Identity, Ostension , and Hypostasis

1. Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis W.V. Quine, Journal of Philosophy 47 (1950): 621-632

2. Definitions • Identity: oneness, individuation, oneness over time. • Two things are identical if they are indiscernible, i.e., there is no attribute or property that distinguishes them. • Ostension: showing something; point at something. • Hypostasis: substance or foundation of identity; the essence of something.

3. The Problem of Identity • Am I the same person I was yesterday? • Am I the same person I was a week ago? • Am I the same person I was 40 years ago? • The common sense answer is yes, but how can this be possible, if I am different today than the person I was yesterday?

4. Heraclitus • The philosopher Heraclitus believed that everything was in flux and thus nothing remained the same. • This raises several problems: (1) you can never know anything, because once you get to know it, it is already changed and it is not the same thing you knew. • (2) There is nothing that is identical over time. • For instance, he claimed that one could not step into the same river twice.

5. Quine’s Thesis • To show that identity of extended objects (physical objects) over time is metaphysically plausible, and thus that we CAN bathe in the same river twice. • To identify four different metaphysically real, ontologically relevant ideas: (1) Spatial Spread, (2) Temporal Spread, (3) Conceptual Spread, and (4) abstract universals. • To connect reality with language: (1) Proper names (names that identify one particular, concrete thing) and (2) General terms (names that identify more than one concrete particular thing)

6. Quine • Quine identifies four different metaphysically real, ontologically relevant ideas: (1) Spatial Spread, (2) Temporal Spread, (3) Conceptual Spread, and (4) abstract universals. • Quine connect reality with language: • (1) Proper names (names that identify one particular, concrete thing) • (2) General terms (names that identify more than one concrete particular thing)

7. Four Dimensional Reality: Thing and Moments • Quine distinguishes a thing from the thing’s stages and its moments in time. • Reality is not constituted of only the 3-dimensions of physical things but also of a temporal dimension. • Quine argues, “The truth is that you can bathe in the same river twice but not the same river stage.”

8. Cayster River and Water Stages • a = the water stage in the river 400 b.c.e. • b = water stage in the river 2 days after • c = the same water stage as a but half is in the river (much further downstream) and the other half is in the Aegean Sea. • a and b stand in relation to the same river. • a and c stand in relation to the same water but not the same river.

9. “Time-consuming objects” • The Cayster river in Lydia is a time consuming object. It cannot be grasped or understood as a temporally static thing. • To identify it, to refer to it, we must consider the conception of time as part of its hypostasis (substance). • Processes and time-extended objects.

10. Spatial and Temporal Spread • We can then speak of objects having both spatial and temporal spread. • The Cayster River has spatio-temporal spread.

11. Identity and Time-extended Objects • The notion of identity is necessary and is directly related to the individuation of a time-extended object. • “The imputation of identity is essential, here, to fixing the reference of the ostension.” • “The concept of identity, then, is seen to perform a central function in the specifying of spatio-temporally broad objects of ostension.”

12. Quine • “Our sample pointing's need to be made not only on a variety of dates, but at various points up and down stream, if our listener is to have a representative basis for his inductive generalization as to the intended spatio-temporal spread of the four dimensional object Cayster.”

13. Ostension-Induction-Conceptualization • “this My Block”(at time 1) Where “My Block” refers to one particular block. The listener can form the concept of the one object named “My Block,” even if the Temporal stages of the block (i.e., x,y,z) are different. • “this My Block” (at time 2) • “this My Block” (at time 3) X Y Z

14. Ostension-Induction-Conceptualization • “this” (at time 1) Where “this” points to different objects. The listener can learn and grasp the concept of block which is represented by any object with similar properties. • “this” (at time 2) • “this” (at time 3) X X X

15. The Point • The point of the two previous examples is to show that the intellectual process of identifying one particular thing or proper name (e.g., Cayster river) and the process of identifying one general term (e.g., river) are similar.

16. Conceptual Integration: Forming Identity of Concepts • “Objects indistinguishable from one another within the terms of a given discourse should be construed as identical for that discourse.” • “More accurately, the reference: the references to the original objects should be reconstructed for purposes of the discourse as referring to other and fewer objects , in such a way that indistinguishable originals [people or personhood] give way each to the same new object [income groups]”.

17. Integration • The cognitive process of integration of forming a conceptual identity is similar to forming identity of individual or of general terms. • Spatial integration: red, persons (identity of general terms) • Temporal integration: John (identity of individuals) • Conceptual integration: income group (identity of concepts)

18. General Term: Conceptual Spread • (1) Proper Names • (2) General Terms (2.1) Refer to a particular, concrete entity but not continuous. (e.g., “Red”) (concrete parts of a concrete whole.) (2.2) Refer to a concrete instance of an abstract universal (e.g., triangle) • Quine also wants to argue that just as the identity of physical objects in the world can be understood as spatially and temporally inseparable so too can conceptual objects. • Concepts are simply very big particular things.

19. Red and Cayster • So, “red” refers to all red things, going from the general term to the various particular manifestation of it in the world. • “Cayster” goes from the proper name to the various particular manifestation of it in the world.

20. Differences between singular and general terms (of irreducible universals) • 1) ostensions which introduce a general term do not impute identity of indicated object. So, for instance, “square” refers to various qualities of square but the instances do NOT refer to the same thing. (as in the case of Cayster river) • 2) The general term (e.g., square) need not be a name for a separate entity where the singular term does.

21. Explain • 2) The general term (e.g., square) need not be a name for a separate entity where the singular term does. • “Square” • “Square” Square does not refer to a as a particular object (i.e., A and B are not the same. ). In this sense it is very different from the general term “red”. And there does not have to be any object such as squareness to which “Square” refers. A B

22. Ontology: Square vs. Squareness • Square is a general term and it in no way implies that there must be abstract entities. • However, squareness is an abstract singular term and it does imply the existence of abstract entities.

23. Language and Ontology • Cayster, Bernie, Mississippi • Red, person, river • Triangle, square,