November 1, 2006 Sang-Hyun Lee The Sejong Institute, KOREA shlee@sejong

1. Changes from Within:Changing Security Perception in South Korea and Its Implications for ROK Security Policy November 1, 2006 Sang-Hyun Lee The Sejong Institute, KOREA shlee@sejong.org

2. South Korea’s Key National Interests • Guarantee national security • Deter North Korean aggression, defeat if attacked • Maintain military alliance • Arms control on the Korean peninsula • Robust economic development and prosperity • Economic development • Access to world market • Development of liberal democray • Transition to liberal democracy • Legal justice and civil rights • National self-esteem and contribution to international peace • Image of peace-loving nation • Peaceful reunification • Peaceful and step-by-step reunification Georgia Tech Korea Conference

3. Traditional Security Concept • Security 101 - Deter North Korean invasion • Legacy of Korean War - war and subsequent division • Inter-Korean relations as a ‘legitimacy war’ • Both claimed to be the sole legitimate regime on the Korean Peninsula • Basis of regime legitimacy – performance and ideology • Diverging ideologies • Democracy vs. nationalism • South adopted US-style democratic political system • North – based on Kim Il Sung’ Soviet affiliation, experience in underground nationalist movement • State capitalism v. ‘Juche’ Georgia Tech Korea Conference

4. Inter-Korean Relations After the War • Armistice, not the end of the Korean War • Military Armistice Commission (MAC) –Administer military ceasefire – perpetuate military stalemate, not to resolve the conflict’s underlying causes • Series of high level North-South dialogues commenced in 1990s • Containment and deterrence • Dominated much of the inter-Korean relations until the 1990s • Korea-US alliance system was designed to deter North’s aggression • Dialogues and conflicts • July 4, 1972 – first North-South Joint Communique • 1974 – Moon Se-kwang’s attempt to assassinate president Park • 1983 – Rangoon, Burma - explosion during Chun’s state visit to Burma • From containment to engagement • Roh Tae-woo’s Nordpolitik • 1991 – both Koreas admitted to the United Nations Georgia Tech Korea Conference

5. Korea, North and South Georgia Tech Korea Conference

6. Comparison of GNI (’90~’04) Georgia Tech Korea Conference

7. Security Perception Change • The End of the Cold War • President Roh Tae-woo’s ‘Northern Policy’ – diplomatic normalization with Russia and China • ‘Basic Agreement’ for non-aggression, reconciliation, and cooperation (1992) • Changes in Inter-Korean Relations • Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il’s June 2000 summmit and Joint Communique (2000) • Joint Declaration of Denuclearlizaion of the Korean Peninsula (1992) • Changing perception for ROK-US Alliance • From Client-patron relations to more equal partnership Georgia Tech Korea Conference

8. Turn Toward Engagement • Late ’80s and ’90s • End of the Cold War • Nordpolitik – from Chun Do Hwan (1980~1988), Roh Tae-woo (1988~1993) to Kim Young Sam (1993~1998) • Taepo-Dong launch, 1998 • Food shortage – as many as 3 million dead between August 1995 and Jaunary 1998 • Changing Concepts on North Korea • ‘Main enemy’, but still the same ‘nation’ • Chung Ju Young - ‘cattle diplomacy’ and Kumkangsan tourism paved the way • South Korean civil society began to look at Northern brethren – NGOs, civil activists, and religious organizations voiced for engagement Georgia Tech Korea Conference

9. Sunshine Policy • Objectives of Sunshine Policy • “Improve inter-Korean relations by promoting peace, reconciliation, and cooperation” • Three principles • No armed provocations will be tolerated • No takeover or absorption of North Korea by the South • Expansion of reconciliation and cooperation • Kim Dae-jung government’s feature (1998~2003) • A minority reformist regime • Conservative oppositions • External environment – US suspicion Georgia Tech Korea Conference

10. Changing Perception on ROK-US Alliance • Korea’s domestic changes • Growing awareness of the Korean ‘nationhood’ • No more unilateral support from the United States • National pride for economic achievements along with remarkable democratization • Generational change - the younger generations have much more positive attitudes toward North Korea • Changes in US perception • After the September 11, heavy emphasis on anti-terrorism and counter-proliferation • Less inclined to tolerate anti-American sentiments abroad Georgia Tech Korea Conference

11. New Political Landscapes in Korea • Political Parties • Progressives • Uri Party • KDLP (Korean Democratic Labor Party) • Conservatives – GNP, PFP • Civic Movement Organizations (CMOs) • Empowered by democratic transition in the ’80s • Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (1989) • Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (1993) • People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (1994) • Labor Unions • Korean Teachers and Education Workers’ Union (전교조) • Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (민노총) • Federation of Korean Trade Unions (한노총) Georgia Tech Korea Conference

12. Perceptions on Korea-US Alliance • Global Views 2004 (EAI, CCFR Joint Survey, 2005) Georgia Tech Korea Conference

13. Perception on USFK by Generations Georgia Tech Korea Conference

14. Evaluation of Korea-US Relations since Roh Moo-hyun Took Power Georgia Tech Korea Conference

15. Attitudes for Transfer of Wartime OPCON Georgia Tech Korea Conference

16. Perceptions on USFK Reduction Security impact of USFK reduction Positive Traditional Anti-American Group N=389 39% Accepting US Military Transformation Group N=214 21% Oppose USFK stationing Support USFK stationing Emotional Anti-American Group N=100 10% Traditional Pro-alliance Group N=297 30% Negative Georgia Tech Korea Conference

17. How President Roh Moo-hyun is Doing Georgia Tech Korea Conference

18. How Political Parties are Doing Georgia Tech Korea Conference

19. After a Nuclear Test Hankook Ilbo, Media Research (Sept. 2006) Georgia Tech Korea Conference

20. Perception for Engagement Policy Georgia Tech Korea Conference

21. Implications for Korea’s Security Policy • Domestic politics • Uri Party – currently holds 47% of National Assembly, considers dissolving and recreating the party • Bleak promise of re-election from Roh’s party • Engagement Policies: Can it continue? • After a nuclear test – can it be the same? • More reciprocity and monitoring • Transformation of ROK-US alliance • From military alliance to comprehensive security partnership • Transfer of wartime OPCON – dissolution of the CFC – more independent and equal, but how much efficient? Georgia Tech Korea Conference