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Institutional design 1

Institutional design 1. The prices versus quantity debate revisited. Prices versus quantities. The Kyoto protocol : key features . National quotas rigid, based on emissions at a year basis An international market for permits (exchange of quotas). Voluntary participation (Annex B).

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Institutional design 1

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  1. Institutional design 1 The prices versus quantity debate revisited

  2. Prices versus quantities • The Kyoto protocol : key features. • National quotas rigid, based on emissions at a year basis • An international market for permits (exchange of quotas). • Voluntary participation (Annex B). • An alternative : a world tax ?. • Note : • Kyoto is a « quantity » policy. • Harmonized world tax would be a «price » policy ?

  3. Prices versus quantities • A simplistic formal model : • without uncertainty, Notation q : emissions abatement. • Nash : • q°(i): Max {U[i, Q°(-i)+q(i)]-C(i,q(i)}, iB • iq°(i)=Q° • Kyoto : • Quotas s(i), iB, q°°(i), • q°°(i) : Max {t°°[(q(i)-s(i)]-C(i,q(i)}, iB • iB s(i)= iB q°°(i)=Q°° • IR ? • Market for permits, world carbon price t°°. • Harmonized taxation : • q°’(i) : Max {t°’[(q(i)]-C(i,q(i))}, iB •  iI q°’(i)=Q°’ • Welfare : U(i, Q°’)-C(i, q°’(i))

  4. Prices versus quantities : the conventional wisdom • Note : • Kyoto is a « quantity » policy. • Harmonised world tax would be a «price » policy ? • The intellectual debate : • Under certainty, • equivalent,(modulo participation) • See the above model. • Under uncertainty : • Weitzman’s argument (1974) : • If the marginal cost is steep and uncertain and the expected marginal benefit of abatement is flat, the price policy is superior. • Resp. threshhold effect, quantity is superior.

  5. p q Prices versus quantities : Application of the standard argument • The graphical argument : flat marginal benefit • Optimal price policy : p=p* • Optimal quantity policy : q=q* • Compare losses in both cases • The intuition. • Algebra gives differences in welfare : depend on the variance of noise.. p* q*

  6. p q Prices versus quantities : Application of the standard argument • The graphical argument : flat marginal cost p* q*

  7. The conventional wisdom. • The one-period analysis. • Think of 2008-2012 • Marginal cost is steep and uncertain ? • Stock externality • One period abatement small vis-à-vis objectives • Social value of abatement cannot change drastically. • Price policy is better (tax, safety valve..) • The multi-period analysis. • Many periods : a calibrated model. • Newell D. et Pizer W (2000), “Regulating stock externalities under uncertainty”, Resources for the future, Washington DC, DP 9910. • Surprising conclusion • Quantities are what we are concerned with. • But a priori the argument makes qualitative sense,

  8. The conventional wisdom : what is wrong ?. • What might be wrong : • The flatness of the marginal benefit curve may overlook the option value component of benefit. • Additional attention may be required. • What is wrong and may be significantly wrong. • There is a time aggregation problem • Abatement cost of the last unit in t, much higher than the abatement cost of the first unit at t+1. • Exaggerates inconveniences of a quantity policy. • Reflects a cost modelling problem • Key inter-temporal dimension of the abatment problem. • What is seriously wrong: • What we can control is possibly a « harmonized tax », not the user price of carbon • The key issue may be how the price of fossil fuels reacts to carbon taxes • A subject on which a convincing reflection is lacking.…

  9. A few additional and more basic remarks on « price policies » : the static model. • A key and neglected issue to evaluate taxation policies. • The relationship between the price of fossil fuels and taxation. • The teachings of the static model • The tax leaves the price unchanged, but transfers the rent from the producer to the taxing authority. • A tax (or subsidy) does not affect either exhaustion, unless it leads to a zero price for the owner of the resource.. • Policy assesment. • Ineffective on all grounds but distributive. • Inferior in some sense to a quantiy policy, unless it « de-possesses » the owner.

  10. Q Q* Rent T p P*

  11. A few additional and more basic remarks on « price policies »: dynamics • References : • Abundant literature some time ago with different emphasis • Recent emphasis on the greenhouse effect in • Chakravorty, Moreaux, Magné (2004), or Magné-Moreaux (2002) « Long term energies trajectories : assessing the nuclear option in response to global warming”,Université de Toulouse • Their model : • one single (carbon) fossil fuel, • a « backstop » technology available later, • and non oligoplistic producers, (competitive pricing). • Hotelling rule the rate of price increase is the the interest factor) • Exhaustible, no production cost. • Certainty, « rational » expectations

  12. p(t) t q(t)

  13. p(t) t q(t)

  14. p(t) tax t q(t)

  15. Taxation and the price of fossil fuels : some insights on dynamics. • The dynamic counterpart of the static teachings. • Some tax schemes will leave the actual price path unchanged, only transferring rent (it seems always possible to do so).. • Some will delay exhaustion; but can prevent it only by « surprise », and by imposing a zero future price for the resource • Other insights on dynamics : • taxes may help to delay exhaustion, but clever time modulation is required • The tax equilibria are not « eductively » stable. • Provisional Conclusion. • Commitment to Taxes is not a substitute of commitment to Quantities • The right control variable would be the price of fossil fuel ! • The price quantity discussion has to be revisited…

  16. Some references. • Aldy, J.E., P. R. Orszag and J. E. Stiglitz, ''(2001) ''Climate Change: An Agenda for Global Collective Action'', Prepared for the conference on ``The Timing of Climate Change Policies'', Pew Center on Global Climate Change, October. • Bradford, D.F. (2001), « Improving on Kyoto: A No Cap but Trade Approach to Greenhouse Gas control » Princeton University. • Chakrovorty U, Magné B. and Moreaux M, (2003) « Energy resource substitution and carbon concentration targets with non stationary needs'', Leerna 31, Université de Toulouse. • Cooper, R., (1998), ''Toward a real global warming treaty'', Foreign Affairs, vol. 77 no 2, March-April C • Carraro C.(1999) ''The Structure of International Agreements on Climate Change''in C. Carraro C. (ed), International Environmental Agreements on Climate Change, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, NL • Chandler L and Tulkens H. (2005) « Stability issues and climate related dynamic externalities »38p

  17. Some references. • Freixas X, Guesnerie R, et Tirole J. (1985) « Planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect », Review of Economic Studies, LII, 173-191.. • Guesnerie R. (2003) « Les enjeux économiques de l'effet de serre » in «Kyoto et l‘économie de l'effet de serre », sous la direction de R. Guesnerie, La Documentation Française, Paris. • Guesnerie R. ( 2004) « Calcul Economique et Développement Durable », Revue Economique, p.363-382. • Guesnerie R. (2005) ''Assessing Rational Expectations :2- ''Eductive'' stability in economics », MIT Press, 453 P. • Guesnerie R. (2006) The design post Kyoto climate schemes : an introductory analytical assesment ».  • Ha-Duong M, Grubb M et. Hourcade J.C, (1997) ''Influence of socio--economic inertia and uncertainty on optimal CO2-emissions abatment'', Nature, Vol. 390. • Newell, R.G. and W.A. Pizer, (2000), « Regulating Stock Externalities Under Uncertainty », Discussion Paper 99-10, Resources for the Future, Washington DC, February.

  18. Some references. • Nordhaus, W.D, (2002), ''After Kyoto: Alternative Mechanisms to Control Global Warming'', Paper prepared for the meetings of the American Economic Association and the Association of.IEA/SLT(2002)28 • Philibert, C. (2000). ``How could emissions trading benefit developing countries.'' Energy Policy , volume 28, no 13. • Philibert, C., and J. Pershing. (2001). ``Des objectifs climatiques pour tous les pays : les options.'' Revue de l‘Energie 524. • Pizer, W.A., (2001), ''Combining Price and Quantity Control to Mitigate Global Climate Change'', Journal of Public Economics, 85,(3), 409-434. • Rieu J.(2002) ''Politiques nationales de lutte contre le changement climatique et réglementation de la concurrence : le cas de la fiscalité », mimeo. • Weitzman, M. L., (1974) ''Prices vs. Quantities'', Review of Economic Studies, vol.41, October. • Weitzman, M. L., (2000),AER

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