Fragile states

1. Fragile states fragile states and failed states need to be viewed and treated as a specific category of least developed countries if they are to emerge from economic and political insecurity and if they are to have a chance of achieving MDGs.

2. Fragile states • Are unable and/or unwilling to develop and implement pro-poor policies; • Are prone to violent conflict and may lack effective territorial control. • Can experience high levels of corruption; human rights violations and political repression. • Represent environments where international agencies are unable use preferred aid effectiveness modalities and fully align behind nationally-owned strategies.

3. International interest in fragile states is based on: • a recognition that the instruments commonly used in least developed countries are insufficient for tackling poverty, conflict, political instability and good governance. • an understanding that whilst better performing countries are benefiting from development assistance, fragile states are often isolated, leading to a further worsening of their development indicators. • a belief that the human and financial costs of fragility are unacceptably high. • The impact of state frailty has implications for international security. The inability of failed states to deal with their own national security creates knock-on effects for the security of neighbouring countries, and also globally.

4. costs of fragility • It is estimated that fragile states have received 43% less aid when compared with other, more stable states suffering from similar levels of poverty. • Fragile states receive insufficient amounts of aid, delivered at the wrong time and often in ineffective ways. • The World Bank estimates that In Somalia the costs of the civil strife have been high -as implied by income per capita -which could have been a third higher than the $226 estimated for 2002. • UNDP estimates that 22 of the 34 countries that are furthest away from achieving the Millennium Development Goals are affected by current or recent conflicts.

5. International responses The OECD-DAC has deepened its commitment to fragile states and its members have agreed a draft series of principles for working with fragile states.

6. The 12 principles enshrine lessons learnt and best practice stemming from the work of a range of development, diplomatic and security sector actors in fragile states over recent years. The principles cover key topics for engagement such as: priority interventions, alignment, donor coherence and coordination, aid instruments and aid allocations.

7. The principles • Take context as a starting point • Move from reaction to prevention • Focus on state building as the central objective • Align with local priorities • Recognise the political security, development nexus • Promote coherence between donor government and international agencies • Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors • Do no harm • Mix and sequence aid instruments to fit the context. • Act fast • Stay long enough to give success a chance. • Avoid pockets of exclusion.

8. General findings • State building as a central objective emerged as the most important principle but there was significant dissent on how this could be best achieved. • The possibility of divergent interpretations of the principles, as well as the lack of mechanisms available for implementing principles caused some concern. • interviewees almost unanimously agreed that all principles were relevant and that it may not be helpful to have a ‘cherry picking’ approach to them. • No clear picture on how far donors had gone in implementing the principles emerged Most respondents felt it was too early to assess if principles were having impact. • The need for clear monitoring and compliance mechanisms was suggested. Indeed scepticism around the principles, where it existed it was in relation to an apparent weakness in commitment and to the absence of adherence mechanisms. • Several respondents regretted the lack of international commitment to Somalia which often meant absence of significant funds at vital moments, and more particularly, of under- staffed embassies and institutions.

9. Principle 1: start with the context • There is a need for more sophisticated, comprehensive and continuous political –social analysis in Somalia and the regions; • a comprehensive understanding of context could inform strategic decision-making across the donor community; • if the context is understood differently by different stakeholders, it is inevitable that harm will be done; • good analysis will not of itself lead to improved and coordinated decision-making, but it is a key element;

10. 3. Focus on state building as the central objective • Unified diplomatic efforts are required to find the most appropriate and effective ways to engage with emerging Somali institutions; • the international community was urged to be strategic but pragmatic in its approach; • support regulatory frameworks over heavy service delivery models of government; • donors can support both bottom-up and top-down approaches but cannot put the onus on civil society to create a democracy.

11. 7. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors • The international community appears fragmented and this is understood by other development and humanitarian actors as well as by Somali authorities; • the lack of effective coordination on strategic issues means that some actors are ‘going their own way’. A common voice would have some influence; • the issue of coordination needs to be addressed in the context of joint plans and activities; • coordination around development and humanitarian assistance is vital, but should be matched by coordination at the political level;mechanisms which bring stakeholders together, such as the CMC and JPC smf JNA , need to consider approaches which promote unified positions and cooperation.

12. 8. Do no harm • The consequences of ill-advised or uniformed decisions can be renewed levels violence, mistrust and fear; • move beyond the concept of ‘do no harm’ and propose positive benefits; • all external actions and decisions can be perceived as political; • the presence of risk should not lead to inaction, but to a better understanding of context; • use tools and approaches which mitigate both the intended and unintended consequences of decisions.