Slide 1:Historical Analysis of Terrorist Campaigns With observations on current operations in Iraq

Dstl/CP10135 Presentation to Cornwallis IX, 5 - 8 April 2004 Dr Andrew Hossack Dstl Policy & Capability Studies Dept UNLIMITED UNLIMITED © Crown Copyright 2004 Some of these slides have notes that provide amplifying detail, for example slide 3’s notes list the analysis’ assumptions and constraints.Some of these slides have notes that provide amplifying detail, for example slide 3’s notes list the analysis’ assumptions and constraints.

Slide 2:Before we start…...

Disclaimer 1 The work reported here is the product of operations research (operational analysis), not academic research: A perfect answer a day late is worthless Goal is the best answer in the time-and-money available Aim is to understand underlying trends, not model details Disclaimer 2 The studies upon which this presentation is drawn were both to some extent “quick-n-dirty” OR

Slide 3:What is “Historical Analysis”?

Historical Analysis (HA): Is operations research of data describing actual behaviour of systems (of warfare) in a wide range of historical cases Is empirical, stochastic and holistic Involves the testing of quantified hypotheses using established statistical techniques Is based on quantified primary source data from both sides of conflict where possible Is performed by multi-disciplinary teams of analysts, historians and military experts Focuses on understanding the enduring, underlying mechanisms of warfare

Slide 4:What is Historical Analysis Not?

“Historical Analysis” is not the same as: “Historical Research” - the collation and synthesis of primary source material to construct subjective estimates of objective ground truth. “Historical Survey” - the qualitative study of individual historical events (as reported by historical research) to draw lessons, identify factors and produce descriptive statistics. Stress HA not about creating, interpreting historical narrative per se; about using historical data as a resourceStress HA not about creating, interpreting historical narrative per se; about using historical data as a resource

Slide 5:Background to studies

This presentation based upon two separate studies: A general investigation of terrorist/insurgent campaigns (2002) A short-notice, urgent “fastball” study (2003) 2002 Study: Part of 2 year project to inform UK defence planners on issues relating to counter-terrorism overseas 2003 Study: No notice, 4 week study for UK military planners: How bad were Coalition casualty rates in Iraq, compared objectively to other internal security/counter-terrorism campaigns?

Slide 6:Definitions, Context & Scope (1)

“Terrorist” and “Terrorism” are emotive words, open to multiple (mis-)interpretations and abuse “Terrorist” typically used to refer to groups that predominantly use terrorism tactics……e.g.: bombings shootings assassinations …but identical tactics also often present in “insurgency” campaigns as well, to lesser degree

Slide 7:Definitions, Context & Scope (2)

UK / NATO doctrine defines “terrorism” to be: “…..the unlawful use or threatened use of violence against individuals in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives” UK / NATO doctrine defines “insurgency” to be: “….an organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict” Both terrorism and insurgency considered in these analyses

Slide 8:Definitions, Context & Scope (3)

Scope of these studies: is limited to historical campaigns by States & State Security Forces (SSyF) against terrorist &/or insurgent groups (TIGs) excludes use of terror by states against sub-populations of the state [e.g. Tonton Macoutes in Haiti] excludes use of terror by sub-populations of the state against other sub-populations of the state [e.g. Protestant Paramilitary organisations in NI vs PIRA etc]

Slide 9:Part I:Properties of CT Campaigns

Slide 10:Data Collection

Data collected on 30 post WWII terrorist/insurgent campaigns Each data point represents an entire campaign Information collected for both RED & BLUE on: force sizes, leadership, objectives, organisation, levels of activity etc. 50 data fields collected per campaign / data point Hard to find accurate quantitative data in time allowed Campaigns difficult to fit into one conceptual framework RED data was difficult to find at all

Slide 11:Campaigns Researched

Irgun Huk Rebellion Viet Minh Malayan Emergency Mau-Mau Emergency 26 July Movement Algeria FLN EOKA Emergency ETA Viet Cong ANC FLQ Borneo Confrontation FARC Aden Emergency Black Panthers Shining Path Baader-Meinhof November 17 FRETILIN PIRA ZANU / ZAPU Afghan Mujahadeen LTTE (“Tamil Tigers”) Aum Shinrikyo Intifada I Kashmir Algeria AIS / GIA Al-Gama Al-Islamiya UCK Macedonia Irgun = Palestine 44 - 48 Huk Rebellion in Philippinnes 26 July Movement - Castro rebels in Cuba FLQ - Quebec Liberation Front FRETILIN - E Timor LTTE - Tamil TigersIrgun = Palestine 44 - 48 Huk Rebellion in Philippinnes 26 July Movement - Castro rebels in Cuba FLQ - Quebec Liberation Front FRETILIN - E Timor LTTE - Tamil Tigers

Slide 12:Terrorists/Insurgent Motivations (1)

Prevalence of various low-level TIG motivations examined: Separatism - Religious Fundamentalism Nationalism - Ideological Fundamentalism Sectionalism - Single-Issue Activism Isolationism - Millenarianism Each historical campaign coded for (believed) primary, secondary & tertiary motivation based upon data provided on TIG origins & objectives Frequency of occurrence examined Separatism: the intention to create a new polity (state, nation) from a part of the territory of an existing polity. Nationalism: the intention to redefine the identity of a polity as a whole. [ For example, ethnic cleansing (the violent redefinition of state identity upon exclusive ethnic lines) would be a form of nationalism]. Sectionalism: the intention to improve the de facto or de jure status of a sub-group of a polity in relation to other sub-groups. Isolationism: the intention to change the policy of a polity to minimise or eliminate interactions between the polity and other, external polities. Religious fundamentalism: The intention to change the religious (and if necessary the political and social) structure of a polity to reflect some religious beliefs. Ideological Fundamentalism: The intention to change the political and social structure of a polity to reflect some ideological beliefs. Single-Issue Activism: The intention to change an individual strand of the domestic law or policy of a polity without seeking to change the structure of the polity itself. Millenarianism: The intention to precipitate an anticipated (implicitly global) apocalypse which is expected to destroy all but the millenarianists.Separatism: the intention to create a new polity (state, nation) from a part of the territory of an existing polity. Nationalism: the intention to redefine the identity of a polity as a whole. [ For example, ethnic cleansing (the violent redefinition of state identity upon exclusive ethnic lines) would be a form of nationalism]. Sectionalism: the intention to improve the de facto or de jure status of a sub-group of a polity in relation to other sub-groups. Isolationism: the intention to change the policy of a polity to minimise or eliminate interactions between the polity and other, external polities. Religious fundamentalism: The intention to change the religious (and if necessary the political and social) structure of a polity to reflect some religious beliefs. Ideological Fundamentalism: The intention to change the political and social structure of a polity to reflect some ideological beliefs. Single-Issue Activism: The intention to change an individual strand of the domestic law or policy of a polity without seeking to change the structure of the polity itself. Millenarianism: The intention to precipitate an anticipated (implicitly global) apocalypse which is expected to destroy all but the millenarianists.

Slide 13:Terrorist/Insurgent Motivations (1a)

33% campaigns have been principally ideological: most explicitly communist / Maoist (Huk, VC, Shining Path); some weakly so (Baader-Meinhof, 26 July, November 17). 23% campaigns have been principally Separatist: FLQ, PIRA, ETA, FRETILIN, LTTE, Intifada I 20% campaigns have been principally Nationalist: Mau-Mau, EOKA, Mujahedeen 13% campaigns have been principally Sectionalist: UCK, ZANU / ZAPU, ANC, BPP 7% (2) campaigns have been principally Religious Fundie: 3% (1) campaign has been principally Milleniarianist!

Slide 14:Terrorists/Insurgent Motivations (2)

Note that although nationalism is 2nd most frequent cause as primary, is most frequently present as primary, secondaty or teriaryNote that although nationalism is 2nd most frequent cause as primary, is most frequently present as primary, secondaty or teriary

Slide 15:Types of Violence Employed

Campaigns categorised by presence/absence of: “terrorist” violence (bombings, shootings, assassinations etc.) open, armed “insurgency” widespread, systematic civil violence (e.g. Intifada I) With 2 exceptions, every campaign considered includes “terrorist” violence justifies decision to include “insurgency” campaigns in scope In addition: 5 campaigns also contain widespread violence 12 campaigns include open, armed insurgency Of the two exceptions to the “terrorism in all cases rule”: - one case is probably a spurious misjudgement/miscoding arising from a lack of data; - the other is the Black Panther Party which, having read some supporting material, looks like is is arguably not a TIG in the sense used elsewhere in this presentation Of the two exceptions to the “terrorism in all cases rule”: - one case is probably a spurious misjudgement/miscoding arising from a lack of data; - the other is the Black Panther Party which, having read some supporting material, looks like is is arguably not a TIG in the sense used elsewhere in this presentation

Slide 16:Campaigns Outcomes (1)

The success achieved by each of SSyF and TIG against their objectives by their own actions were coded as: Success (S) Compromise (C) Failure (F) Ongoing (O) 19 of the 23 campaigns that have reached a conclusion were zero-sum games: 8 ended as SSyF successes & TIG failures 4 ended with compromises by both sides 7 ended with SSyF failures & TIG successes Of the 4 completed cases that were not-zero sum: - one was (SSyF-TIG) Compromise-Success [UCK in Macedonia] - one was Failure-Compromise [Virt Minh in Fr Indo-China] - 2 were Failure-Failure (Irgun & Algerian FLN in Algerian Independence War) In both the last two cases, the TIG objectives were achieved, but not by the TIGs themselves as a result of their actions (except by continuing to exist)Of the 4 completed cases that were not-zero sum: - one was (SSyF-TIG) Compromise-Success [UCK in Macedonia] - one was Failure-Compromise [Virt Minh in Fr Indo-China] - 2 were Failure-Failure (Irgun & Algerian FLN in Algerian Independence War) In both the last two cases, the TIG objectives were achieved, but not by the TIGs themselves as a result of their actions (except by continuing to exist)

Slide 17:Campaigns Outcomes (2)

Each campaign categorised by State Government Type: Pluralistic, Universal Franchise (PUF): States with legal & effective mechanism for changing the highest leadership & with participation genuinely open to all members of the state Pluralistic, Restricted Franchise (PRF): States with legal & effective mechanism for changing the highest leadership but with participation restricted to only some members of the state Monopolistic, Limited Freedom (MLF): States without any legal & effective mechanism for changing the highest leadership of state but allowing individual freedom for members in every-day matters Totalitarian (TOT): States without any legal & effective mechanism for changing the highest leadership and exercising considerable control over members’ every-day lives

Slide 18:Campaigns Outcomes (3)

Historical sample contains no examples of terrorist/insurgent campaigns in totalitarian states - is this significant? “Democratic” (PUF) states are, statistically, three times more likely to win campaigns than “dictatorship” (MLF) states “Win” here means achieving a better outcome than opponent (Success vs Compromise, Compromise vs Failure etc.) There is also a statistically significant correlation between economic complexity of state and state wins Pr(State Winning | State is Democracy) ~ 6/7 = 85% Pr(State Winning | State is Dictatorship) ~ 2/7 = 28% There is also a significant correlation between government type & economic complexity with democracies having a higher average Economic Complexity Key Score (ECKS, 0-5 scale)Pr(State Winning | State is Democracy) ~ 6/7 = 85% Pr(State Winning | State is Dictatorship) ~ 2/7 = 28% There is also a significant correlation between government type & economic complexity with democracies having a higher average Economic Complexity Key Score (ECKS, 0-5 scale)

Slide 19:Campaigns Outcomes (4)

Slide 20:Campaigns Outcomes (5)

Irrespective of government type, states are significantly more likely to win purely “terrorist” campaigns than those also involving civil violence or armed insurgency The adoption of cellular network structures by TIGs may be significantly correlated with TIG campaign wins (confidence value 88%) There appears to be no correlation between outcome and either campaign duration, TIG network centralisation or primary motivation Pr(State Winning | Terrorist Campaign) ~ 5/6 = 83% Pr(State Winning | Insurgent or Civ Violence Campaign) ~ 3/10 = 30% Pr(State Winning | Terrorist Campaign) ~ 5/6 = 83% Pr(State Winning | Insurgent or Civ Violence Campaign) ~ 3/10 = 30%

Slide 21:Stability of States

Half of all campaigns involving open, armed insurgency begin within 2 years of some radical change in state: revolutionary or violent change in political system of state (coup, popular uprising, invasion, occupation, annexation by other state etc) fundamental change in nature of system affecting sections of state (colonial independence, introduction of disenfranchising legislation) By contrast, 80% of terrorist & civil-violence campaigns begin at least 10 years from last such relevant radical change Possible existence of short-term “political instability” effect? Speculative, hypothesis onlySpeculative, hypothesis only

Slide 22:Part II: MOEs for Iraq IS Campaign

Slide 23:Analysis undertaken

“Fastball” study: Limited to data already-to-hand or on internet Campaign Period Studied: May 03 - Nov 03 Specific comparison of Iraq SyF loss rates with: The Malayan Emergency 1948 - 1960 The EOKA Emergency in Cyprus 1955 - 1959 US involvement in Vietnam 1961 - 1972 “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland 1969 - 1994 General analysis of relationships between loss rates, force ratios & campaign outcomes insurgent densities and campaign type

Slide 24:Loss Data for Historical Campaigns

Loss rate measures used as first order surrogate for incident, contact rates: incident, contact rates vary significantly in definition, completeness impossible to obtain in time available Loss, manpower measures use whole-theatre estimates generally good surrogates for actual campaign losses, manpower Vietnam data includes “conventional war” vs NVA Assumes deaths are meaningfully comparable over 50 years most modern medical evacuation/care capabilities in place by 1950s improvements in personal protection assumed a second order effect

Slide 25:Iraq IS/CT Campaign (1)

Mar 03 Start of Iraq War (20 Mar) Apr 03 Overthrow of Saddam Foundation of Coalition Provisional Authority May 03 Bush announces end of “major combat operations” (2 May) Jun 03 Serious attacks begin on Coalition forces, others - 6 UK Military Police killed July 03 US acknowledges de facto IS/CT campaign accelerated build-up of Iraqi SyF begins Aug 03 UN HQ in Baghdad bombed Oct 03 Suicide bomb attacks on RED CROSS HQ in Baghdad Nov 03 Terrorist “Ramadan Offensive”: - truck bomb kills 17 Italian paramilitary personnel - 7 Spanish intelligence officers killed in ambush Dec 03 Saddam Hussein captured Jul 03: President Bush’s “Bring Them On” Speech taken as de facto acknowledgement of existence of ongoing IS/CT campaign Jun, Nov 03: the emphasis on UK RMP (Royal Military Police), Italian, Spanish deaths etc in no way intended to ignore, slight the losses suffered by other Coalition members, US, Iraqis. However, these are relevant as local peaks in national monthly loss rate per size force, as developed/discussed in slides 39, 40 etc There may be an interesting historical study here on when/why the insurgents switch tactics/targets…..from: - guerrilla-style ambushes by small numbers against isolated SyF patrols, convoys, bases, etc to: - IEDS vs same to: - suicide bombs (car vs human?) vs same to: - suicide bombs (car vs human?) vs Iraqi Syf (police stations), civilians rather than Coalition SyF Jul 03: President Bush’s “Bring Them On” Speech taken as de facto acknowledgement of existence of ongoing IS/CT campaign Jun, Nov 03: the emphasis on UK RMP (Royal Military Police), Italian, Spanish deaths etc in no way intended to ignore, slight the losses suffered by other Coalition members, US, Iraqis. However, these are relevant as local peaks in national monthly loss rate per size force, as developed/discussed in slides 39, 40 etc There may be an interesting historical study here on when/why the insurgents switch tactics/targets…..from: - guerrilla-style ambushes by small numbers against isolated SyF patrols, convoys, bases, etc to: - IEDS vs same to: - suicide bombs (car vs human?) vs same to: - suicide bombs (car vs human?) vs Iraqi Syf (police stations), civilians rather than Coalition SyF

Slide 26:Iraq IS/CT Campaign (2)

Source: Jane’s Online 2003

Slide 27:Iraq IS/CT Campaign (3)

Coalition Security Forces (Nov 03): United States c. 130,000 United Kingdom c. 9,900 Italy, Poland c. 2,400 each Others (13+ nations) c. 7,400 overall Iraqi Security Forces (Dec 03): Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) c. 11,000 National Iraqi Army (NIA) c. 600 Police c. 68,400 Iraqi Border Police c. 12,400 Facilities Protection Service (FPS) c. 53,100 Total Coalition: c. 152,000 Total Iraqi: c. 145,500

Slide 28:Iraq IS/CT Campaign (4)

Strength of ‘Iraqi’ terrorists/insurgents: Lower estimate (active insurgents only?): “forces opposing US-led troops …total no more than 5,000 mostly loyalists of…Saddam Hussein” Gen John Abizaid, Comd US Centcom, Nov 2003 Upper estimate (active insurgents + passive sympathisers?): “Top Pentagon adviser Richard Perle said... some 30,000 armed supporters of Saddam Hussein's fallen regime remained active” Jordan Times, Wednesday July 23, 2003

Slide 29:Iraq IS/CT Campaign (5)

Coalition Losses: Iraq Coalition Casualty Count (www.lunaville.org/warcasualties/ summary.aspx) Iraqi SyF Losses: “They’ve killed something like 86 Iraqi security forces” Donald Rumsfeld, 13 November 2003 Iraqi civilian deaths: Possibly 4,200+ (www.sadnews.net) Hostile Fatalities

Slide 30:Comparison of SyF loss Rates (1)

Slide 31:Comparison of SyF loss Rates (2)

Slide 32:Comparison of SyF loss Rates (3)

A clear separation between NI, Cyprus, Malaya & VN Consequence of “conventional war” element in VN data? Iraq falls amongst NI, Cyprus, Malaya distributions: average losses are greater than for these historical campaigns 1/6 of loss rate for VN all observed loss rates fall within range of loss rates for NI, Malaya average SyF monthly loss rates for Iraq exceeded by: c. 8% of NI monthly losses (1972 - 1984) c. 30% of Malayan monthly losses (1948 - 1957)

Slide 33:Breakdown of Iraq SyF Loss Rates (1)

Highest Malayan, NI or Cyprus annual loss rate corrected for timescale: 0.61 SyF deaths per 1,000 SyF per Equivalent-Month

Slide 34:Breakdown of Iraq SyF Loss Rates (2)

Greatest national monthly loss rates are: UK (Jun 03) 0.61 deaths / 1,000 SyF US (Nov 03) 0.64 deaths / 1,000 SyF Italian, Spanish (Nov 03) 5.6 deaths / 1,000 SyF Could a single, sufficiently lethal incident lead to withdrawal of one of the smaller, more peripheral Coalition forces? NB possible basis for future analytical comparisons with, e.g.: Bombing USMC barracks in Lebanon (Oct 83) ~ 30% fatalities “Black Hawk Down” raid, Somalia (Oct 93) ~ 18% fatalities

Slide 35:Summary of Iraq Loss Measures

Slide 36:Loss Rates & Campaign Outcome (1)

At the whole-campaign level, there is a clear separation between overall loss rate and outcome: Current estimate for Iraq ~ 3.5 deaths / 1,000 Man-years But: correlation is not the same as causality; current estimate may not approximate whole-campaign value Means are significantly different at 99% confidenceMeans are significantly different at 99% confidence

Slide 37:Loss Rates & Campaign Outcome (2)

Note that at least 8 of these 10 campaigns were successful in narrow military terms Algeria, Angola & Vietnam were (arguably) lost through failures of political will or changes in political priorities Hypothesis: Can (a perception) of high loss rates drive campaign failure by undermining political will? NB: In democracies, there is a significant correlation between (relative) casualties and public support for ops

Slide 38:Force Ratios & Campaign Outcome

As campaigns move from “Terrorist Win” to “SyF Win” outcomes, overall force ratios increase: Result is significant at 90% confidence (Jonckheere Test) Current estimate for Iraq <= ~ 9.3 SyF per Insurgent Again, not consistent with failing campaign “Not consistent with a failing campaign”, but not a predictive indicator of a successful campaign Strictly, Jonckheere teat is test on medians. Thee data is significant at 90% exactly and the observed medians are not in the H(1) order. But this is driven by a single outlier in one of the samples. The overall trend in the data supports H(1).“Not consistent with a failing campaign”, but not a predictive indicator of a successful campaign Strictly, Jonckheere teat is test on medians. Thee data is significant at 90% exactly and the observed medians are not in the H(1) order. But this is driven by a single outlier in one of the samples. The overall trend in the data supports H(1).

Slide 39:Force Ratios and Loss Rates (1)

y = 32x-0.56 R2 = 0.65 Iraq 2003+ (Nov 03 Estimate)

Slide 40:Force Ratios and Loss Rates (2)

Significant inverse-square-root relationship between overall loss rates and force ratios (99% confidence) Increasing force ratio increases absolute SyF losses but reduces loss rates Increased “target opportunity” effect dominates any suppressive “troops-on-ground” effect? Can we quantify the implied trade-off with force ratio between absolute fatalities & probability of campaign success?

Slide 41:Insurgent Density & Campaign Type

Iraq 2003 Estimate (Nov 03) ~ 1.2 Terrorists/Sympathisers per 1,000 Popn Iraq 2003+

Slide 42:Conclusions

Even with crude data it is possible to identify general trends and correlations in terrorist/insurgent campaigns The campaign in Iraq is not (currently) particularly bloody compared to previous, successfully resolved IS campaigns an order of magnitude less lethal than the US involvement in Vietnam within the limits of violence experienced in NI and Malaya The current state of the campaign is more consistent with eventually-successful than otherwise campaigns not that we can predict outcome (dangers of predicting future from entrails!)

Any Questions? Acknowledgements I would like to gratefully acknowledge the contributions made by my colleagues in Dstl to the design & execution of these analyses: Mr A Hopkin Mr A Morley Miss J Offord Miss CL Simmonett Mr K Sivasankaran Dr D Tilley