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Location Verification and Trust Management for Resilient Geographic Routing

Location Verification and Trust Management for Resilient Geographic Routing. Ke Liu, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh and Kyoung-Don Kang Binghamton University CS 587x Nishanth Gaddam. Overview. Geographic Routing (GR) in wireless networks Security Issues in GR

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Location Verification and Trust Management for Resilient Geographic Routing

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  1. Location Verification and Trust Management for Resilient Geographic Routing Ke Liu, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh and Kyoung-Don Kang Binghamton University CS 587x Nishanth Gaddam

  2. Overview • Geographic Routing (GR) in wireless networks • Security Issues in GR • Existing Solutions • Proposed Solution • Location Verification Algorithm • Trust-based Multi-Path Routing. • Performance • Limitations

  3. Geographic Routing in Wireless Sensor networks • Wireless Sensor Networks • Lack of infrastructure • Limited Battery life • Geographic Routing (GR) • Geographic forwarding ( Forwarding sets) • Complementary routing (Void avoidance) Fig a Fig b

  4. Security in Geographic Routing • GR requires exact location of each node. • Use of node location as address rather than node id • Falsification of location information is possible. • Attacks in GR • Sybil attacks – Misbehaving nodes falsify location information • Black hole or Selective forwarding attacks.

  5. Attacks • Sybil Attacks • Malicious node claim multiple locations • Packets misrouted or routed through sub-optimal paths • No centralized system to check the attacks • Black hole attack • In a distributed environment a node can only monitor nodes at 1-hop distance • Adversary node can attract packets towards it and may decide to drop all of them or selectively forward few of the packets

  6. Existing Solution:Location verification scheme Challenge Request Location Information S - Source C n V - Verifier V R S n Ultra-sonic channel • Delay between challenge and response is used for calculating the location estimate.

  7. Problems in Existing solution • Requires specific hardware required for verifying claimed location. • Immediate response is not possible because of packet losses or overload. • Single verifier of the claim.

  8. Threat model and Assumptions • Two types of nodes • Anchor nodes • Assumed to know its own location ( using GPS ) • Trusted nodes • Sensor nodes • These nodes are not trusted • An adversary can capture and compromise sensor nodes. • Efficient Public key system is assumed • Each anchor or sensor node is assigned unique private and public key pair • Public keys are distributed among anchor and sensor nodes • Two communication ends can exchange shared key once trusted route is established • No Physical or MAC layer attack is considered • Denser network (each sensor node has several one hop neighbors) • Sybil and Black hole attacks are possible.

  9. Triangulation based Localization • Basic Idea: • Non-Trusted node is not allowed to generate its own location estimate • There are specific nodes ( anchor ) for generating location information to each sensor node. • Multiple nodes are responsible for generating location information • Location of sensor node is determined using lateration technique • A 2D position requires at least 3 distance measurements

  10. Scheme : Demo • Localization is initiated by sensor node. It transmits request to all the anchor nodes at 1-hop distance Location Certificate Sensor C A Anchor Lc Lc LA LA P P P S B LB LB • Anchor nodes exchange these information with each other to securely produce location estimate using triangulation method • Location estimate is provided to sensor node with a certificate • Each anchor node produce an estimate of the distance based on: • Radio Signal Strength (RSS) or Time of Arrival (TOA)

  11. Counter measures against attacks • Localization Broadcast Manipulation • Node transmit at low/high power to appear far/close • Example Scenario • Assume attacker is at (5,5) and the anchors are at (0,10),(10,10) and(10,0) • Attacker is at 5√2 units from each anchor node. • Attacker transmitted with reduced power to appear 2 units farther (5√2+2) • The set of equation to solve are: • (x,y) = (5, 9.07). But substituting in second equation reveals the infeasibility of the solution.

  12. Calculating original location estimate • Let ei = di+f be the distance calculated by each anchor node • . • We can estimate the location of the attacker by solving for f,xm,ym.

  13. Counter measures contd.. • Multiple Unicast Packets • Attacks • A node can send multiple unicast packets to each anchor node separately with different transmission power using directional antennas • Counter Measure • Synchronizing anchor nodes with the tolerance of a packet length • Anchor nodes can also detect clock skew in the serial attack. • Mobility of nodes • Attack • Malicious node can obtain a valid location certificate and move to new location • Counter Measure • Periodical renew of certificates

  14. Packet Forwarding Attacks • How to ensure that intermediate nodes are forwarding packets ? • Naïve forward verification method is to overhear neighbor transmissions and check whether it has forwarded the packet • But sender may miss the transmission because of collisions • Node B can forward packet in the wrong direction or even to a non existing node

  15. Secure Routing (Resilient Geographic Routing) • Proposes multi-path routing to increase the chance of using uncompromised paths. • Steps for implementing the routing scheme • Source before transmitting messages gets the location information of 2-hop neighbors by querying anchor nodes • Source exchanges authenticated RTS and CTS packet with neighbors • Source adds neighbor ID and location information to routing table ( if it is not present before ) • Build forwarding set of nodes closer to destination • Compute the probability of forwarding packet to each neighbor based on their trust levels • Selects k neighbors based on roulette wheel selection technique and floods packets to them • Source node overhears transmissions of neighbors and checks whether it has transmitted to legitimate location by referring to its cache.

  16. Trust Management • Basic Idea • Favors honest nodes by giving credit for successful packet forwarding • Penalize nodes which lie about location information and also drop packets • Calculating Trust levels of neighbor nodes • Ti (Trust value) is initialized to 0.5. • On successful transmission Tinew =Ti +θ • On dropping the packet Tinew = Ti- φ • Any trusted nodes can exchange trust information of their neighbors

  17. Results • Simulations were done on ns2-simulator and compared with GPSR • RGR outperformed GPSR (insecure) in different scenarios • Delivery ratio is high in RGR even when there are attacks in the network ( because of multi-path routing) • Path length of the received packets increase under attacks • Energy consumption is also high under attacks

  18. Limitations • Requires at least 3 anchor nodes around each sensor node. Deploying anchor nodes is costly • Periodical renew of location information adds additional overhead in terms of energy consumption • RGR fails when there are 2 attackers in a sequence ( or 1 is attacker and other node is completely drained of energy • Multi-Path routing requires exchange of 2-hop neighbor location information periodically. This is additional overhead in terms of transmitting energy and storing it. • Consensus between Anchor nodes. • Assumption that anchor nodes are trusty is not practical

  19. Reference • Ke Liu, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh and Kyoung-Don Kang,” Location Verification and Trust Management for Resilient Geographic Routing” Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing, 215-228, Volume 67, Issue 2, Feb 2007.

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