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Maritime Security in Southeast Asia

Maritime Security in Southeast Asia. Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies. Joshua Ho Senior Fellow 22 August 20 07. The A sia-Pacific Century (1). Figure 1: GDP by Major Countries and the EU: 2000 and 2015 (Source: NIC’s Long Term Growth Model). 1. The A sia-Pacific Century (2).

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Maritime Security in Southeast Asia

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  1. Maritime Security in Southeast Asia Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Joshua Ho Senior Fellow 22 August 2007

  2. The Asia-Pacific Century (1) Figure 1: GDP by Major Countries and the EU: 2000 and 2015 (Source: NIC’s Long Term Growth Model) 1

  3. The Asia-Pacific Century (2) Figure 2: The Largest Economies in 2050 (Source: Goldman Sachs BRICs Model Projections) 2

  4. Increasing Trade Flows (1) Intra-Asian Trade Flows are Increasing 3

  5. Increasing Trade Flows (2) Growth in Trade: 2002 - 2004 4

  6. Rising Energy Demand Table 1: World Energy Consumption by Region, 1990-2020 (Sources: 1990 and 2000: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2001 (Washington D.C., February 2003); 2010 and 2020: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2003)) 5

  7. Strength of Merchant Fleet Figure 5: Percentage of Top 20 Merchant Fleets By Region (As of 1 July, 2003) (Source: Lloyd’s Register Fairplay in U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration website) 6

  8. Growth of Regional Navies Figure 6: East Asia Regional Defence Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP (Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies’ The Military Balance: 20032004) 7

  9. Maritime Challenges • Maintain continued regional stability • Prevent inter-state maritime conflict (traditional) • National rivalries due to resource and trade competition • Ensure Security of Sea lanes (non-traditional) • Piracy • Maritime Terrorism • Prevent state interdiction of shipping 8

  10. Preventing Inter-State Maritime Conflict • Korean Peninsula • Taiwan Straits • Island and Territorial Disputes • Spratly Islands • Brunei, China, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam • Paracel Islands • Taiwan, China and Vietnam • Gulf of Thailand • Cambodia and Thailand • Kurile Islands • Russia and China • Senkaku or Diaoyu Tai Islands • Japan and China, Taiwan • Takeshima or Dokdo Islands • Japan and South Korea • East China Sea • China and Japan 9

  11. Ensuring the Security of Sea Lanes • Sea has been used as a medium for the exchange of goods, news and ideas • Makassar peoples - annual pilgrimages to northern Australian waters in search of sea cucumbers to trade with the Chinese • Fishermen from different areas in Europe met each other as they followed shoals of migratory fish far out from shore • Same patterns developed in the Asia-Pacific, Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, and the Mediterranean • Maritime trade routes thus developed and turned the world into a complex maritime system – SLOCs of today 10

  12. Major Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia • Malacca Straits • 63,000 ships transit annually • 525 million metric tonnes carried • US$390 billion worth of resources • Singapore flagged ships • 13.3% of total no. of passages • 10,019 transits by 580 ships • Singapore owned ships • 13% of total no. of passages • 9,849 transits by 571 ships 11

  13. Major Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia • Lombok Straits • 3,900 ships transit annually • 140 million metric tonnes carried • US$40 billion worth of resources • Singapore flagged ships • 11.1% of total no. of passages • 67 transits by 27 ships • Singapore owned ships • 10.1% of total no. of passages • 61 transits by 26 ships • Sunda Straits • 3,500 ships transit annually • 15 million metric tonnes carried • US$5billion worth of resources • Singapore flagged ships • 6.9% of total no. of passages • 157 transits by 71 ships • Singapore owned ships • 7.2% of total no. of passages • 163 transits by 73 ships 12

  14. Major Ports • Singapore • Largest container port in the world • 24.8 million TEUs (2006) • Daily sailings to every major port in the world (about 50% of Malacca and Singapore Straits traffic) • US (2 ships) • Europe (4 ships) • Japan (5 ships) • S Asia (6 ships) • Greater China (9 ships) • SE Asia (64 ships) 13

  15. Major Ports • Port Klang • 16th largest container port in the world • 6.3 million TEUs (2006) • Tanjung Pelapas • 19th largest container port in the world • 4.8 million TEUs (2006) • Tanjung Priok • 24th largest container port in the world • 3.3 milllion TEUs (2006) 14

  16. The Malacca and Singapore Straits • One of the most important Straits in the world • Carries a quarter of world’s trade • Carries half of the world’s oil • 80% of oil imported by Japan, South Korea and China comes from the Persian Gulf • Second busiest Straits in the world • 200+ ships transit daily • 63,636 large ships use it annually • Traffic density likely to increase further 15

  17. The Malacca and Singapore Straits 42% increase in shipping in the Malacca Straits for the six years from 1999–2005 (Source: STRAITREP Data from 1999-2005) 16

  18. Piracy/Armed Robbery • Total number of attacks relatively low (25-64 per year) • Proportion of ships attacked is even lower (0.04% - 0.19%) • Data for 2006 is comparable to 2005 • Data for 2005 and 2006 is half that of 2004 • Three types of groups that conduct piracy • Small criminals • Criminal syndicates 17

  19. Location of Attacks • In or near Indonesian port in Eastern Sumatra (Belawan) • In international waters in the northern Malacca Strait • Off Malacca in the Southern Malacca Strait • In the Philip Channel off Singapore and in the western approaches to that channel • In an area East of Bintan Island in the eastern approaches to Singapore Strait • Very few attacks occur within the traffic separation scheme 18

  20. Location of Attacks 19

  21. Type of Attacks • Attacks predominantly on vessels on local or regional voyages • A lot of attacks occur in and around vicinity of ports • Most common type of attack is robbery • More sophisticated attacks involving hijacking rarely take place in comparison although of a higher profile • Smaller Vessels targeted (less than 1,000 GRT) • Mainly fishing vessels or tugs (16 out of 20) • Remainder were product tankers (4 out of 20) • Kidnap for ransom cases occurs predominantly on small vessels below 1,000 GRT like fishing vessels and tugs 20

  22. Vessels Attacked • Attacks predominantly on those vessels on local voyages • Smaller size • Smaller crews • Lower freeboard • Closer to the coast • Those targeted on international voyages are also smaller vessels • Larger tankers and cargo carrying vessels on international voyages are not attacked unless they slow down for some reason • These vessels are also more likely to be taking all the precautions recommended by the IMO 21

  23. Weapons Used • Majority of attacks have used knives and machetes • Increasing trend towards the use of small arms, like guns • Possibility that illegal trafficking in small arms may have occurred across the Strait • Thailand seems to be a key point of origin and transit in the trafficking of small arms 22

  24. Piracy/Armed Robbery • Possible nexus between piracy and maritime terrorism • Wide recognition amongst analysts that motivations of terrorists and pirates are fundamentally different. • Vigilance still needed as piracy forms the background noise from which maritime terrorist attacks may materialise 23

  25. Maritime Terrorism • Ports have evolved to providers of complete logistics networks brought about chiefly by containerisation → high volume mainline trade will focus on just a few mega ports • Closure of hub ports could cause severe disruptions to inventory and production cycles → potential lucrative targets • Attacks on shipping could cause ships to divert from current sea lanes to a safer route → increased cost to industry 24

  26. Maritime Terrorism • Scenarios painted by commentators include: • Turning hijacked container ships into Trojan horses laden with ‘dirty bomb’ • Turning hijacked ammonium nitrate, LPG and LNG carrier into floating bombs • Bomb laden small boat attacks on shipping • Consequences for Maritime Terrorism is High • Disruption of Singapore port could cost more than US$200 billion per year (1993 trade flows) • Diversion from Malacca Straits could cost US$8 billion per year (1993 trade flows) 25

  27. Maritime Terrorism Threat thought to be highly credible as: • SEA is the second front for terrorism • First Bali bombing on 12 Oct 02 • JW Marriot bombing in Jakarta on 5 Aug 03 • Australian Embassy bombing in Jakarta on 9 Sep 04 • Super Ferry Bombing in the Philippines in 27 Feb 05 • Second Bali bombing on 1 Oct 05 • USS Cole bombing suspect was in KL in Jan 01 • Recovery in Afghanistan of AQ tapes • Uncovering of a JI plan to attack US warships in Dec 01 in Singapore • Limburg was chartered by Petronas at time of attack in Oct 02 (SEA link?) 26

  28. Maritime Terrorism • Known modus operandi of AQ: • Use of zodiac type speedboats loaded with explosives • Use of medium-sized ships that could be blown up near other vessels. • Use of private commercial planes as ‘kamikaze’ aircraft • Use of underwater demolition teams to attack vessels 27

  29. Maritime Terrorism • Likelihood (Low) • Maritime terrorism rare in history • Maritime terrorism requires specialised skills • Al Qaeda concentrating its resources in the middle east, especially in the US occupied Iraq • No indication of maritime attacks being planned by JI in the maritime domains currently • Sophistication of attacks by JI have not increased and still focused largely on land targets largely due to increase in efforts by regional states to fight land based terrorism • Attacks by the Abu Sayaff group have mainly targeted ferries and confined to the Philippines 28

  30. National Countermeasures • Upgrading of patrol assets • Increased surveillance by ships and shore-based radar (Ops Gurita by Indonesia) • Conduct of exercises in affected areas to increase presence • Assignment of specially trained and dedicated assets (Malaysia’s Paskals, Indonesia’s Special Forces and Singapore’s ASSeT) • Compliance with international measures like the International Ship and Port Facility Security code (ISPS code) and Container Security Initiative (CSI) 29

  31. National Countermeasures • 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) • Allows for someone that had conducted act of terrorism in one country to be prosecuted in another country • 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention • Provide a common Treaty Framework for prosecuting individuals who use a ship as a weapons or means of committing a terrorist attack • For prosecution of individuals who transport by ship terrorists or cargo intended for use in connection with weapons of mass destruction programmes • So far only half of the ASEAN countries have ratified the SUA Convention whilst China, Japan, and South Korea have ratified 30

  32. National Countermeasures • Singapore: • Increasing patrols • Increasing surveillance activities • Deployment of armed naval security teams on more vulnerable vessels entering and leaving port • Compliance with international measures like the ISPS code, CSI, AIS regime and the SUA convention • Beyond ISPS: tracking of vessels below 300 GRT via harbour craft transponder systems 31

  33. Bilateral Countermeasures • Coordinated patrols and joint surveillance activities: • Singapore and Indonesia • ship patrols every three months • Direct communications links between operations centres • radar surveillance (SURPIC) • Malaysia and Indonesia • Patrols conducted four times a year • India and Indonesia • Joint patrol of Six Degree Channel since September 2004 • Between Indonesia’s Aceh and India’s Nicobar islands 34

  34. Bilateral Countermeasures • Coordinated patrols and joint surveillance activities: • Malaysia and Thailand • Coordinated patrols • US and Indonesia • Conducted anti-piracy exercises with Indonesia which has involved the boarding and inspection of shipping 35

  35. Bilateral Countermeasures • Japanese Contribution: • JCG Exercises • India, Malaysia, Philippine, Thailand, Indonesia, Brunei, Singapore • Maritime Law Enforcement Training Courses • Acceptance of overseas students to the JCG academy • Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines, China, Indonesia, Thailand • Contribution of ships • 1 training ship to MMEA, Malaysia (MV Marlin) • 3 patrol craft to Indonesia 36

  36. Bilateral Countermeasures • Chinese Participation • China and Indonesia signed an MOU on maritime cooperation on 25 April 2005 • China and Malaysia also signed and MOU on maritime cooperation on 25 August 2006 37

  37. Multilateral Countermeasures • Many multilateral fora that talks about combating piracy and maritime terrorism • ARF • ASEAN Plus Three • Other multilateral arrangements • Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) • Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) 38

  38. Multilateral Countermeasures • ASEAN Regional Forum • Adopted Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and other Threats to Maritime Security at the 10th ARF Post Ministerial Conference held in Cambodia in 2003 • ARF participants regard maritime security as an indispensable and fundamental condition for the welfare and economic security of the ARF region • ARF participants also expressed their commitment to becoming parties to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) and its protocol 39

  39. Multilateral Countermeasures • ASEAN Plus Three • In November 2001, Koizumi proposed the convening of a governmental-level working group to study the formulation of a regional cooperation agreement related to anti-piracy measures • Acceptance of this proposal led to the formation of the ReCAAP • Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia Sea (ReCAAP) • ASEAN + East Asian trio + South Asia trio • Agreed to setting up of Information Sharing Centre (ISC) in Nov 04 in Singapore • 14 countries have ratified the agreement and the agreements has already come into force on the 4 Sep 06 • Indonesia and Malaysia have expressed support for ReCAAP at the Batam Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the three countries in August 05. 40

  40. Multilateral Countermeasures • Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) • Status of an international organisation • 13-15 full time staff, including representatives from member countries • First time that regional governments have institutionalised their cooperation in the form of a permanent body with full time staff • Has an Information Network System (IFN) to share information on piracy and armed robbery • The first governing council meeting was held in Nov 06 and the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre is already operational 41

  41. Multilateral Countermeasures • Malacca Straits Patrols • MALSINDO Patrols • Eye in the Sky Initiative • Joint Coordinating Committee and SOP • Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrols (MALSINDO) • Comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore • Up to 17 ships to conduct patrols on a daily basis • Conducted since July 04 • ‘Eyes in the Sky’ (EiS) Initiative • Launched in Sep 05 and augments MALSINDO • Comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand • Each country to conduct two maritime air patrols per week • Coordination with dedicated ground agencies for action if required • Extra regional countries have also been invited to participate in the air patrols under Phase II 42

  42. Multilateral Countermeasures • Joint Coordinating Committee (JCC) • Tasked to oversee the aerial and sea patrols of the Malacca and Singapore Straits • Standard Operating procedures for the sea and air patrols have been signed • Enshrines the existing bilateral cross border pursuit arrangements between Singapore and Indonesia and Malaysia and Indonesia 43

  43. Multilateral Countermeasures • Other Multilateral Arrangements • Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) • Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) • Five Power Defence Arrangement • FPDA was founded in 1971, comprising United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore • Formed primarily as a response to the Indonesian Confrontation • Recently, the FPDA has expanded its scope of activities to cover non-conventional security threats such as maritime terrorism • The FPDA has conducted an anti-terror drills as part of Bersama Lima in 2004 as well as Bersama Padu in 2006 44

  44. Multilateral Countermeasures • Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) • 18 member navies of countries with territories in the Western Pacific • Initially a forum to promote mutual understanding among navies of the region and to increase naval cooperation • WPNS has grown to include regular shore-based and sea exercises • Coast guard agencies have been invited to participate in the sea exercises as well to enhance inter-agency coordination and understanding • Recent sea exercises have focussed on sharing of data through a common data link as well as anti-terrorism scenarios 45

  45. Conclusion – Securing the Seas • Security of vital sea lanes will become more important due to increasing shipping traffic as the Asia-Pacific economies boom • Malacca Straits continues to be an important thoroughfare for the region and importance likely to increase in the future • Security of ports will similarly increase in importance due to the high dependency on the few mega hub ports • Besides individual and bilateral measures, need to move towards a more cooperative regime between the littoral states and other stakeholders due to transnational nature of threat • Creation of stable maritime regime needs to continue to remain high on the regional agenda 46

  46. THANK YOU 47

  47. Actual Maritime Terrorist Attacks, 2000-2004 12 October 2000, YemenIn Aden, small dingy carrying explosives rammed USS Cole, killing 17 sailors and injuring 39 others 6 October 2002, Yemen In al-Dhabbah, small boat carrying large amount of explosives rammed the hull of French oil tanker Limburg anchored approximately 5 miles from port, killing one person and wounding four others April 2004, Basra Coordinated boat attack on oil terminal 10 km off the southern city of Basra in Iraq by three boats, killing two US sailors and wounding four others

  48. Recent Attempted Maritime Terrorist Attacks, 2001-2002 2001, Malaysia Malaysian Special Branch disrupted a plan by the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) to ambush a US ship in 2001 2002, Philippines The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) claimed responsibility for an explosion of a large ferry killing around 100 people 2002, Singapore Singapore’s Internal Security Department (ISD) disrupted an Al-Qaeda and JI plot to attack a US ship 2002, Indonesia Senior Al-Qaeda operative, Omar al-Faruq, now in American custody, also told officials of plans to attack an American naval ships in Surabaya, Indonesia’s second largest port.

  49. Maritime Terrorism • Some foiled maritime attacks were also revealed by President George Bush at his Remarks on the War on Terror on 6 October 2005. • Foiled 2002 Persian Gulf Shipping Plot • Foiled 2002 Straits of Hormuz plot

  50. Number of Maritime Terrorism Incidents Worldwide: 1961 - 2004 • Maritime terrorist incidents constituted only 2% of all international terrorist incidents from 1961- 2004 (Source: Data converted from Lieutenant Commander Krzysztof Kubiak, Polish Navy, “Terrorism is the New Enemy at Sea,” Proceedings: US Naval Institute Independent Forum for the Sea Services, December 2003, p. 70.)

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