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E-Voting in the Netherlands

E-Voting in the Netherlands. The Approaching End of Black Box Voting Dr. Anne-Marie Oostveen <anne-marie@social-informatics.net>. Dutch situation (1). Simple elections: one candidate per election, at most 3 elections at the same time. E-voting introduced without any public debate

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E-Voting in the Netherlands

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  1. E-Voting in the Netherlands The Approaching End of Black Box Voting Dr. Anne-Marie Oostveen <anne-marie@social-informatics.net>

  2. Dutch situation (1) • Simple elections: one candidate per election, at most 3 elections at the same time. • E-voting introduced without any public debate • Nearly 100% of population votes electronically • Lots of mystery surrounding voting computers • Problem: unverifiable (not transparent), no recount possible • What was wrong with paper ballots??

  3. Dutch Situation (2) • Black Box Voting: “Any voting system in which the mechanisms for recording and/or tabulating the vote are hidden from the voter, and/or the mechanism lacks tangible record of the vote cast”. • Actors: - Ministry of Interior Affairs - Kiesraad (advisory board) - Brightsight (commercial testing institute) - Manufacturers (Nedap, Sdu) - Municipalities - Voters • Legislation: - Constitution (Grondwet) - Election Law (Kieswet) - Election Order (Kiesbesluit) - Approval regulations voting machines 1997

  4. Manufacturers Nedap Sdu

  5. Testing / Certification Based on ‘Approval regulations voting machines 1997’ • Done by TNO -> TNO-ITSEF -> Brightsight • Specifications severely lacking: • No security requirements specified: the entire concept of intentional vote-tampering does not appear at all in the requirements/regulations. • Mostly about the size of buttons, shock resistance and various other electrical and environmental specifcations • Certification does not protect elections from anything: protection against manipulation is left up to the manufacturers

  6. “e-Voting is safe. Trust us” • 2004, Minister of Interior: “In contrast to elections using paper ballots, the count of an electronic election cannot possibly be wrong, so there is never a need for a recount”. • “The Irish situation is completely different, and so is the software made for Ireland. So all of these Irish security problems with the Nedaps do not apply here”

  7. Wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl • ‘We don’t trust voting computers’ campaign launched, June 2006 • Campaign against unverifiable elections • Mediawiki website • ‘Machines’ vs. ‘Computers’ • Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) • Put all the documents/letters on the net, extensive library (articles, FOIA, legislation, political, links to sisterorganisations, etc) • Discussion list, newsletter, meetings (drinks, debate) • Becoming legit: foundation, office, staff, fundraising

  8. Mail from Ministry • They: “The ministry is taking your campaign very seriously and would like to discuss ways to further increase the level of public confidence in electronic voting”. • We: “We hope the ministry does not see us as the problem. If the ministry would just retract some previous statements regarding e-voting, we are very willing to help ensure a proper burial of black-box voting. As it stands, we believe that increasing the level of confidence in e-voting is not in our nor in this country’s best interest”.

  9. The Nedap hack • The foundation manages to borrow a Nedap from a municipality for a month. Nobody knows! • However, They suspect we are up to something: Nedap and government sent letters to municipalities warning them to be careful with their Nedaps • 4 days later: the foundation buys 2 more Nedaps from a municipality that hasn’t opened these letters yet. Costs: 3000 euros and a cake!

  10. Findings of the hack • Reverse engineering project • Keys • Nedap Chess • Nedap PowerFraud • Radio emissions (CDA-detector)

  11. Consequences of the hack • Broadcast on national TV (4 october) • Politicians reactions: shock, horror • Press conference in parliamentary news center • All over the evening news and the newspapers

  12. Consequences of the hack • Parliamentary debate • AIVD (secret service) looks at radio emissions • Minister announces an independent committee to revise the entire voting process • Nedap gets fixed-up, Sdu’s license suspended • Amsterdam and 34 other municipalities back to red pencil

  13. Sdu NewVote decertified

  14. Elections Before and during: • OSCE fact-finding mission • Cake-delivery by 40 volunteers to all 500 Amsterdam polling stations After: • AIVD and the NFI (Dutch Forensic Institute) check dozens of used voting computers.

  15. Secret, secret, secret! • Forensic research

  16. Current Situation • Committee announced • Foundation met up with Commission • Next election: 7 March 2007 • Sdu NewVote license still suspended • Sdu courtcase against the State (last Friday) • Remote internet voting is pushed by special interest groups and a majority in parliament, because: advantage for disabled, voting from any place, no counting of votes, modern/high-tech image.

  17. Future • Most likely to be with voting computers with a paper trail. • Hopefully internet voting will not be implemented, because of technical as well as important social issues: • No increase in turnout • Digital divide • Civic ritual • Coercion/ Vote-buying • Trust/Social Identity

  18. Thank you!

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