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Computational Functionalism

Computational Functionalism. Motivations. A functionalist general purpose input-output device certainly sounds like a computer Mind does informational things A machine implementation of functionalism is natural Computational functions are multiply realisable. Turing Machine.

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Computational Functionalism

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  1. Computational Functionalism

  2. Motivations • A functionalist general purpose input-output device certainly sounds like a computer • Mind does informational things • A machine implementation of functionalism is natural • Computational functions are multiply realisable

  3. Turing Machine • Turing machines consist of: • an infinite tape divided into squares • a head that reads from and writes to the tape • a finite set of internal states; q0, …, qn • a finite alphabet; b1, …, bm

  4. Turing Machine #    #    1   1    1    +    1   1   #   #  q0

  5. Turing Machine #    #    1   1    1    +    1   1   #   #  q0

  6. Turing Machine #    #    1   1    1    +    1   1   #   #  q0

  7. Turing Machine #    #    1   1    1    +   1   1   #   #  q0

  8. Turing Machine #    #    1   1    1    1    1   1   #   #  q0

  9. Turing Machine #    #    1   1    1    1    1   1   #   #  q0

  10. Turing Machine #    #    1   1    1    1    1   1   #   #  q0

  11. Turing Machine #    #    1   1    1    1    1   1   #   #  q1

  12. Turing Machine #    #    1   1    1    1    1   #   #   #  Halt

  13. Turing Machine #    #    1   1    1    +    1   1   #   #  q0

  14. Machine Functionalism • The computational functionalist claim is that the mind can be thought of as a TM • Mental states of Stephen are to be identified with the internal states of Stephen’s TM

  15. Psychology • Instrumentalism A theory predicts • Realism A theory explains

  16. Difficulties • Identity • What does it means for A to have the same mental state as B? • q0 is only definable as the triplet: {<1, 1Rq0>, <+, 1Rq0>, <#, #Lq1>} • Each state is defined in terms of the other states • Different psychologies can’t even be compared

  17. Difficulties • Simulation • Do we think that a weather simulation program actually has weather going on inside it?

  18. Turing Test • If a machine passes a test that we think could only be passed by a thinking thing then we have no grounds to deny that the machine is thinking. • Have a conversation with A and B, one of them a machine, the other a person. If you can’t tell which is the machine then both are thinking.

  19. The Chinese Room • Searle thought that the idea that mental states could be identified with computational states was almost demonstrably incorrect.

  20. The Chinese Room • Responses • System The room + the man + … understands • Reply Let him memorise it all

  21. The Chinese Room • Responses • Robot Connect the room to the world • Reply What is the robot really receiving?

  22. The Chinese Room • Responses • Simulator Make the room look like the brain • Reply Where’s computation now?

  23. The Chinese Room • Searle thinks that only  machines can think, ie. brains, but not by computing.

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