Overcoming Noise and Misunderstanding: The Functionality of Generosity

1. Overcoming Noise and Misunderstanding:The Functionality of Generosity Paul A.M. Van Lange and Anthon Klapwijk VU University Amsterdam and Leiden University Kyoto Social Dilemma Conference 2009

2. NoiseNoise refers to unintended errors that affect interaction outcomes. Noisy situations are situations that are prone to unintended errors in interaction.

3. Outcomes for the other are perhaps less good than intended ….

4. Outcomes for the other are certainly less good than intended ….

5. Outcomes for the other are certainly less good than intended: negative noise

6. Noise is prevalent - communication between people with different backgrounds (ethnic or otherwise) - in poorly organized relationships, teams, and nations Yet, in five decades or more on social dilemmas, it has hardly been studied – in less than 0.1% of the empirical studies (I am guessing).

7. Importance of Negative Noise (versus Postive Noise)1. Objectively more prevalent in everyday life2. Psychologically more impactful – and it undermines cooperation.

8. Noise has often two important consequences: • Uncertainty • Misunderstanding Which may cause enduring conflict (and patterns of noncooperation)

9. How can be effectively cope with negative noise?1. Adding generosity even substantial forms of generosity work (Klapwijk & Van Lange, 2009, JPSP) and ones induced by empathy (Rumble, Van Lange, & Parks, in press, EJSP)2. Clarifying “I did not mean it that way” (Tazelaar, Van Lange, Ouwerkerk, 2004, JPSP)

10. Why does adding generosity work?1. builds trust2. symbiosis with reciprocity (which is what most people do, at least with strangers)3. induce a more enduring other-regarding mindset? Such that it affects behavior in a dictator game, where reciprocity does not work….

11. Parcel Paradigm • The participants and their partner • deliver valuable parcels for each other • throughout a city. • A trial consists of two parts: • In part A the participant is the deliverer of the parcel. • In part B the participant is the sender of the parcel.

12. The cooperation measure is the time they take to deliver the parcel. The deliverer earns money per second (€ 0,60). His interest is to be slow (cf. taxi driver) The sender loses money per second (€ 1,40). He hopes the deliverer to be quick. By alternating roles of sender and deliverer, the two parts together form a social dilemma structure.

13. Parcel Paradigm: Part A of trial

14. Parcel Paradigm: Part B of trial

15. Noise is introduced to the participants as construction blocks that every now and then appear on the map. • In the present studies there is no noise on the participant’s side. Now and then they are reminded of noise through blocks that form no obstruction. Parcel Paradigm: Noise

16. Emphasis on effort and time • There is even a possibility to take advantage of noise in a nearly unconscious manner. • 2. Fluctuation, or inherent noise • In the coin paradigm, if you want to give 5, you give 5. • Here, clarity is challenged somewhat, because (a) you decide as you act (“online”), and (b) your “decision” will be less specific. Two innovations

17. Will the benefits of generosity last when the interaction has ended? That is, can it induce an other-regarding mindset that affects cooperation in a dictator game -- a single-trial situation with no future of interaction?

18. The experiment 86 participants interacted in PDG with ‘pre-programmed’ other (9 rounds) - Strategy of other was manipulated: TFT vs. Generous - Noise was manipulated: Noise vs. No Noise After interaction: participants received extra money that they could donate to other person with whom they interacted in the PDG – a DG after PDG.

19. Manipulation of strategy Strategy of pre-programmed computer partner: Tit-for-Tat: start 13 sec.  do what pp does (b) Generous: start 13 sec.  do what pp does - 4 sec. Sequential behavior paradigm, other starts first

20. 1 N 3 4 N 6 7 N 9 Manipulation of negative noise “Road blocks” could appear on the way to the flag There was no noise on pp’s side, but they were reminded of possible noise  road blocks that did not obstruct the way to the flag. • Noise: seven seconds were added to delivery time of partner in rounds 2, 5, and 8 (i.e., unintended error) • No noise: intention = action

21. “Altruistic” giving of money After interaction had ended, we offered pp extra money (150 cents). How much do you want to give the other in the lab (0, 50, 100, or 150 cents)? Money was doubled for the receiver by experimenter.

22. Cooperation (9 rounds)

23. Impressions of benign intent (10 items)

24. Giving in Dictator Game(in actual cash)

25. Why give so little to Generous Other when there is no noise? Speculatively…. how do we deal with others that are clearly nicer than ourselves – a threat of moral inferiority? do-gooder derogation (Monin, 2007; but see Weber et al., 2008) The other must have a special skill…

26. conclusions Under negative noise, generosity seems to: 1. build trust 2. pair well with reciprocity (symbiosis) 3. induce other-regarding mindset

27. conclusions • Generosity may shed other light on the end-game affect • Evolution of generosity – especially because more than one proximal mechanism seem to underlie it.

28. conclusions After all, under negative noise, generosity promoted 1. impressions of benign intent 2. cooperation 3. freely giving (in Dictator Game)

29. Take home message: The power of generosity may be easily overlooked when one does not consider realistic situations that are challenged by negative noise.