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Why did Japan invade Manchuria and Northern China?

Why did Japan invade Manchuria and Northern China?. L/O - To examine the causes of the invasion and to identify its key features. Manchuria as a turning point.

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Why did Japan invade Manchuria and Northern China?

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  1. Why did Japan invade Manchuria and Northern China? L/O - To examine the causes of the invasion and to identify its key features

  2. Manchuria as a turning point • The invasion of Manchuria in September 1931 was a turning point for Japan. It dramatically increased Japanese involvement in China, which would eventually result in the Sino-Japanese War of 1937. • It’s success fuelled an increasingly autonomous and expansionist military, whose officers would begin to dictate Japanese foreign policy. • At home, it represented such as severe undermining of democratic government that it would never recover, leading to the decline of parliamentary democracy by 1932.

  3. The Birth of Imperialism • Yet the invasion itself, despite its rapid outbreak, wasn’t a surprise to many. Japan had been steadily increasing its influence in China since at least 1895. • Japanese politics and society also had a remarkable degree of consensus over the idea of imperialism in China. Many saw an empire as a ‘right’ and believed that Japan should ‘throw off Asia’. • But many within the military and government disagreed over how best to achieve this goal.

  4. Unilateral or Multilatera? • Should Japan extend its influence in China through cooperation with Western powers or through unilateral action? Should it work with the post-1911 government, or cut deals with warlords against it? Should it confront or work with the USSR? • Thus policy agreement about China was split between those that favoured cooperation with Western powers, versus those that wanted Japan to take a more aggressive and unilateral posture.

  5. Japan and the First World War • These cleavages in opinion were exacerbated during the First World War. In 1914 Japan joined its ally Britain in declaring war on Germany. • This enabled Japan to take control of Shandong and its Pacific Island colonies. Then in January 1915, the Japanese government issued the 21-Demands to Yuan Shikai. • It’s more contentious demands would have made China into a virtual colony of Japan. Under US/UK objections, Japan had to be content with economic influence over the railways in Shandong and Manchuria. Yuan Shikai 袁世凱

  6. Japan and the First World War • In 1917, Japan signed the ‘Ishii-Lansing’ agreement with the USA, in which Japan’s ‘special interests’ in China were acknowledged. • This was followed by the 1918 ‘Nishihara Loans’ in which Japan granted loans to Chinese warlords in return for further economic privileges in Shandong and Manchuria. • Finally in 1919, Japan was allowed to keep control over Shandong province during the Paris Peace Conference. This greatly antagonised the Chinese, leading to the May 4th anti-Japanese protest movement.

  7. Parliamentary Democracy? • By the 1920s, Japan had through unilateral action, greatly extended its influence in China. • The Seiyukai cabinet under Hara Takashi 1918-22 (the first PM who was an elected parliamentarian), then sought a more cooperative approach, discontinuing the Nishihara loans and returning Shandong province in the 1922 Washington agreements. • This pro-Western approach was continued by the Minseito governments 1924-27 under foreign minister Shidehara Kijurowho refused to send troops to China to confront anti-Japanese protests. Hara Kei 原 敬 Shidehara Kijuro 幣原 喜重郎

  8. Aggression in China • The re-emergence of a more aggressive policy came between 1927-28 when General Tanaka Giichi took over as PM. • Tanaka sent troops to China on three occasions between 1927-28, mostly to protect ‘Japanese interests’ but in reality to intimidate Chiang Kai-shek’s new government – which sought to reunite the country. • Tanaka’s ‘positive policy’ was backed up by public opinion and increasingly restless military officers which favoured a less Western orientated and more aggressive foreign policy. Tanaka Giichi 田中 義一 Chiang Kai-shek 蔣中正

  9. Short-Term Causes of the Invasion • Thus these tensions between ‘slow-track’ and ‘fast-track’ imperialism continued until the early 1930s, when the Great Depression exacerbated the problems facing Japan – forcing many army officers to consider radical solutions. • One such hotbed of increasing radicalism was the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. Its military leaders were influenced by ultranationalist thinking. They believed that Manchuria should be occupied in order to strengthen Japan for an inevitable war with the West.

  10. Short-Term Causes of the Invasion • As early as 1928, the Kwantung Army had assassinated the Chinese warlord Zhang Zoulinin an attempt to persuade the PM to support a more aggressive policy in Manchuria. • Failing to discipline those responsible, PM Tanaka was forced to resign after criticism from the Emperor. • As tensions rose in Manchuria, disagreements between Japan and the West also increased. The London Naval Conference in 1930 saw Japan being bluntly refused to increase its naval tonnage ratio to 10:10:7 rather than 5:5:3. This angered military radicals, who blamed the government for being too weak. Zhang Zoulin 张作霖

  11. Short-Term Causes of the Invasion • Hypocrisy by the West, the potential threat of the KMT in China, perceived government ineptitude at home, impact of the Great Depression – all these factors seemed to distil a rising sense of emergency in the minds of ultranationalists. Drastic action was needed. • From 1930-32, young military officers carried out a number of assassinations against the government. PM Hamaguichi was shot in November 1930. This was followed by further assassinations and coup attempts in 1932. Yet the government seemed unwilling to consider bolder moves in China. HamaguchiOsachi 濱口 雄幸

  12. The Mukden Incident • Viewing the government as unable and unwilling to protect Japanese interests in China, officers of the Kwantung Army decided to take matters into their own hands. • On September 18, 1931, they blew up a section of track on the South Manchuria railroad near the city of Mukden (Shenyang). Blaming it on Chinese forces, they used it as a pretext to invade the entire province, succeeding by December.

  13. Political Response in Japan • The Seiyukai government of PM Inukai Tsuyoshi responded weakly to military insubordination. He refused to allow the military to annex Manchuria fully, but did concede to install a puppet regime in the area. • Founded in March 1932, Manchukuo was supposedly an independent nation yet in reality was controlled by Japan. The ex-emperor Puyiwas enthroned as Manchurian Emperor to give legitimacy to the new regime. Inukai Tsuyoshi 犬養 毅 Emperor Puyi 溥儀

  14. Why wasn’t the military punished? • The invasion was a case of insubordination in direct violation of the civilian government. Yet military officers went unpunished. • The civilian government was unwilling and indeed, even supported the action. Army minister General Ugaki Kazushige supported the invasion believing it would help Japan avoid a ‘social tragedy’ at home. • The public were also jubilant. It is easy to understand why civilian politicians failed to publicly go against popular and elite sentiments. To prove the point, PM Inukai Tsuyoshi was assassinated on May 15th 1932 due to his weak support for the invasion. Ugaki Kazushige 宇垣 一成 Inukai Tsuyoshi 犬養 毅

  15. Impact of the Manchurian Invasion • After this failed ultranationalist coup d’état, army leaders refused to allow the Seiyukai to form a new cabinet. Instead, Admiral Saito Makoto was appointed as PM of a national unity cabinet. • Japan would thus turn into an increasingly authoritarian state, ruled in effect by the military. In March 1933 they withdrew from the League of Nations in response to the Lytton Report calling for demilitarisation in Manchuria. • By May 1933, the Kwantung Army had further annexed Jehol province, extending Manchukuo to the Great Wall. Saito Makoto 斎藤 実

  16. Impact of the Manchurian Invasion • Internationally, Japan was treated as a pariah state. Britain and the USA refused to recognise Manchukuo and Japanese product boycotts continued in China. • In response, Japan withdrew from naval arms limitations talks with the West in December 1934. It immediately embarked on a massive rearmament programme. • Economically, Japan wasted no time in integrating Manchukuo into its economic sphere which was rapidly recovering. From 1931-34, industrial output rose 82%, with exports doubling from 1930-36.

  17. Significance of the Manchurian Invasion • The invasion of Manchuria was therefore a major turning point for Japan. Many historians argue that the events of 1931 represent the start of the ‘Fifteen-Year War’ with China. • Invasion made some form of military conflict with China inevitable, crystallising Chinese resistance, and it put Japan on a collision course with Western interests. • Domestically, the invasion also led to the collapse of parliamentary government and the rise in power of the military. There was no longer any check to the power of the military.

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