Putin ’ s New Presidential Term and Russia’s Domestic Developments

1. Putin’s New Presidential Term and Russia’s Domestic Developments Vladimir Gel’man (Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki) Finnish National Defence University, 3 May 2018 Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man

2. The background • March 2018 – Vladimir Putin easily re-elected for his fourth • presidential term in office (since 2000) till 2024; • What we might expect during his new term on domestic • political and policy arenas? • Contradictions between political goals of authoritarian • rulers and policy goals of socio-economic development; • (2) Contradictions between ambitions and realities; • (3) Contradictions between outdated ideals and present-day • agenda; Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man

3. The background Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man / FiDiPro Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man Re-assessing the previous trajectory of Russia under Putin: Since 2000 – creeping rise of authoritarian trends against the background of economic growth and development; The major increase of real income of Russians (2.6 times during 2000-2014) is the major source of Putin’s popularity; The major decline of democratic institutions in the 2000s was not much important in the eyes of many Russians, who enjoyed the rise of well-being and individual freedoms; BUT! – the rapid economic growth has been exhausted after 2008-2009 crisis (annual economic growth since 2008 is about 1%) 7.1.2020 3

4. The background Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man / FiDiPro Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man The sudden wave of political protests in 2011-2012 (For Free Elections movement), gradual decline of Putin’s support; Response of the Kremlin – ”tightening of the screws” (tough laws and regulations, selective repressions against certain activists and organizations, etc.); Increasing fears of “color revolutions” among Russia’s rulers; 2014 – overthrow of Yanukovych in Ukraine; furious reaction in the Kremlin, annexation of Crimes and domestic “rally around of flag” (rise of Putin’s approval rate up to 80+%); 7.1.2020 4

5. The state of affairs Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man / FiDiPro Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man By 2018 – consolidated authoritarian regime (rather weak opposition, effective mechanisms of political control via both coercion and co-potation, information machinery); BUT: Legal constraints (presidential term limit – what to do?); Ageing of rulers (Putin will be 72 years old in 2024); Retrospective normative ideals – “a good Soviet Union” as a role model both domestically and internationally; … and bleak prospects for economic growth (forecasts are about 1-2% for the next decade or so) 7.1.2020 5

6. The state of affairs Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man / FiDiPro Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man Since 2014 – major shift of policy priorities of the Russian leadership: a shift from development to geopolitics (no way back again?); Decline of real incomes (above 10% in 2015-2017) against the background of increase of military spending; Poor state of public health, pensions, public infrastructure, etc. is recognized by political leadership Demand for the new developmental policy program (Center for Strategic Research – Kudrin); 7.1.2020 6

7. The problems lies ahead Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man / FiDiPro Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man New (modest) program of policy reforms: Increase of public spending for welfare (education and health as top priorities) and infrastructure; Gradual increase of retirement age; Rise of tax rates (sales tax, individual income tax) and change of spending policy via change of budgetary rule: rise of cut-off oil price from $40 to $45 per barrel); Minor changes in the courts and judiciary; No major changes of “rules of the game” in politics; 7.1.2020 7

8. The challenges lies ahead Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man / FiDiPro Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man At the same time: Vicious attacks on civil and individual freedoms (Internet use, attempts of control over educational mobility, etc.); New wave of counter-sanctions against the West (proposed ban on US-produced medications, denial of intellectual property rights, etc.); Obsessions with the threat of “revolutions”, new waves of repressions against activists, NGOs, and the media; To what extent these steps are combatable with proposals of socio-economic development? 7.1.2020 8

9. The challenges lies ahead Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man / FiDiPro Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man Diverse role models of Russia’s future – economic system like in South Korea, but political system like in North Korea? Behind-the-scene struggles within the ruling coalition: siloviki vs. technocrats + business people (who will get key posts in the new government and presidential administration); Would Putin prefer development goals over new “tightening of the screws” in domestic politics and aggressive foreign policy? Answer from political science: “bad policy is good politics” (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2011) 7.1.2020 9

10. Putin forever? Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man / FiDiPro Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man Problems of political survival, especially in the wake of coming 2024 end of Putin’s presidential term and inevitable generational changes; Legal options - constitutional changes (amendments, adoption of the new constitution, turn to parliamentary model?); Political solution – further repressions and more repressiveness of the Russian state, rise of ideological components of the regime amid ”besieged fortress” self-positioning of Russia at the global political map 7.1.2020 10

11. Putin forever? Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man / FiDiPro Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man What may shake this ”bad equilibrium” of authoritarianism, self- isolation, and sluggish growth and development? Economic problems may increase over time but as of yet collapse sounds unrealistic (unless oil prices will go down to $20 per barrel or so) – prudent macroeconomic policy by the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance; Social unrest – increasing troubles yet it is manageable by the government (localized protests, minor concessions, avoiding risks of politicization); 7.1.2020 11

12. Putin forever? Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man / FiDiPro Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man Short-term prospects: more “stability” and more stagnation? Medium-term prospects: Increasing gap between expectations and realities (similarly to the Soviet Union in the 1970-80s); Low elite mobility both nation-wide and sub-nationally; Increase of emigration intentions among the educated youth; Inefficiency of ideological indoctrination (modern society versus “traditional values”); More rent-seeking and corruption (“bad governance”) For how long this “bad equilibrium” may survive? 7.1.2020 12

13. In Lieu of Conclusions Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man / FiDiPro Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man Further scenarios: “Political decay” – preservation of the status quo until Putin’s physical extinction; “Iron fist” – full-scale denial of developmental goals for the sake of regime survival, extensive use of repressions, new “Iron curtain” etc.; “Regime’s collapse” – sudden breakdown due to undesired effects of exogenous shocks; “Creeping democratization” – regime change because of the pressure from below; 7.1.2020 13

14. In Lieu of Conclusions Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man / FiDiPro Aleksanteri Institute / Vladimir Gel’man … and thanks for your interest! Comments are very welcome (vladimir.gelman@helsinki.fi) 7.1.2020 14