The “Preemptive Corollary” and Operations in Iraq

1. The “Preemptive Corollary” and Operations in Iraq PO 326: American Foreign Policy

2. Iraq and the Doctrine of Preemption • Since the conclusion of the 1991 Gulf War, US remained concerned about Saddam’s expansionist tendencies and WMD program • Establishment of “no-fly zones” to check Iraqi expansionism • Clinton authorizes funds to aid Iraqi opposition, attacks Iraqi air defenses • UN weapons inspectors allowed into Iraq after Gulf War, but are essentially expelled by Saddam in 1998 • After 9/11 and the enunciation of the Bush Doctrine, Iraq’s intransigence takes on a much more urgent meaning for the administration • General realist thinking: Real lesson of 9/11 is that serious threats to US must be dealt with early (Rice), and any rogue states with WMD must be considered threats (leads to speculation about North Korea, Iran) • Connection to war on terror: If Saddam’s WMD are somehow transferred to al-Qaeda or other terrorists, resulting attacks could make 9/11 pale in comparison – makes Iraq a primary target for preemption in eyes of administration • Shows just how much 9/11 attacks change traditional US thinking about terror • Difficulty in establishing linkages; remains key obstacle, source of opposition

3. Building the Case Against Iraq: Bureaucratic Politics • Action against Iraq had been discussed in the “War Cabinet” since 9/11 • Part of DoD plan for multiple actions in war on terror (Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz); regarded Saddam as serious threat even before 9/11 • Cheney begins to push hard for Iraqi action in early 2002 • State’s concerns (Powell, Armitage) – We’d certainly win, but: • Saddam is largely contained as it is; little threat of state action or WMD getting into hands of terrorists • Difficulty in gathering prewar intelligence • Destabilization of Arab world; impact on Arab-Israeli conflict • Cost of postwar occupation • Dangers of American unilateralism – any actions taken against Iraq must have broad-based international support, preferably through UN or coalition-building

4. Building the Case Against Iraq: Bureaucratic Politics • Internal wrangle over Iraq develops; Bush’s approach sides heavily with Defense and Cheney • Saddam’s continued tenure seen as threat to American/Middle East security (human rights violations) • Early 2002: Covert ops to oust Saddam (opposition support, help to prepare for possible military strike) • April 2002: Bush declares that regime change is the goal in Iraq • June 2002: Formal declaration that preemptive strikes would be launched against states that were serious threats (Rice’s view) • Return of Reagan-style evangelism: Bush views himself as defending good against evil (Woodward) • Bush takes some of Powell’s concerns seriously (will seek UN support), but believes that unilateral action (or action with few allies) is sovereign right

5. Building the Case Against Iraq: Linkages to al-Qaeda (?) • Important to the ability of the administration to “sell” its position regarding Iraq to others is its capacity to determine linkages between Saddam and al-Qaeda – evidence is scant at best • Theories about connection of Ramzi Yousef to Iraqi intelligence (largely discredited) • Wolfowitz: al-Qaeda unable to plan/execute 9/11 attacks without state sponsorship (many doubters – Clarke) • In the end, Bush moves against Iraq with almost no evidence that al-Qaeda is likely to get Saddam’s WMD • Instead, relies upon general threat posed and the remote possibility that such weapons could fall into terrorist hands; deposing Saddam simply “makes the world a safer place” – risks are in not acting • Much international skepticism

6. Building the Case Against Iraq: UN Security Council Resolution 1441 • Powell’s continued requests for diplomacy result in administration attempts to procure UN resolutions supporting military action (Bush’s speech) • UN SC Resolution 1441 (11/8/02): Calls on Saddam to declare his WMD programs, disarm, and allow inspectors to verify; threatens “serious consequences” if he fails to (major diplomatic victory for Powell) • Blix and inspectors arrive on 11/27 • Iraq releases statement denying weapons program on 12/7; Blix, US administration very skeptical, and inspections continue • Bush, never believing that Saddam would comply, states that “time is running out” before military action ensues (1/14/03)

7. Building the Case Against Iraq: Domestic & International Opposition • With increasing prospects of military action, domestic criticism is more widespread regarding Iraq than regarding any US foreign policy action since Vietnam • Main thrust of opposition: Because victory and postwar occupation will be costly and because there are no clear linkages to al-Qaeda, an Iraq war will destroy the war against terrorism (Scowcroft) • Apparent UN opposition to military action solidifies contention that any war is unilateral, and will cut US off from allies (Powell) – diminishes post-9/11 support • Nevertheless, Congress gives president full authority to attack Iraq unilaterally; indication that it will approve necessary finances in the future • Internationally, most governments (esp. France’s) believe that invasion is unjustifiable; request more time for inspections • Widespread popular opposition in foreign countries (Europe, Middle East) • UK is only major power that fully backs US and offers military assistance, but domestic British opposition constantly pressures PM Blair

8. Building the Case Against Iraq: The Countdown to War • In early 2003, Blix and inspectors begin to steer middle course • No “smoking gun” regarding WMD programs means that even more inspections are justified, not invasion; seemingly undercuts US case • In State of the Union Address, Bush makes case for military action to the American people • Threat posed by WMD necessitates action; presence of program all but certain given continued intransigence • Powell goes before UN with new allegations and apparent evidence of Iraqi WMD (2/5) – united front within administration signaled • In February, US, Australia, Spain, and a few other states openly begin military buildup, hoping to compel Iraq to comply before war (some Arab states offer covert assistance) • In early March, a second UN SC resolution giving Saddam an ultimatum to disarm and authorizing military action if it was not met is contemplated by the US, but France and Russia indicate that it would be vetoed • 3/17: Bush gives ultimatum to Saddam to leave Iraq within forty-eight hours or face invasion (not backed by UN vote); Saddam defiant, and US military action begins

9. Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Ground War • Unlike in Afghanistan, the US develops a concrete strategy prior to action in Iraq • Largely planned by Defense, Gen. Franks, in the few months prior to the ultimatum – necessity of revamping outdated Iraqi invasion plans in short period of time (very limited input by State, others) • Main thrust: • Use strategic bombing to ease way for ground troops, who will invade from south with the goal of nominally securing opposition strongholds and then quickly advance on Baghdad • Substantial numbers of ground troops, but far fewer than first Gulf War • A major goal is also to foment or unleash popular uprising against regime, thereby taking pressure off of troops – CIA operatives deployed prior to and at early stages of war to accomplish this goal • Limited air strikes against leadership at outset (3/20) seek to “decapitate” regime

10. Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Ground War • This strike was immediately followed by the launch of simultaneous air and ground operations; ground operations focus on southern Iraqi tier • British and US Marines deployed in south to secure al Faw peninsula, southern oil fields, port of Umm Qasr, and the region around Basra • Heavy bombing, special ops in north • US Army 5th Corps moves rapidly toward Baghdad • After several weeks of heavy fighting around Basra, UK troops take the city center on 4/6 • After several days of incursions into Baghdad, US troops take effective control on 4/9 • Northern city of Tikrit fell to coalition forces on 4/13, ending main combat phase • Bush declares major combat operations over on 5/1

11. The Ground War Through mid-April 2003 • Map from http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/daily/graphics/iraqMap_033103_1.gif

12. Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Postwar Presence • The air and ground war against the regime is a complete battlefield success. There were, however, issues that lead to serious difficulties on the postwar scene • Popular revolt does not materialize; indeed, some resistance is encountered by Shiite Muslim factions who, though repressed by Saddam, consider the US-led invasion illegitimate • Coalition forces also encounter very heavy resistance by pro-regime opposition forces in the area north of Baghdad (“Sunni Triangle”); intensifies costs of postwar occupation

13. The “Sunni Triangle” • Map from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunni_triangle

14. Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Postwar Presence • The conflict waged by opposition forces necessitates the presence of sizable American and allied forces to ensure order following the defeat and eventual capture of Saddam • Urban combat operations in Tikrit, Najaf, Fallujah, Mosul; unconventional tactics (terrorist bombing) used against US troops, resulting in many more casualties than ground war and further domestic dissent • Terrorism thus introduced to area previously characterized by order; compounded by introduction of new targets, difficulty of guarding border (revitalizes al-Qaeda and its cause?) • Kidnappings and attacks on troops, reconstruction officials (UN), and other allies’ homelands lead to political reconsideration (Spain, Philippines) • US and allies seek to install new representative regime via free elections, but violence slows democratization

15. Iraq and the War on Terror: Questions and Implications • Bureaucratic politics • Focus on Iraq represents victory of Defense over State, exhibits conventional military prowess, defines preemptive arm of Bush Doctrine • Problems with connectivity to terrorist threat • According to some, bogs US down in area oblique to “war on terror” – issue of definitional ambiguity • Perceived evangelism and near unilateralism – immense impact on global relations • Are we revitalizing al-Qaeda? Playing into its hands? Or is Rice’s lesson the crucial focus? • Postwar occupation, nation-building, and costs • How does postwar nation-building in Iraq fit into the administration’s original approach? How does it fit into traditional impetuses of US foreign policy (realism, isolationism, Wilsonianism)? • What does nation-building, taken in conjunction with the Bush Doctrine, mean for the future of the war on terror?