Communist Party, violently suppressed labor strikes, abolished many militant / “troublesome” unions, and eliminated most of the earlier liberal / Autentico Party restrictions on business freedom • Obviously, he was no longer a Populist reformer – he had “changed course”

  5. US businesses - Bethlehem Steel and Merrill-Lynch – praised Batista’s repressive policies towards unions and strikes, as well as his support for unlimited foreign investment, and the free enterprise system in general (remember historiography on US Economic Imperialism / continued involvement in Latin Am, though using different methods, during so called Good Neighbor policy_ • US govt. officially recognized Batista’s administration, and agreed to sell him arms and military equipment (Ruiz and Mexico…survival depended on US recognition and arms sales). • But under Batista the economy continued to deteriorate – it suffered from glaring weaknesses and deficiencies…

  6. Cuban Economy • Dominance of one crop / activity: monoculture: Sugar….cattle ranching the second most important economic activity • Overdependence on US to purchase Cuban sugar: By agreement with the US govt., the US bought 50% of Cuba’s sugar crop annually (had purchased up to 100%) • Concentration of land, esp. sugar plantations, in very few hands: much of the land often remaining idle / unproductive, awaiting a sugar boom • Ownership by foreigners of 80% of the sugar economy (land, refineries) – (American companies controlled 56% of that 80%) - so the bulk of the profits generated by Cuba’s sugar economy flowed out of the country

  7. Lack of industry, due to importation of cheap US goods in return for purchasing Cuban sugar (under reciprocal trade arrangements): “this dampened any efforts at creating import substitution industries in Cuba and discouraged cheaper exports from elsewhere.” (Sebastian Balfour) • The Cuban govt. feared a reduction of the 50% quota by the US if Cuba increased its own manufacturing sector or imported them from elsewhere – so Cuba continued to import, and mostly from the US

  8. What industries / services there were in Cuba, were often controlled by giant US companies which had moved in to exploit Cuba’s natural resources and industry, before and after the expulsion of the Spanish…during the period of the Platt Amendment • US investment in Cuba was valued at $1.3b by 1926 – sugar, railways, mining, tobacco, banking, commerce, real estate, telephone services, gas, electricity, hotels, casinos……Dollar Diplomacy • US Economic Imperialism (and cultural imperialism – playground of US rich and famous) had replaced Spanish Imperialism

  9. The Platt Amend was replaced in 1934 by “a more modern instrument of neo-colonial domination, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement, whereby in exchange for the sugar quota, US exports to Cuba were given preferential tariffs.” (Balfour) • Balfour casts doubts on the Good Neighbor Policy – he feels the US found a different way to exploit • For the lower class / workers, because of the lack of industry, unemployment was high: and working conditions poor, salaries were low, and poverty was widespread….in the sugar industry there was “underemployment” (seasonal only)

  10. “Any policy of developing Cuba’s economy, any effort to regenerate Cuban society thus came to mean two related things in particular: to shake off its dependence on the US, and to break out of the yoke of its sugar monoculture.” (Balfour) • To Cuban nationalists the struggle for independence was seen as unfinished business…US economic imperialism created more domination over the Cuban economy than under Spanish imperial power…(Balfour) • Balfour talks about the “twin blight of the Cuban republic – its economic and cultural subordination to the USA and the corruption of its political life”

  11. Politics Under Batista • His new regime was unelected, corrupt, and repressive. • Elections of 1952 were cancelled: he then abolished Congress and all political parties….his undemocratic, dictatorial rule and his repressive policies (denied freedom of speech, press: arrested and imprisoned his critics) caused much unrest: he was opposed by • The Autentico, the moderate, liberal party of former PresGrau…its leaders fled to the USA (this party had itself been corrupt under its previous leaders) • Ortodoxo Party, another moderate, liberal, reform party, of the late Eddie Chibas….a breakaway party from the Autentico • The Confederation of University Students

  12. The Communist Party • A new party added to the mix in 1953, the 26th of July Movement, formed by Fidel Castro, who broke with the Ortodoxos • Support? • Batista was supported by Conservative groups, business interests, some unions, army, generals…

  13. Fidel Castro • From a reasonably wealthy landowning / sugar plantation family (father was a former Spanish soldier): private Jesuit (Catholic) secondary education…clever but difficult student; then Studied law at the University of Havana, where he first became politically active (1945) • As a student he participated in an unsuccessful invasion of the Dominican Republic to overthrow dictator Rafael Trujillo (1947) • 1947-1952; after flirting with the student Communist groups (“he felt the attractive influence of Marxism as it provided a seemingly rational and definitive explanation for the events of History” - Quirk), he became a follower of Eddie Chibas and joined the moderate, liberal, Ortodoxo party which favored “a mild program of social reform and fair, uncorrupted politics”

  14. 1952 - disillusioned he broke with the Ortodoxo party (Chibas: committed suicide on the air / radio, during a broadcast)– he said he favored rebellion / revolution rather than Chibas’s moral campaigns, which he felt were insufficient • But he said that he learned a lot from Chibas before breaking with him – about public relations, in particular “the value of bold, emotive political broadcasting”… • Castro ran for political office (as an independent) in 1952 – hoping to use a seat in parliament as a “point of departure for a revolution”

  15. But Batista seized power before the elections could be held. • The coup destroyed any lingering doubts that Castro had that Cuba could be regenerated through parliament… “in any case he was not inclined towards the rituals of parliamentary activity….his political ideals were inspired by the heroic and violent myths of Cuba’s past…..he prized oratory and physical heroism … he was aware of the power of populist leadership”…(Balfour) • After Batista’s take over, he put together a loose organization / following of about 1,200, dividing them into cells of 150 each

  16. He launched a naïve and failed attacked on the Moncada army barracks, near Santiago, on July 26th, 1953, with the local cell, involving 111 men (documentary has a different number?) – his group took their name from this date: he hoped to spark a rebellion against the Batista dictatorship – but the attack was easily defeated • Hoped to capture weapons, arm his followers, incite a popular revolt; and if that failed, flee to the hills of the Sierra Maestra Mts. and engage in guerilla warfare from there………to assist the expected popular revolt • Castro was captured several days after the disastrous attack on the barracks and later put on trial….there wasn’t any popular revolt

  17. Although the assault failed, with heavy casualties, the drastic acts of repression carried out by the govt. in its wake (tortured and shot dead 69 of the 111 – only 3 killed in combat, the rest murdered by fed. troops), and Castro’s eloquent defense speech at his trial got him a lot of publicity, and admiration • His speech was titled History Will Absolve Me and was later printed in pamphlet form

  18. History Will Absolve Me • He first documents the extreme poverty, deprivation, suffering of the Cuban people - unemployment, poor living conditions, unequal distribution of land, foreign ownership of land, illiteracy, malnutrition, lack of health care, education, social services • Then criticized corruption of upper class and past and present governments • He offered a remedy, which he called his five revolutionary laws: • 1. return power to the people and proclaim the democratic Autentico 1940 Constitution the Supreme Law of the State • 2. Redistribution of land to give all peasants a minimum of 150 acres

  19. 3. workers to share 30% of the profits of all large industries, mines, and sugar mills • 4. all sugar plantation workers would share 55% of all sugar production profits • 5. the confiscation of all holdings, all ill-gotten gains of those who had committed frauds during previous regimes • Finally, citing extensively from Montesquieu, Aquinas, Martin Luther, Locke, Rousseau, Paine, the US Constitution and other sources, inc. Cuban nationalist Marti, he carefully laid a legal and historical rationale to justify his right to try to overthrow an unjust dictator who held power illegitimately. Under such circumstances, he argued, he could not possibly be guilty of any “crime”.

  20. Balfour says the speech later became the “Testament of the Revolution”….it was his Manifesto to the People, containing a “profound message of social justice” • While he was in prison, the 26th July Movement was continued by a small group, inc. several women (supported by network of women’s groups “who served the revolution as lawyers, interpreters, medial aids, grassroots organizers, educators, spies, messengers, and armed combatants” – Keen), who formed alliances with other anti-Batista groups. • These women produced and distributed 10,000 copies (later, another 10,000) of his speech, which enhanced his reputation, and made him known nationally

  21. Interpretation of his ideas?? What was he? What was it he was proposing? Was he a Communist at this stage in his career? .......there is no mention of Communism, he was not a member of the Communist Party on the campus of Havanna University…. Had joined Ortodoxo Party, invoked Autentico Constitution • In college he protested that he was not a Communist… and the Cuban Communist Party condemned his attack on Moncada as rash and impulsive

  22. Never claimed at this stage to be inspired by Marx, Lenin, Stalin, or Mao (though he read Marx, and some his best friends were Communist Party members) • At that time he claimed to be a “liberal reformer”: but did not embrace any one specific ideology – he was motivated by the desire for “social justice”, he claimed inspiration from historic figures in Cuban history esp. and mostly by Jose Marti, one of the leaders in the Cuban struggle for independence from Spain in the late 19th century…

  23. “he was relatively unsophisticated ideologically, drawing inspiration from many different sources, of which the most important were Cuba’s nationalist traditions….he was a liberal reformer…” (Balfour) • Castro was not inspired by Marxist or Leninist strategy, nor was his movement a working class organization, though it had popular roots (Balfour) • “Fidel saw political ideology as a pragmatic tool to be adopted by political geniuses in the services of historic achievements. Pragmatism in the pursuit of power was clearly the underlying concept that he embraced.” (Peter Bourne, Fidel, A Biography of Fidel Castro.)

  24. Balfour argues that the biggest influence on his ideas was Jose Marti….a nationalist, who had opposed Spanish imperialism • “Castro became one of the most dedicated disciples of Marti: the “Apostle” became for the new aspiring liberator of Cuba a guide to action and a source of legitimacy; Castro never lost an opportunity to link himself publicly with the revolutionary traditions embodied by Marti, and in the darkest moments of his endeavor he was able to find some inspiration from the example of Marti’s political labors”. Balfour • Marti wanted an end to dependency on the US, and major social reform

  25. Marti represented a brand of romantic, republican nationalism, which he combined with a passionate belief in social justice, in the need for universal education, in the virtues of the countryside and land cultivation….all of which found an echo in the young Castro (Balfour) • Castro was also drawn to Eddie Chibas’s Ortodoxo party by somewhat similar ideas: “Chibas’s brand of patriotic and populist radicalism exercised a deep influence on the young Castro for whom no other models were available among the politicians of the day. Castro was drawn to Chibas’s fearless style of moral denunciation as well as the new party’s vague social reformism and anti-imperialism.” (Balfour)

  26. Bourne goes on to say that History Will Absolve Me was an attempt to give idealism to the Moncada attack, it was his attempt to have the attack understood as one event within the context of a long term struggle to achieve revolution in Cuba around a set of clear ideals • The goal was for the speech / document to serve as a core around which a movement could be created, an opportunity to state his goals and the goals of his movement. • Bourne says that it was a document carefully crafted to mobilize the broadest possible support while at the same time offending the smallest number of potential backers.

  27. It was acceptable to the Communists, but avoided mentioning Communism, Marxism, Socialism. • It identified what everyone knew were the injustices in Cuban, without threatening a time frame or specific or methods for redress. • There was no attack on the USA or no call to revolution. It was intended to draw to his cause the idealistic youth of the country, whether independent or affiliated to other parties. • The speech / pamphlet didn’t quite reach the mass of the people but it succeeded in winning over a small group of new followers who were enough to form the basis of the movement.

  28. Sentenced to 15 yrs in prison, he served 22 months (documentary), before release under a general amnesty • Then took over control of his 26th of July Movement – made decisions single handedly – criticized by other members, who wanted decisions by committee – Castro’s response was to ask “when have you seen a Revolution led by a committee.” • Lost some members who complained about the lack of Democracy in the party and labeled him an old style Latin American Caudillo

  29. Decided to go into exile (6 weeks after release) to avoid arrest or murder by the increasingly repressive regime, and to return later / “invade” and organize an armed revolt against Batista • Hoped to have the landing coincide with uprisings and strikes • Went to Mexico to plan the attack / invasion: while there he recruited an Argentine Revolutionary, Ché Guevara (Argentine Revolutionary), to his cause • Left some followers behind to build a grass roots movement / recruit, to prepare the popular uprising

  30. Training received by an invasion force of 82: Castro spent time in the US seeking support and donations among exiles • Accused in his absence of being a Communist, by Batista – denied it (2nd time): distanced himself from a party that supported a non-violent, united front policy of opposition to Batista – reminded Batista that he, Batista, had once allied himself with the Communist Party during the 1940 elections • But Castro was careful in building bridges with the anti-Batista opposition, meeting with 2 Communist Party emissaries who were sent to visit him in Mexico

  31. Returned in Nov/Dec. 1956, with his 82 men which inc.Ché Guevara and Raul Castro his brother, on board an old boat / yacht, the Granma • Had been advised that the timing was not right – strikes had not yet broken out, Govt. was expecting him – but persisted anyway: stubborn.. Still hoped to spark a popular uprising • He had given his word he would return before the end of that year and he planned on keeping it; “Castro’s decision to go ahead with the expedition illustrated once again his belief in the overriding importance of public relations and his faith in the triumph of will over logistics.” Balfour

  32. Invasion was a disaster; old ship, storm, mechanical breakdown, forced to jettison supplies, lost their way, landed in wrong place; informers kept gov. updated: ambushed by Batista’s troops: only 16 of 82 escaped to the Sierra MaestraMts • The hoped for uprisings in Santiago and other cities did not take place • Survived in the Mts due to support from the Peasant-Squatters: peasants hid and fed them and then joined his guerilla band / Castro absorbed groups of peasant bandits…peasants suffered from brutal treatment by federal troops if they were suspected of harboring Castro and his men

  33. It was not Castro’s intention to wage the war almost entirely from a rural base, but as the campaign gradually centered on the Sierra MaestraMts, a new mythology arose about peasant rebellion and rural virtue (though not entirely a peasant war, the guerillas leaders were city people) • The campaign in the Mts was supported by urban sabotage, strikes, …(adaptability, flexibility…..like Lenin; involve peasants / use rural base more than was originally planned) • Many successful guerilla raids from the mountain base……the ability of the rebels to repel military units not only eroded the morale of Batista’s rank and file soldiers but also strengthened the belief that the army could be defeated by military means

  34. As the guerilla forces consolidated their hold in the mountains, the center of opposition to Batista increasingly became the liberated zone in the Sierra. This change of emphasis was accelerated by two things: the relative failure of anti-Batista actions in the city, and the skilful radio and press campaign carried out by Castro form his mountain fastness • Other abortive efforts were made to overthrow Batista – by the student underground, by ex-President Prio, by a mutiny of officers and sailors – but all were crushed…serving to raise Castro’s stature as the leading opponent of the dictator Batista

  35. As the Batista regime became more and more brutal in the face of increased dissent, strikes, protests…Castro’s support increased • He had an article published in the liberal media to explain what it was he was hoping to change • He explained that he was fighting for genuine representative govt., that he had no interest in becoming president, that among his objectives were freeing all political prisoners, full and untrammeled freedom of public information, and the wiping out of corruption, also said that he had no plans for the expropriation or nationalization of foreign investments, but did stress land reform, as well as literacy, as key objectives.

  36. Keen says that the views he expressed in this article are even less radical than those in History Will Absolve Me: these are not extreme views, not Marxist or Communist – what he was hoping to do was express views that were broad enough to bring together all anti-Batista elements • Castro conducted an effective public relations campaign from the Sierra Mts. Knew, from his student days, the value of the media in attracting attention: aware of the value of radio broadcasting from his old mentor Chibas • Just 10 weeks after his landing he staged a publicity stunt that did more for his standing than any military engagement – he smuggled a willing NY Times journalist, Herbert Matthews, into the depths of the Mts to interview him (partly to disprove Batista’s claim that he was dead)

  37. Castro stage managed the interview to give the impression that he controlled a wider area of the Mts, and that he had considerable numbers under his command...exaggerated his strengths – Several articles were published in the NY Times and reported in the Cuban press – caused a sensation, not least because it suggested that Castro’s forces were invincible • Soon after, CBS sent a news crew to film a short documentary….. giving him more publicity • Another important media coup was the installation of a radio station in the spring of ’58 by which rebel forces controlled a large part of the Sierra – Radio Rebelde – this brought a new dimension to the guerilla war. Castro used its airways with great effect to put over his program for reforms, report on successful victories over Gov. forces

  38. Within a year, Castro’s forces dominated the Sierras. Fed Army could not stop the flow of messengers, recruits, arms to the guerilla stronghold…rebels established hospitals, workshops for making arms and ammunition, a printing press, in addition to the radio station • Divisions were emerging between Castro and the urban leaders, who preferred the urban campaign. But the failure of strikes in Aug. ’57 and of a general strike in April ’58 (which he supported), helped strengthen his leadership and faith in the rural guerilla campaign as the main instrument of overthrowing Batista

  39. His growing reputation / status….Opposition groups began to see him as a leader whom they could unify behind, and Castro realized he needed to cultivate the connections to other groups with a wide base of organizations • began to realize that he should cultivate an alliance with the party that seemed to have the most reliable grassroots support – the Communist Party • After another failed strike of April 1958 he began to turn to the Communist Party as a source of organized support.

  40. The Communist Party, conscious of Castro’s growing stature, were also keen to establish closer contact and by September 1958 had a top-level member permanently in the Sierra. • For the Communist Party, as well as Castro, the failure of the 9th April general strike, finally, reinforced the moral hegemony of the rural guerrilla over the city worker (Balfour). • He issued a manifesto known as the Caracas Pact, signed also by many other opposition groups (except the Communist Party). In it there was no mention of radical reform. Instead, the document referred to the restoration of constitutional and democratic rights and economic and social progress

  41. Later, Ortodoxo and Communists party leaders met with him and signed the Sierra Maestra Manifesto, in July 1958; it called for free elections, democratic govt., absolute guarantee of freedom of the press, freedom for labor unions to organize, land reform. • Keen again says that it was not as radical as History Will Absolve Me, that Castro was againseeking a broad range of support…..(pragmatic, building a broader base….)

  42. Castro needed money as well as political support, as he neared the final assault…..his new moderation was also designed to attract the backing of wider sections of the population. • And indeed, money began to flow in, no longer only from the labor fronts of the Movement but now also from sugar-mill owners, sugar farmers, cattle ranchers, bankers, and industrialists, especially in Oriente • Castro promised Cuban businessmen that he would free them from US domination and Govt. corruption – that they had nothing to fear from the Revolution and much to gain

  43. In one interview he assured them that: “I know revolution sounds like bitter medicine to many businessmen. But after the first shock, they will find it a boon – no more thieving tax collectors, no plundering army chieftains or bribe-hungry officials to bleed them white. Our revolution is as much a moral as a political one”

  44. Batista continued to try to portray Castro and his movement as Communist, believing that this was a sure way of maintaining US support for his regime. • Castro denied this charge, again – his response was: “I hate Soviet imperialism as much as I hate Yankee imperialism. I am not breaking my neck fighting one dictatorship to fall into another.” He claimed his movement was Nationalist and Humanist • Castro was expanding his support base, in anticipation of Batista’s massive offensive against his guerrilla stronghold……..

  45. Army of 2,000 troops, backed by the air force…but still failed to dislodge the rebels from their bases. The failure of the offensive was the story not so much of the military strength of the guerrillas as of the “moral weakness” of the regular army. (Balfour) • Already unpopular among large sections of the population for their association with the dictatorship, many officers and soldiers had little stomach for fighting. Several units had gone over to the rebels and there had been many desertions. In contrast, the guerrillas were a highly disciplined body • After victories over the regular army, Castro felt confident enough to establish more and bigger bases in other rural areas (esp. in Oriente)

  46. In the “liberated zones”, the rebels began to enact a wide-ranging program of social reform.. esp. land distribution • By September 1958, Castro was ready to move the main force of guerrillas out of the Sierra Maestra and towards Santiago, the capital of Oriente. • Having beaten back the army, the rebel forces launched their own general offensive. Castro’s column from the West and his brother’s from the East advanced into the heart of Oriente, capturing town after town until they surrounded Santiago….then moved on Havana.

  47. Meanwhile, a group of army officers plotted to replace Batista with a mixed civilian and military junta, which, they hoped, would be recognized by the US • Batista tried to brutally crush the mutiny using extreme force (using bomber planes and heavy artillery given to him by the US) • This led to Batista being abandoned by the US – had become an embarrassment – invoked a clause in the arms sales agreement about not using heavy weapons for domestic purposes; as a result, the US suspended arms shipments / began embargo to Batista’s govt. in March 1958

  48. Now abandoned by the US, Batista and his followers prepared to flee Cuba - Batista fled to the Dominican Republic in Dec. 1958…….later to Miami • The junta that replaced him enjoyed only a brief moment of power. • Castro issued a call for a general strike to overthrow the new regime…….supported by many workers. • Castro and his 3,000 “strong” army marched to Havana and assumed power on Jan 1st 1959

  49. “The rebels won because they were persistent and disciplined, and gained the sympathy of all the people – peasants, workers, and the middle class – and because they faced an army wracked by favoritism and incompetence. Batista’s army, put to the test, proved able to terrorize unarmed citizens but disintegrated when confronted with a formidable insurgency.” (Keen). • Castro had cashed in on the cumulative effect of all the opposition efforts to overthrow Batista (Keen)

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