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NDIA 2005 Group A Outbrief

NDIA 2005 Group A Outbrief. Review – Summary Position. Agreements and Why. DO concept is solid DO provides the necessary “boots on the ground persistence” DO objectives are on the mark DO includes “quick mass” capability, which must be retained DO early focus on the Marine appropriate

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NDIA 2005 Group A Outbrief

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  1. NDIA 2005Group AOutbrief

  2. Review – Summary Position Agreements and Why • DO concept is solid • DO provides the necessary “boots on the ground persistence” • DO objectives are on the mark • DO includes “quick mass” capability, which must be retained • DO early focus on the Marine appropriate • DO broad implementation vice a smaller “SOF-like” approach good • DO identification of training as key enabler on the mark

  3. Review – Summary Position Issues and Why • DO impact to Amphibious and Air Lift needs not assessed • DO concept assumes functional support will and can step up… this needs further analysis and experimental verification • DO concept does not address overarching infrastructure implications across several areas (missing integrating ConOps) • DO concept does not address critical sustainment capabilities: - Resupply (means, methods, and force protection) - MedEvac (means, methods, and force protection) • DO concept identifies training needs, but appears to not acknowledge the extent of this challenge…Training load increase by up to 5X…must make time and manpower available to accomplish this • Manpower model does not support the DO concept • DO equipage costs for all squads across 26 BNs is likely underestimated by over 2X

  4. Review – Summary Position Issues and Why • DO concept IDs comm/net improvements, but current doctrine limits a BN’s number of nets…all company's will not get a net…limits ability to conduct DO across the entire BN simultaneously • DO concept pushes responsibility down, but does so without adequate assessment of how far this can go. If Company Commander is to pickup BN responsibilities, then can this be done without additional resources/capabilities (staff, etc.)…Add as factor to second LOE • DO has not addressed (adequately) implications of Human Factor / cognitive limitations that may impact widespread implementation (or scope) of concept…Need to keep an eye on this issue

  5. Group A List of Critical Capabilities • Urban Warfare Implications • Reliable NLOS Comms • Sustainment System (Resupply and MedEvac) • Power generation is critical (1 of 3 USMC C2 KPPs) • Fires • C2 /Intel (e.g., PLI/BFT + red tracks potentially down to squad leader level) – Must include automated info mgmt (filters)

  6. 1. Urban Warfare Capabilities • Description: Execution of DO in Urban Canyons • What actions are required to implement this capability - Add this in as an experimental factor to a future LOE • Standards: TBD  • Effect of this capability • Advantages – Exploits DO force multiplying effects in Urban Environments, better SA generation via increased footprint of boots on ground • Disadvantages – None identified • Effect on Enemy – Overwhelm with maneuver and fires • Enemy Effect on Capability – Mass, IEDs, jamming DO equipment set must be compatible andfunction in the Urban Environment

  7. 2. Reliable NLOS Comms • Description: Reliable team member to team member (and higher) comms without LOS restraints to include ability to function in and around buildings in the urban environment • What actions are required to implement this capability – establishdetailed requirements to include automatic link establishment,meshed network with seamless waveform transitions and relaycapability (including SAT)…Acquire gear • Standards: Works anywhere to anyone all the time (e.g., basement to the 17th floor and out to command seamlessly • Effect of this capability • Advantages – Seamless team coordination, reduced susceptibility via other comm techniques, one piece of gear • Disadvantages – None identified (assumes this replaces other comm gear currently fielded) • Effect on Enemy – Enhances maneuver and fires further • Enemy Effect on Capability – Jamming and DF

  8. Seabase DO LOCs 1 500-1000 nm HQ BN X Events Hours Days Weeks 0 (must address scalability) DO ConOps

  9. 3. Sustainment System(Resupply and MedEvac) • Description: Ability to keep the distributed force sustained and supported including MedEvac capability • What actions are required to implement this capability: Assessrequirements (to include details of support required), establish overall sustainment/MedEvac ConOps, and add this as factor to ongoing analysis and experimentation • Standards: All DO squads have what they need when they need it to include timely MedEvac support

  10. 3. Sustainment System(Resupply and MedEvac) • Effect of this capability • Advantages – It’s a critical enabler for DO ops beyond a few days…MedEvac side is a life saver • Disadvantages – Force protection (potentially) • Effect on Enemy – Continued pressure at their location • Enemy Effect on Capability – Ambush small/single vehicle resupply “convoy” (need to consider air lift) Supporting Technologies & Other: - Autonomic Sustainment major enhancing technology feature (RFID needs to broaden application to support)- “Push” distribution (Sense & Respond Logistics)- Direct Support Co’s- Fuel will be largest need…significant LIMFAC if not resupplied

  11. 4. Power Generation • Description: Batteries that never run out or can be automatically recharged with equipment organic to the squad • What actions are required to implement this capability: Assessrequirements, establish viable concept, and procure capability • Standards: One standard power source. No calls for batteries...Ever…  • Effect of this capability • Advantages – Don’t run out of power and/or require signifi- cant sustainment of power generation gear • Disadvantages – None identified • Effect on Enemy – Enables continuous ops • Enemy Effect on Capability – None identified

  12. 5. Fires • Description: Effective coverage 24/7, timely/accurate, simultaneous support to multiple distributed units in depth with deconfliction transparent caller • What actions are required to implement this capability: Assesssizing, response time, and netted fires implementation require-ments. Add to ongoing analysis and experimentation (andfuture procurement plans as applicable) • Standards: Targets suppressed in 60s or less (every time) • Effect of this capability • Advantages – Enemy has no chance once located • Disadvantages – None identified • Effect on Enemy – See advantages • Enemy Effect on Capability – Convert to democracy Should/can fire support coordination bepushed to a lower level?

  13. 6. C2/Intel • Description: SA provided to the lowest DO unit level (CTP/Voice/Data) • What actions are required to implement this capability: Assumesa network exists throughout the AOR of the distributed op, addressintel dissemination policy, integrated system with an operationallysuitable interface for the warfighter • Standards: No link loss / No SA loss / Full connectivity with near real- time updates • - IFF (a/c, vehicles, personnel [blue, green, white, gray, red]) • PLI (BFT) + Red Tracks- TTPs- ISR- Info Mgmt/Automation/simple and effective filtering- Bandwidth and associated management Lowest level responsible Distributed Operatorneeds a package ofthis capability

  14. 6. C2/Intel • Effect of this capability • Advantages – Increases SA for DO unit, reduces reaction time and results in increased unit effectiveness • Disadvantages – Potential for too much info and may lead to or enable micro-management of units from higher • Effect on Enemy – Outthink / out maneuver (quicker speed of effects) • Enemy Effect on Capability – Spoofing, jamming, hacking net, intrusion

  15. Key/Remaining Issues What key issues remain to be considered? • Infil/Exfil/Rapid Rejoin - Means, Methods, Force Protection • Logistics and MedEvac issues (e.g., resource and fund a larger scope 2nd LOE to test whether current/ in place functional resources can support DO…Need to test at BN Level at a minimum) • Fires? Who gets em…what’s the priority? • Upping equipage to squads to include vehicles to BNs could (more likely will) drive increased sustainment and maintenance (fixer) needs • Optempo and impact on dispersion distances - impacts/needs/timing required to mass

  16. Key/Remaining Issues What key issues remain to be considered? • Dispersion distances needs to be an experimental factor (event driven optempo and randomly paced events) • Deconfliction of the battlespace needs to be pushed down to the company commander vice BN cmdr, but will it work (add this to experiment too) • DO should natural apply to Urban Warfare….add this to one of the experiments • DO training beyond infantry to other MOS’s (arty, engrs, etc.)

  17. Second/Additional Experiments Expand Scope of Second LOE: • Stress the concept and assess scalability - Multiple DO units - Multiple DO echelons of command - Extended time duration - Extended dispersion ranges - Escalating / Multiple simultaneous events • Expand LOE 2 to include 24 DO squads, 9 platoons, 3 companies, 1 BLT, 1 MEU • Above must include/test all battlespace functions (CSS, Fires, MedEvac, etc….The entire MAGTF concept) USMC must resource this…NOW…not later…

  18. Questions

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