1 / 13

IEEE 802.11i is Secure

IEEE 802.11i is Secure. Authors:. Date: 2010-05-11. Abstract. This document outlines the IEEE 802 response to ISO/JTC1/SC6 on the WAPI NP process. IEEE 802 provided input into the WAPI NP proposal voting and resolution process. Oct 10 : N14436 Initial WAPI NP disposition.

morela
Download Presentation

IEEE 802.11i is Secure

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. IEEE 802.11i is Secure Authors: Date: 2010-05-11 IEEE 802.11 WG

  2. Abstract This document outlines the IEEE 802 response to ISO/JTC1/SC6 on the WAPI NP process IEEE 802.11 WG

  3. IEEE 802 provided input into the WAPI NP proposal voting and resolution process Oct 10: N14436 Initial WAPI NP disposition Feb 10: N14228 WAPI NPvoting results Oct 09: N14123 WAPI NP proposal Mar 11: N14620 Revised WAPI NP disposition O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J 2009 D 2010 2011 J Timeline of IEEE 802 participation Dec 09: N14142 IEEE 802 comments on WAPI NP proposal Jan 11: N14551 IEEE 802 comments on WAPI NP disposition IEEE 802.11 WG

  4. Unfortunately, that input was ignored and is now being rejected Oct 10: N14436 IEEE 802 input is ignored, incorrect claims about 802.11i are repeated Oct 09: N14123 Justification of WAPI NP based on assertion that 802.11i is insecure Feb 10: N14228 Apparently IEEE 802 input was not considered in WAPI NP vote Mar 11: N14620 IEEE 802 input is dismissed on the basis that it is too late! O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J 2009 D 2010 2011 J Timeline of IEEE 802 participation Dec 09: N14142 IEEE 802 rebuts all assertions regarding the claim of 802.11i insecurity Jan 11: N14551 IEEE 802 again rebuts all assertions regarding the claim o f 802.11i insecurity IEEE 802.11 WG

  5. N14123: WAPI NP justification entirely based on assertion that 802.11i is insecure • Single assertion to justify WAPI NP: • “It is a well known fact that current WLAN international standards contain serious security loopholes which need to be dealt with by enhanced security mechanisms.” • Evidence to support this assertion: • “Can your neighbors router make yours sick?”– Hu, et al, 2008 • “A Wi-Fi virus outbreak? Researchers say it’s possible”– article in Network World, 2008 • “Practical Attacks Against WEP and WPA”– Beck and Tews, 2008 • “A Practical Message Falsification Attack on WPA”– Ohigashi and Morii, 2009 IEEE 802.11 WG

  6. N14142: IEEE 802 rebuts all claims of 802.11i insecurity • “Can your neighbor’s router make yours sick?” • Assumes either no security, or WEP, on an AP. WEP has been deprecated in favor of 802.11i! Says nothing about 802.11i. • “A Wi-Fi Virus Outbreak? Researchers say it’s possible” • Refers to paper by Hu et al– i.e. no security or WEP, not 802.11i • “Practical Attacks against WEP and WPA” • WPA attack is against TKIP and its MIC, Michael, which is not a one-way function, and whose security is not assumed strong. TKIP was designed in 2003 with a 5 year expectation of validity. Paper says nothing about mandatory aspects of 802.11i (i.e. it addresses WPA not WPA2). • “A Practical Message Falsification Attack Against WPA” • An improvement on paper above-- it’s WPA, no mention of WPA2 IEEE 802.11 WG

  7. N14228: Significant Lack of Consideration of IEEE 802 rebuttal during WAPI NP vote • US NB • Two comments made challenging the statement that 802.11i is insecure (apparent consideration of IEEE 802 rebuttal). • Seven other substantive comments submitted. • UK NB • Comments alluding to technical concerns. • Mostly focused on “standalone security issue”. • No other NB submitted comments • Silence implies the rebuttal was not considered. IEEE 802.11 WG

  8. N14436: Repeats, and extends, invalid claims regarding 802.11i security • IEEE 802 rebuttal of previous claims are completely ignored. • Asserts that “Security loopholes in the current IS (ISO/IEC 8802-11) have been reported in the security literature”. • Additional, new, unsubstantiated claims • WAPI can protect against fake STA/AP attacks and 802.11i cannot. • In N14123, N14399, N14402 and N14410 all “comprehensively address weaknesses in existing network security”. • Specific security problems were asserted during 802.11i fast track ballot in 2006. IEEE 802.11 WG

  9. N14551: IEEE 802 Rebuts New Claims of 802.11i insecurity • Repetition of N14123 • Already addressed by N14142! Unfortunately N14142 was ignored. • N14410 refers to IEEE 802.16 Security Issues: A Survey • This notes that security was not designed into IEEE 802.11-2003, says nothing about IEEE 802.11-2004 (or ISO/IEC 8802-11)! • N14399, N14402 and N14410 make claims on lack of mutual authentication between STA, AP and AS • RFC4017-compliant EAP methods perform mutual authentication, the AP/AS distinction is logical and in many deployments does not apply, the 4-way Handshake confirms AS has disclosed PMK to AP and provides implicit authentication. • Claims made during Fast Track Balloting of 802.11i • Same sort of non-mutual authentication assertions. IEEE 802.11 WG

  10. N14620: IEEE 802 Objections and Rebuttal of invalid claims of insecurity dismissed • After ignoring comments, they are dismissed on the basis that the comment disposition is no longer concerned with the WAPI NP proposal! • “This comment is focusing on the Justification of ISO/IEC 20011, but it should be noted that the NP ballot has passed; the main comment and contribution in this state should be focused and changed to the editing and commenting of WD text.” • Comments are ignored for an extended period of time and then dismissed as invalid because they are made too late! • This improper behavior is an insult to IEEE 802. IEEE 802.11 WG

  11. IEEE 802’s Current View of the Process is Best Summarized in Conclusion of N14551 • IEEE 802 respectfully requests consideration: • … the fundamental justification for a WAPI NP in SC6 is based on the assertion that there are security loopholes or flaws in mandatory security components included in 802.11 (and its amendments). However, no valid or credible evidence has been provided to support this assertion. • The reality is that mandatory security components included 802.11 have no known “security loopholes”. This statement is practically supported by the use of 802.11 in millions of systems worldwide, in high security applications, by governments, financial institutions, telecommunications providers, enterprises and consumers. • IEEE 802 requests SC6 do not consider any assertions that mandatory security components included in 802.11 (and its amendments) are insecure when deciding whether to authorize the WAPI NP proposal. Alternatively, IEEE 802 invites any SC6 NB to provide valid and credible evidence to the 820.11 WG of “serious security loopholes”. IEEE 802.11 WG

  12. IEEE 802 Requests SC6 to Undertake Further Action • Remove all existing, and unsubstantiated allegations regarding the security of 802.11i from official SC6 documents • Particularly the WAPI NP proposal and all associated comment dispositions. • Provide credible evidence of security issues with mandatory features of 802.11i • Stop accepting unsubstantiated assertions regarding 802.11i security. • Halt any new project activity whose justification relies on invalid assertions of security issues with 802.11i IEEE 802.11 WG

  13. References IEEE 802.11 WG

More Related