PUBLIC CREDIT GUARANTEES AND SME FINANCE

1. PUBLIC CREDIT GUARANTEES AND SME FINANCE Salvatore Zecchini University of Tor Vergata Rome and Marco Ventura Institute for Studies and Economic AnalysesISAE, Rome The World Bank Conference: 13-14 March 2008 Partial Credit Guarantee Schemes – Experiences and Lessons

2. Is State intervention or a State-funded guarantee scheme an effective instrument to promote lending to small firms? • Contrasting views in economic literature • Against: costly, financially unsustainable, no conclusive evidence of additional lending to SMEs, no substitute for correction of system failure. • In favour: new access to credit lower funding cost need of tight financial criteria. • Our aim is to test the impact of a State-funded guarantee scheme on SME financing in terms of credit additionality, borrowing costs, financial sustainability.

3. The focus of our empirical tests is Italy’s Fund for Guarantee to SME (SGS or Fund) • We will present in turn: • A brief review of the economic literature on the subject of SME financial constraints • Eligibility and selection criteria of the Fund • Fund’s performance from the SME financing viewpoint • Fund’s financial sustainability • Our econometric approach as compared to that of other authors • Econometric test of guarantee impact on SME borrowing cost • Empirical evidence on credit additionality • Conclusions: this public guarantee instrument has had a positive effect on SME credit access and borrowing cost, albeit limited.

4. SME financial constraints in the economic literature and in Italy • Some empirical evidence shows financial constraints are inversely related to firm size (Bagella-Becchetti-Caggese 2001) • Start-up firms, young enterprises, smaller ones, innovative ones, with fewer tangible assets and an uncertain track record are subject to much tighter financial constraints than other firms, especially, under the form of credit rationing by the banking system, Berger-Udell, 1998. • Small firms are subject to impact of imperfections in bank credit market more than other firms, due to ex ante asymmetric information between bank lenders and borrowers, agency problems, relatively high evaluation and monitoring costs for the lender. • The interest rate cannot often serve as a tool to distinguish good borrowers from bad ones, since info asymmetries can lead to adverse selection (Stiglitz-Weiss, 1981).

5. Under certain conditions, the provision of collateral can lessen credit rationing and borrowing costs (Coco,2000). • Can the provision of outside guarantees be a tool to overcome market imperfections and lack of inside collateral, thereby giving SMEs broader access to bank financing? • The guarantee value is a function of length and cost of legal procedures, as well as of the loan recovery rate. • Given financial market imperfections and institutional weaknesses, Governments in general resort to various industrial policy tools to improve credit allocation to the advantage of SMEs. • One of them is credit guarantees.

6. An outline of Italy’s guarantee system and the role of mutually-based guarantee institutions and the Fund • Multi-pillar and multi-layer system, based on a mix of private and public funds. • 3 pillars: a) mutual guarantee institutions (MGI) b) banks and other financial institutions c) State- or Region Government-sponsored guarantee Funds. • Multi-layer structure: grassroots level = MGIs and banks second level = second-tier MGIs (credit reinsurance) and regional reinsurance institutions third level = 3 State guarantee Funds for SME credit, namely SGS, Fund for crafts credit, and Fund for Farm credit. • Italy’s MGI system is the largest one in Europe. About 600 MGI, 37 % ot total outstanding guarantees in 2005 and 46 % of beneficiary SMEs.

7. Italy’s State Fund for Guarantee to SMEs • In 2005, equity base was € 233.5 millions. • In 6 years, € 4.6 billion of guaranteed loans, equal to 3% of total lending to small firms that are eligible. • Eligibility criteria:

9. The economic performance of the Fund • The Fund is run according to tight criteria • Eligibility criteria lead to low rejection rate (83% of applications) • Guarantee coverage rate was on average about 50 % of debt principal, with a 25-88% dispersion range • Some preference was given to disadvantaged groups (women in business, micro firms) • Manufacturing and construction industry received 71% of guarantees • Investment projects received 54% of total guarantee. But rising share of guarantees against lending for working capital • Loan maturity structure: concentrated on medium-term loans (48%) • Regional distribution: industrial regions got 60%; South 26% • Emphasis on counter-guaranteeing MGIs (61 % of total) • Overall, significant degree of risk aversion, guarantees were driven to a significant extent by credit supply institutions, support to mutual credit guarantees .

12. Financial sustainability of the Fund • The degree of financial sustainability is assessed through the following equation [1] L + A + I = F + O + S where L = loan losses A = administration expenses I = public debt service cost (cost of use of borrowed capital) F = guarantee fees O = other income, such as the return from the investment of reserves S = the amount of public subsidy to cover any losses. The subsidy element is the balancing item that allows to avoid the exhaustion of the capital base.

13. Financial performance

14. Fund’s financial performance is better than similar schemes in other European countries (losses: 0.25% vs. 2-10% of guaranteed loan portion) • The default ratio is lower than that of Italy’s banking system (1.83% vs. 5.89%) • Small firms and micro firms generated less losses for the Fund than medium-sized firms (49% of losses in medium-sized firms) • Loan default rates appear as being an increasing function of the loan size and guarantee size (following figure). • Highest default rate is in the smallest loan class (up to €10,000), but a relatively low loss rate, because of low guarantee coverage. • 69% of defaults are among loans for working capital needs • 59% of defaults happens after the first 2 years of the loan • Regional distribution of defaults is heavily dependent on sectoral distribution.

17. Subsidy rate S/G = (( L + A + I - F - O )/G ) * 100 namely, 0.25 + 0.39 + 0.47 (~ 0.66) - 0.35 - 0.012 = 0.75 (~ 0.94) The subsidy rate was much higher for those enterprises that were charged no fee: it is estimated to go on average up to 1.29% of the guarantee. Fees did not cover either losses or operating expenses. There was in fact a current-account deficit averaging 0.28% per guarantee, that prevented the scheme from breaking even. Such a deficit (0.14% per euro of guarantee[1]) looks, however, very low compared to the other State-funded subsidy schemes for enterprises, [1] This is the ratio of the deficit to the amount of guaranteed loans, and is equal to the product of the deficit ratio by the guarantee coverage ratio (tab. 3).

18. Approach to credit additionality and interest cost reduction • To carry out quantitative tests of guarantee impact, reference to empirical literature on the presence of tighter financial constraints for some groupings of firms and on their underlying factors. • Applications to models of investment demand together with notion of capital mkt imperfections and disparities in firms’ access to credit mkt (Hubbard 1998). • Cash flow sensitivity of investment demand (Fazzari et al. 1988, Kaplan Zingales 1997). • Credit rationing: some firms’ inability to get credit, even if they would pay higher interest rate (Stliglits Weiss 1981) • Attempts to estimate impact of Gvt credit programmes (Gale, Boocock Shariff, Riding Haines) • Novelty of our approach.

19. Is the Fund effective? • 2. What happens once the guarantee expires? Definition of effectiveness of the Fund: • Guaranteed firms are charged lower financial costs once guaranteed and/or • Guaranteed firms receive a greater amount of bank loans. Additionality or incrementality effect.

20. Answer to question 1: Yes it is, the Fund is effective Answer to question 2: Puzzling evidence formerly guaranteed firms are charged lower financial costs, but they are not granted higher quantity of bank loans. Further investigation

21. HOW TO REACH THESE ANSWERS Before giving any sensible answer to qn. 1 & 2 one must rule out the ANTICIPATION EFFECT: The Fund systematically guarantees better performers, therefore we want to make sure that:

22. Guaranteed firms are not charged lower financial costs BEFORE receiving the guarantee and/or • Guaranteed firms do not receive higher quantity of loans BEFORE receiving the guarantee

23. where rt Nx1 vector of (log of) financial costs in 1999; x1t Nx1 vector of (log of) number of employees in 1999; x2t Nx1 vector of (log of) sales in 1999; x3t Nx1 vector of (log of) bank debt in 1999; dt+n dummy variables, that takes on value of 1 if the firm is guaranteed at time t+n (where t=1999) and to 0 otherwise; ut error term.

24. Table 4. Estimates of the  parameter using data prior to 1999 for firms receiving the guarantee in the following years (cost effect) Standard errors in parenthesis. “***”, “**” and “*” indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. Different regressions are reported in each column by changing the dummy in order to account for the firms guaranteed in different years. For instance, in column 3 we report the estimated  coefficient related to the 1999 financing cost for firms that received a guarantee in 2001.

25. The dummy coefficient is always positive and significant: => • guaranteed firms were not better performers in terms of cost, they were charged higher financial costs in 1999, wrt other SMEs

26. where yt Nx1 vector of (log of) bank debt in 1999; x1t Nx1 vector of (log of) number of employees in 1999; x2t Nx1 vector of (log of) sales in 1999; x3t Nx1 vector of (log of) total assets in 1999; dt+n dummy variables, that takes on value of 1 if the firm is guaranteed at time t+n (where t=1999) and to 0 otherwise; ut error term.

27. Table 5. Estimates of the  parameter using data prior to 1999 for firms receiving the guarantee in the following years (additionality) Standard errors in parenthesis. “***”, “**” and “*” indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. Different regressions are reported in each column by changing the dummy in order to account for the firms guaranteed in different years. For instance, in column 3 we report the estimated  coefficient related to the 1999 bank debt for firms that received a guarantee in 2001.

28. EVIDENCE • The dummy coefficient, δ, is negative and significant for 2000-2004 Guaranteed firms in those years received a lower quantity of bank loans, i.e. they were not better performers, • δ is not significantly different from zero for 2005. Guaranteed firms in that year did not receive a higher quantity of bank loans, i.e. they were not better performers, • δ is positive and significant for 2006 Guaranteed firms in 2006 were better performers, we rule them out from the sample otherwise we cannot single out the causal effect of the Fund on SMEs.

29. ESTIMATION STRATEGY To isolate the causal effect of the Fund we use the DID estimator: • once defined an appropriate outcome variable the DID compares the average time difference of the treated to the average time difference of the control group. • We exploit a twofold counterfactual 1. guaranteed firms before receiving the guarantee, 1999 2. non guaranteed firms

30. When the anticipation effect did not occur the underlying hypothesis of the DID are satisfied. • We can isolate the causal effect of the Fund on the treated unit ATT The proves of answers to questions 1 and 2:

31. Table 6 - DID estimate of the causal effect of the guarantee on the (log of) financial costs 1999-2005 (cost effect) Robust standard errors in parenthesis. “***”, “**” and “*” indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. S.E. are computed through the SUR (PCSE) coefficient covariance matrix to account for both cross-section heteroskedasticity and correlation.

32. The dummy coefficient is not significantly different from zero, therefore financial costs charged to guaranteed SMEs are in line with non guaranteed. • Recall: before the Fund started operating guaranteed firms were charged higher financial costs, other things being equal. See anticipation effect. • The effect persists once the guarantee expires

33. Table 6 - DID estimate of the causal effect of the guarantee on the (log of) bank debt 1999-2005 (additionality effect) Robust standard errors in parenthesis. “***”, “**” and “*” indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. S.E. are computed through the SUR (PCSE) coefficient covariance matrix to account for both cross-section heteroskedasticity and correlation.

34. The dummy coefficient is positive and significant, => guaranteed firms are granted a higher quantity of bank loans, 13.77% computed as [exp(δ)-1]*100. In the same direction Bocock Sharif (2005), Gale (1991), Riding Madill Haines (2006). • Recall: before the Fund started operating guaranteed firms were granted a lower quantity of bank loans (see estimates of anticipation effect for additionality). • Once the guarantee expires no traces are left, guaranteed SMEs go back to the previous situation of lower bank loans.

35. SUMMING UP: • THE FUND HAS BEEN PROVED TO BE EFFECTIVE IN: • DECREASING FINANCIAL COSTS FOR GUARANTEED FIRMS • INCREASING THE AMOUNT OF BANK LOANS

36. ONCE THE GUARANTEE EXPIRES • THERE ARE TRACES OF PERSISTENCE IN THE COST EFFECT, WHILE 2. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF PERSISTENCE IN THE ADDITIONALITY EFFECT.