Presentation Transcript

1. Political Science 345:The Legislative ProcessFinal Exam Review

   Professor Jon Rogowski
2. Big themes of the course Imagine that you are Mayor Bloomberg. What do you need to know about legislatures to help get your policies passed through Congress? Institutions within legislatures Institutions external to legislatures
3. Institutions within legislatures Parties and committees How do parties and committees affect legislative outcomes? Theories of parties and party influence Theories of committees Rules and procedures How does the way bills are considered influence what results? Constitutional provisions and obstructionism Filibusters and vetoes
4. Institutions outside of Congress Interest groups and lobbyists Can (and how) might they influence what happens in Congress? The president Dynamics of interchamber bargaining The courts Judicial review Bureaucracy Delegation and oversight
5. Two levels of analysis Individual level How do these factors influence how individual members of Congress cast their votes? Want to base this analysis on a theory of legislative voting behavior Aggregate level How does these factors affect what happens in the chamber as a whole? For instance, agenda setting Strategic interaction with other outside actors
6. Where’s the party? “The crucial question has to do with individual legislators’ policy preferences. In casting apparently partisan votes, do individual legislators vote with fellow party members in spite of their disagreement about the policy in question, or do they vote with fellow party members because of their agreement about the policy in question?” - Krehbiel 1993, 238
7. Methods of Party Influence Lots of carrots, a few sticks Parties can offer Committee assignments Pork Information Electoral resources Party leaders are chosen by members (delegation) and can be removed. MCs can vote against the party without fear of losing their jobs.
8. Party Effects in Congress Source: James M. Snyder, Jr. and Tim Groseclose, 2000, “Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll Call Voting”, AJPS.
9. Do Parties Push Members Apart?
10. Party Leaders’ Balancing Act Party leaders need the power to twist arms of marginal MCs to win roll calls. But asking MCs to vote against constituent interests often and/or on big issues risks losing the seat altogether. Strategic use of party power means picking fights and controlling the agenda. Often the best tactic is to keep issues that divide the party off the agenda altogether. Focus on feasible, desirable policy changes. For this reason, party leaders excuse some disloyalty on substantive issues but demand complete loyalty on procedural issues.
11. Positive and Negative Agenda Control Parties use negative agenda control to keep losing or divisive issues off the agenda. Thus we may never see the party lose a vote, even when it is internally divided. But parties can do much more than block. Parties coordinate agendas: Facilitate logrolling across committees Broker deals across Houses of Congress and with the White House
12. Parties and the agenda Legislatures commonly face collective action problems Parties as one solution Floor voting coalitions Parties discipline their parties to ensure a cohesive voting bloc on the floor Procedural coalitions More important that parties control the legislative agenda Agenda = the set of bills considered and voted on the floor
13. Forms of agenda control Positive agenda control Ability to push bills through the legislative process to reach a final passage vote “proposal rights” Negative agenda control Ability to block bills from reaching a final passage vote on the floor “veto rights”
14. How agenda control works Positive agenda control Members of a majority coalition of legislators are more likely to be recognized and thus have increased ability to make a proposal. Has already been preapproved by other members of coalition. Negative agenda control Majority parties allocate veto power to committee chairs (for instance) and thus reduce the proposal power of any particular MC
15. Parties as cartels “The key resource that majority parties delegate to their senior partners is the power to set the legislative agenda; the majority party forms a procedural cartel that collectively monopolizes agenda-setting power.” – Cox and McCubbins 2005, 24
16. Cartelizing the agenda Majority party chooses occupants of seats with agenda-setting powers (Rules, committee chairs, etc) Party members entrust party officeholders with acting in best interests of party Rank-and-file support the agenda-setting decisions of its officeholders In all, much less costly than enforcing discipline
17. Testing this theory Party roll rates How often is a majority of the majority party on the losing side? How often is a majority of the minority party on the losing side? Negative agenda control and the majority party
18. Proposal Power Any member can submit a bill calling for changes to the status quo. Every bill is assigned to a committee, and the committee decides whether it is acted on. In a typical year, 15,000 bills are submitted, but fewer than 1,000 are acted on The 1,000 are not selected at random So committees decide not only whether to open the gates or not, but also which proposals get through the gates
19. Committees and the “Setter Model” An agenda-setter has power to offer a “take it or leave it” motion. If the agenda-setter is “high demand” and the reversion point is well below the median’s ideal point, the agenda-setter makes out like a bandit Proposal Q M S W(Q)
20. Application of Setter Model to Committees Easy to think of committees as providing “take it or leave it” propositions and being composed of “high demanders” “Deference” to committees Supposed “self-selection” on committees Problems with this view “High demand committees” hard to sustain in a majoritarian institution Empirical evidence mixed Amendment opportunities galore Discharge possible Status quo rarely so Draconian
21. Theoretical Perspectives on Committees Distributive Theories (Weingast and Marshall) Emphasize gains from trade Informational theories (Krehbiel) Uncertainty about relationships between policies and outcomes
22. Outlier Committees? Critical test between informational and distributive theories of committees Though even informational theories do not predict perfect alignment of committees and floors Need to consider both preferences of members and rules that govern the bills they introduce
23. Super-Majoritarian Procedures Despite rhetoric of majority rule, some of our most important political institutions are governed by non-majoritarian principles. Veto Two-thirds vote of both chambers required to override a presidential veto Filibuster Three-fifths vote of Senators required to bring cloture (end a filibuster)
24. Floor agenda (median voter) model Not propose q Median Voter in Congress (m) m Propose
25. Pivotal politics game Not propose m or 2f-q q yes Median Voter in Congress (m) 2v-q President yes yes f (pivot) no v (pivot) Propose no no q q
26. p v f m f m v p Equilibrium Policies Outcomes I II III IV V Gridlock Status quo
27. v p f m f v p m Introducing the executive and the courts Outcomes I II III IV V Gridlock d Status quo q
28. Open Rule All germane amendments in order Amendments are considered under the 5-minute rule in the CoW Pro forma amendments for the purposes of debate “Move to strike the last word.”
29. Closed Rule No amendments are in order Typically does not involve the CoW Simple up or down vote on the bill
30. After the CoW House votes on amendments approved by the CoW No other amendments are in order Frequently consider multiple amendments in a single En bloc vote Engrossment and third reading Motion to recommit Final vote on the bill
31. Motion to Recommit With or without instructions With instructions: effectively represents a substitute amendment This motion is a protected right of the Minority Leader Without instructions: effectively kills the bill Often proposed, rarely succeeds
32. Shortcuts Suspension of the rules Requires bipartisan support; discretion of Speaker; 75% of laws enacted this way; 2/3s vote with no amendments; 40 min debate Unanimous consent Truly noncontroversial matters; pretty uncommon; requires consent of both parties’ leadership Discharge petition Majority sign in support of considering a bill
33. Offering complex amendments is more a strategy for the Senate than for the House
34. The Broad Strokes of the Budget Process Submission of budget by President Prepared by OMB Congressional review of President's budget Handled by various committees Congressional action on spending bills Appropriations committee Execution of spending-related laws Generally done by executive agencies Audits and reviews of agency spending (GAO)
35. The 1974 Budget Act Centralized and Regularized the Budget Process Created Budget Committee in each chamber Created Congressional Budget Office (CBO) House Committee rotating membership partisan Members have “turf“ interests Committee is Privileged Senate Committee Traditional standing committee Prestigious/powerful committee Impoundment Act: does not allow president to withhold funds from programs he opposes
36. Budget Resolution in the 2 Chambers The House Budget Resolution is a privileged matter in the House Usually, special rule: a substitute-based amendment structure The Gephardt Rule (Rule 28) and Debt Ceilings in the House The Senate Privileged matter: Motion to proceed is not debatable Debate on resolution itself is limited to 50 hours, “Vote-a-rama:” unlimited, debate-free amendments after 50 hrs Germaneness requirement on amendments, waived with 60 votes
37. Authorizations and Appropriations Formal 2-step procedure by which money is allocated Authorization Bill: describes programs and recommends funding levels Appropriations Bill: allocates funding to the programs Authorizations are intended to precede appropriations Standing, multi-year, and single-year authorizations Most appropriations for single year only
38. Authorization-Appropriation Process House Rule 21 prohibits intermingling of legislation and appropriations Frequently waived by special rule Also cannot appropriate for unauthorized programs Senate Rule XVI requires that amendments to general appropriations bills be germane But appropriations can be added to non-appropriations bills as amendments Filibuster is a threat for all bills
39. Why a “two step” budget process? Early Legislatures tried to separate policy and spending. Intermingled bills are often delayed longer Policy should be debated with “cool minds,” etc. Intermingling of the two is inevitable.
40. Failure of the Two-Step Bargaining: bundling policy and money Logrolling/coalition building Appropriations bills are “must-pass" Authorization bills often die in Senate Appropriations bills are better protected in the Senate Authorizing committees require special rules in House
41. Details of the Process 12 Regular (“General") Appropriations Bills - 1 for each Appropriations subcommittee Several “emergency” supplemental appropriations bills per year “Continuing resolutions" when needed - 1995 showdown with Clinton These deal with the approximately 30% of spending that is ”directly controllable."
42. Inside Lobbying Mostly Informational Clients may want to know what is happening Members want information about constituents Members want information about legislation Coordination (Electoral and Policy Goals) Raw influence/bribery rarely observed Does it happen? Probably, but probably affects some policy areas less than others
43. Outside Lobbying Mobilizing support among voters Demonstrating that support to Members Grassroots v. Astroturf Members care about how much constituents care about the issue Groups can achieve unrealistic “levels of support” that Members discount The internet is changing the world of outside lobbying
44. Inside v. Outside Inside costs $ Need professional lobbyists Some organizations can’t do this legally Outside requires costly effort Must have a true constituency Hard to have an effect if the issue is “narrow” Not mutually exclusive Opposed groups tend to pursue both.
45. Congress and the President The “power to persuade? Going public Strategic anticipation The politics of veto bargaining
46. Legislative checks on the judiciary Nomination process Constitutional amendments Withdrawal of jurisdiction: Congress can threaten to withdraw S.C.’s authority to review certain categories of cases Impeachment of judges Size, Procedure, and Pay: Congress can change the size of the S.C., set salary and voting procedure
47. Judicial-Congressional interactions In reaching decisions, Supreme Court justices must anticipate the actions of Congress Voting their preferences may provoke Congress into enacting legislation that the justices don’t like “The switch in time that saved nine” Several justices voted in favor of (possibly unconstitutional) New Deal legislation to diminish Congressional support for Roosevelt’s plan to pack the court
48. The Power of the Judiciary Interpretative decisions can uphold or broaden the powers of Congress Can check overreaching by the Congress through judicial review Policymaking catalyst when Congress is deadlocked, or doesn’t want to act
49. How Does the Court Decide when to intervene? 1. Justiciability: “cases and controversies" 2. No advisory opinions (1793) 3. Mootness: injury must not have been removed 4. Ripeness: must be at least a threatened injury, and other judicial alternatives must not have been exhausted 5. Political Questions
50. Courts or Administrators? Courts are not experts Courts view themselves as less “representative” than Congress and Executive Branch Accordingly, most difficult decisions related to policy have been left to administrators (Chevron) Courts do intervene, of course but usually to say something can’t be done, rather than what should be done.
51. How Does the Court Decide when to intervene? 1. Justiciability: “cases and controversies" 2. No advisory opinions (1793) 3. Mootness: injury must not have been removed 4. Ripeness: must be at least a threatened injury, and other judicial alternatives must not have been exhausted 5. Political Questions
52. Courts or Administrators? Courts are not experts Courts view themselves as less “representative” than Congress and Executive Branch Accordingly, most difficult decisions related to policy have been left to administrators (Chevron) Courts do intervene, of course but usually to say something can’t be done, rather than what should be done.
53. Congress’s choice of action MCs prefer fire alarms to police patrols Police patrols are costly and inefficient Prone to errors Costs and errors of fire-alarm oversight are born by citizens and interest groups Congress will not neglect its oversight responsibilities Costs born by others but benefits accrue to MCs Logic applies further still Allowing bureaucracy to make law is not an abdication of MCs’ lawmaking responsibilities
54. Congress’s choice of action MCs prefer fire alarms to police patrols Police patrols are costly and inefficient Prone to errors Costs and errors of fire-alarm oversight are born by citizens and interest groups Congress will not neglect its oversight responsibilities Costs born by others but benefits accrue to MCs Logic applies further still Allowing bureaucracy to make law is not an abdication of MCs’ lawmaking responsibilities
55. When do legislatures delegate? Incentives Policy disagreement between legislature and agency Capacity Legislature sufficiently professionalized Alternative options for influencing agency Non-statutory mechanisms for control
56. The big picture Who gets represented in the legislative process? Issues of representation Trustee vs. Delegate Elections and accountability