Philosophy and the Arts, Lectures 27&28:

1. Philosophy and the Arts,Lectures 27&28: “Truth and Fiction” and “Metaphor”

2. Two great Philosophers

3. Two good examples

4. A nest of problems…. • In Philosophy, we so often start with what looks simple, and find concealed a nest of problems. I have combined these two lectures because they are largely concerned with technical philosophical issues. • There are at least 3 problems here: • (1) The Logic of Fiction. • (2) Can a work of fiction impart worthwhile truths? • (3) What’s so hot (or so cool) about truth, anyway? • And Metaphor?? That’s something else again…

5. First, the logic of fiction… • In 1933, Gilbert Ryle (Oxford) and G. E. Moore (Cambridge) did a symposium together on “Imaginary Objects,” published by the Aristotelian Society. • In his contribution, Ryle suggests we compare two sentences: • “Mr. Baldwin is a British statesman,” and “Mr. Pickwick is an imaginary being.”

6. More Logic… • The first sentence clearly states that there exists someone who has the joint attributes of being British and being a statesman. • But the second cannot mean that there exists someone who has the joint attributes of being imaginary and being a being. • Why not? Clearly, ‘imaginariness’ is not a property in the sense that being a statesman is a property.

7. Conclusions?? • Philosophy students will recognize that this also points to the reason Anselm’s “Ontological Argument” fails, because ‘existence’ is not a property in this sense, either. • If Ryle is right, then poets and novelists are not, as has been claimed, “liars by profession.” They do not make false statements. Dickens did not tell us untruths about Pickwick, since there is no Mr. Pickwick for his sentences to be true about!

8. On the other hand… • “Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history: for poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular.” • This line, from Aristotle, no less, suggests that poets, and writers of fiction, might be able to express higher, perhaps universal, truths. Many critics would agree.

9. But Sirridge does not! • In the essay you read for today, M. J. Sirridge argued that there is no sense in which fictional works could help us with truths about the natural world. Nor could they supply confirmation of such true propositions. He claims this is only part our continuing, but failed, attempt to show that art works have cognitive value.

10. Morgan—always the comic… • Douglas Morgan really was a man of infinite jest. • But he loved the arts, too, and what he wants to claim is that there are other values in addition to truth. • Isn’t it enough that the painting, opera, novel—or whatever—be beautiful and deeply moving? Why should we also ask that it “tell the truth?” • Doesn’t this show that we are so under the spell of modern science that we let the sciences tell us how we should value the arts??

11. And now…..Metaphor • Many years ago, one of my first publications was what I called an “Index” of the first 20 volumes of the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. I was surprised to see so few articles devoted to some topics (exactly 2 on sculpture), and so many on others, such as metaphor. • Why so much on metaphor? Well, one reason is that Aristotle had talked about it.

12. By the way,did Aristotle really look like this??

13. Aristotle said: “But the greatest thing by far is to have a command of metaphor. This alone cannot be imparted by another; it is the mark of genius, for to make good metaphors implies an eye for resemblances.”

14. And Beardsley, too… • Beardsley also made it important; metaphor became a test case in whether or not figurative language can be interpreted into something non-figurative. • One of the best things I’ve seen on metaphor is the entry by A. P. Martinich in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

15. “George is a wolf!” • Martinich says this can (has been) be explained 3 (at least) ways: • (1) The comparison theory says this means George is like a wolf—but this fails because our first reaction is “George is human, not a wolf.” • (2) The interaction theory is very popular; it claims that a metaphor sorts out “associated commonplaces,” some of which fit George, while some do not. George is ravenous and cunning, but not covered with bodily hair, etc.

16. Worth the trouble? • (3)Martinich suggests the best approach might be some sort of “speech act” theory, in which a theory of the nature of metaphor is made part of a larger theory of language…big subject… • Joseph Margolis has never been known as a humorist, but he has a point, I think, in saying that perhaps a metaphor can be explained, but there is a sense in which explaining a metaphor is like explaining a joke….if a joke has to be explained, it has failed as a joke.