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An Inside Look at Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

An Inside Look at Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005. Written By: Paul Barford and Vinod Yegneswaran University of Wisconsin, Madison Presented By: Jarrod Williams. Outline. Motivation/Goals Botnets Botnet Attributes Conclusion/Review. Motivation/Goals.

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An Inside Look at Botnets ARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005

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  1. An Inside Look at BotnetsARO-DHS Special Workshop on Malware Detection, 2005 Written By: Paul Barford and VinodYegneswaran University of Wisconsin, Madison Presented By: Jarrod Williams

  2. Outline • Motivation/Goals • Botnets • Botnet Attributes • Conclusion/Review

  3. Motivation/Goals • Increase in BOTNET usage • Spam, DDOS, Identity theft • The objective of the paper is to understand how Botnets work and find communalities between them • Botnets: Agotbot (4.0 Pre-Release), SDBot (05B), SpyBot (1.4), GT Bot with DCOM

  4. Motivation/Goals • Architecture • Botnet control mechanisms • Host control mechanisms • Propagation mechanisms • Exploits and attack mechanisms • Malware delivery mechanisms • Obfuscation methods • Deception mechanisms

  5. Botnets • A collection of compromised computers running software controlled by a single user • Botnets are controlled by a botmaster • Compromised host machines are called zombies • Zombies communicate using IRC • A botnet can have many different versions of the same bot making botnet families

  6. Botnets

  7. Internet Relay Chat • is a form of real-time Internet text messaging. It is mainly designed for group communication, but it also allows one-to-one communication via private message and data transfers via direct client-to-client • Created by JarkkoOikarinen in August 1988

  8. Botnet Attributes Considered • Architecture • Botnet control mechanisms • Host control mechanisms • Propagation mechanisms • Exploits and attack mechanisms • Malware delivery mechanisms • Obfuscation methods • Deception mechanisms

  9. Agobot (4.0 Pre-Release) • Most sophisticated • Released October, 2002 • Hundreds of variants of this bot and it is also commonly referred to as Phatbot • Roughly 20,000 lines of C/C++ • The ability to launch different kinds of DoS attacks • The ability to harvest the local host for PayPal passwords and AOL keys through traffic sniffing, key logging or searching registry entries

  10. SDBot (05b) • Fairly simple • Released October, 2002 • Hundreds of variants of this bot • Slightly over 2,000 lines of C • Does not include any overtly malicious code modules • The code is obviously easy to extend and patch • Patches contain malicious code for attackers need • 80 patches for SDBot were found through internet web searching

  11. SpyBot (1.4) • Relatively small like SDBot • Released April, 2003 • Under 3,000 lines of C • The command and control engine appears to be shared with SDBot, and it is likely, that it evolved from SDBot • Includes NetBIOS/Kuang/Netdevil/KaZaa exploits • Contains modules for launching flooding attacks and has scanning capabilities

  12. GT Bot with DCOM • Simple design providing a limited set of functions • Released April, 1998 • Global Threat Bot has hundreds of variants and is also referred to as Aristotle's • Easy to modify but there is nothing that suggests it was designed with extensibility in mind • Capabilities include port scanning, DoS attacks, and exploits for RPC and NetBIOS services • Includes the HideWindowprogram which keeps the bot hidden on the local system

  13. Botnet Attributes Considered • Architecture • Botnet control mechanisms • Host control mechanisms • Propagation mechanisms • Exploits and attack mechanisms • Malware delivery mechanisms • Obfuscation methods • Deception mechanisms

  14. Agobot (4.0 Pre-Release) • Simple vertical and horizontal scanning • Scanning is based on the network ranges (network prefixes) that are configured on individual bots

  15. SDBot (05b) • By virtue of its benign intent, SDBot does not have scanning or propagation capability in its base distribution • Many variants of SDBot include scanning and propagation capability

  16. SpyBot (1.4) • Simple command interface for scanning • Horizontal and vertical scanning capability • Scans are sequential • Command: • scan<startIP address><port><delay><spreaders><logfilename> • Example: • scan 127.0.0.1 17300 1 netbios portscan.txt

  17. GT Bot with DCOM • Includes support for simple horizontal and vertical scanning

  18. Botnet Attributes Considered • Architecture • Botnet control mechanisms • Host control mechanisms • Propagation mechanisms • Exploits and attack mechanisms • Malware delivery mechanisms • Obfuscation methods • Deception mechanisms

  19. Agobot (4.0 Pre-Release) • Has the most elaborate set of exploit modules out of the four bots analyzed • Bagle scanner: scans for back doors left by Bagle variants on port 2745 • Dcom scanner: scans for the well known DCE-RPC buffer overflow • MyDoom scanner: scans for back doors left by variants of the MyDoom worm on port 3127 • Dameware scanner: scans for vulnerable versions of the Dameware network administration tool • NetBIOS scanner: brute force password scanning for open NetBIOS shares • Radmin scanner: scans for the Radmin buffer overflow

  20. SDBot (05b) • SDBot does not have any exploits packaged in its standard distribution • It does include modules for sending both UDP and ICMP packets which could be used for simple flooding attacks • Other variants of SDBot contain exploit more modules

  21. SpyBot (1.4) • This version of SpyBot only included a module which attacked NetBIOS open shares • DDoS interface is closely related to SDBot and includes the capabilities for launching simple UDP, ICMP, and TCP SYN floods • Other variants of SpyBot contain more exploit modules

  22. GT Bot with DCOM • Developed to include RPC-DCOM exploits • Has the capability to launch simple ICMP floods • Other variants of GT Bot contain DDoS capabilities such as UDP and TCP SYN floods as well as other known exploits

  23. Botnet Attributes Considered • Architecture • Botnet control mechanisms • Host control mechanisms • Propagation mechanisms • Exploits and attack mechanisms • Malware delivery mechanisms • Obfuscation methods • Deception mechanisms

  24. Agobot (4.0 Pre-Release) • Of the four bots analyzed, only Agobot had elaborate deception mechanisms • Mechanisms included: • Tests for debuggers such as OllyDebug, SoftIce and Procdump • Test for VMWare • Killing anti-virus processes • Altering DNS entries of anti-virus software companies to point to the local host

  25. Conclusion • Botnets are widely used and communicate using IRC • The details of this paper include descriptions of the functional components of botnets categorized into eight components • Understand your enemy

  26. Strengths • Presents information in an organized fashion on the different Bots • Is the first step to codifying Botnet capabilities

  27. Weaknesses • Only presents a high-level over view of a limited number of Bots and only presents one specific Bot version • More detail should be paid to a Bot family and not a specific Bot

  28. References • An Inside Look at Botnets • http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~pb/botnets_final.pdf • Wikipedia • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Botnet • Wikipedia • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IRC

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