Tackling Piracy and Armed Robbery: From the Shipowners’ Perspective Minerva Alfonso

1. Tackling Piracy and Armed Robbery: From the Shipowners’ Perspective Minerva Alfonso Maritime Advisor, INTERTANKO Director, Overseas Manning Singapore, 1-3 July 2008

2. International Association of Independent Tanker Owners Membership • 250 + members representing > 80% of the independent oil tanker fleet and > 80% of the chemical carrier fleet, with strict membership criteria • 300 + associate members in oil and chemical tanker related businesses

3. ORGANISATION Associate Members Committee Safety, Technical & Environmental Committee (ISTEC) Bunker Sub-Committee IT Committee Annual General Meeting Chemical Tanker Committee (CTC) Offshore Tanker Committee Council Chemical Tanker Sub-Committee Americas Short Sea Tanker Group Executive Committee Human Element Committee Vetting Committee Management Committee Documentary Committee Worldscale Committee Environmental Committee Shipowner Issues Sub-Committee Q-QuestSub-Committee ASIAN REGIONAL PANEL HELLENIC FORUM LATIN AMERICAN PANEL NORTH AMERICAN PANEL 14 issue driven Committees & 4 Regional Panels Insurance & Legal Committee

4. INTERTANKO Services • INTERTANKO represents and promotes the interests of responsible oil and chemical tanker owners worldwide • provides members with technical, operational, legal, documentary and other support services, information and advice

5. . ISSUE OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY

6. Roundtable of International Shipping Associations BIMCO, International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), INTERCARGO and INTERTANKO The Roundtable represents the entire merchant shipping industry worldwide

7. Roundtable Position • Issue of piracy and armed robbery has been a recurring theme on the agendas of the international associations for a number of years ROUNDTABLE POSITION: It is unacceptable that merchant ships and merchant seamen should be subjected to armed attacks at sea in the 21st century.

8. Major concern • Extremely grave threat to the lives of the crews and the safe operation of ships • Not only are the attacks on an upward trend, but the level of violence has also significantly increased

9. IMB 2007 • 2007 IMB report overall increase of 10% in the total number of attacks • Severity of attacks at its worst this year with 63 crew being kidnapped for ransom and 292 seafarers were taken as hostage • Most of these incidents occurred in Nigerian and Somalian waters • One-third of the 263 attacks on ships in the period under review were on tankers

10. IMB 1Q 2008 • 1Q 2008 IMB report overall increase of 20% in the total number of attacks • The use and threat of violence agains crew members remains unacceptably high. • Most of these incidents occurred in Nigerian and Somalian waters

11. Baco-Liner 2

12. MV Watford 03.02.07 0245 LT Posn 06:03.0N – 003.25.5E, Lagos Roads Nigeria Five pirates armed with guns boarded the tanker drifting 20 miles off the breakwaters. Pirates threatened the duty A/B at forward station by pointing a gun at him. They entered the bosun store. Other duty crew informed OOW who raised the alarm and crew mustered. Port control informed but call ignored. Pirates stole ship’s stores and escaped in a motor canoe.

13. MV Ocean Satin 08.02.07 19.50 LT Vicinity of Forcados River, Nigeria Posn 05:23.4N – 005:11.7E Five heavily armed pirates in a speed boat boarded a product tanker underway, they ordered master to drop anchor and forced all crewmembers to the bridge. Pirates smashed master’s head with a bottle. Then, they ransacked crew members cabin and took all personal belongings of crew, vessel’s property and escaped at 0130 LT. Vessel’s calls for assistance from ashore was ignored by authorities

14. MV Hereford Express • Livestock Carrier – ballast voyage • General Santos, Philippines to Broome, Australia • Armed attack by unidentified water borne crafts, 7 June 2008 at 09.45 • Lat 03 24.6N Long 125 05.1E (Indonesian Archipelago)

15. MV Hereford Express

16. MV Hereford Express • .

17. MV Hereford Express • .

18. MV Hereford Express • Clearly a civilian merchant vessel • IMO number and name clearly visible • AIS capable of providing information about the ship to other ships and to coastal authorities automatically

19. Recommendations • The Indonesian government be formally requested to clarify this incident • The Indonesian authorities provide clear guide lines as to how their Marine Police and Cost Guard undertake interception of merchant vessels so that Master of merchant vessels can determine more clearly if it is an “official” approach or potential piracy attack.

20. Piracy Trends • When looking at trends from various sources like ReCAAP, IMO and the IMB reports one thing became evident: • More and more of the incidents occur in TERRITORIAL WATERS

21. Industry Solutions at Micro Level This will involve actions and preventive measures being taken by shipowners and their crew on each ship

22. Actions by seafarers • Be vigilant • Reduce opportunities for theft • Secure Restricted Areas at all times and establish safe secure area(s) • Maintain, exercise and regularly review your Ship Counter-piracy Plan • Report all incidents to the coastal and Flag State authorities

23. Actions by Seafarers The Counter-piracy Plan • The need for enhanced watch keeping; use of lighting and surveillance, detection or perimeter protection equipment • Crew responses if a potential attack is detected or an attack is underway • The radio and alarm procedures to be followed • The reports that should be made after an attack, or an attempted attack • Training to ensure crew react consistently to an incident

24. Industry Solutions at Macro Level • The industry has issued its own guidance for merchant ships to protect themselves against attacks whether in territorial waters or on the high seas • Urged relevant coastal states to take effective action against attacks on merchant shipping in their territorial waters • Strong support to the IMO in its efforts to tackle the problem at inter-governmental level

25. …. BUT…. Even though these measures has been implemented by the shipping industry, THE ATTACKS CONTINUE

26. Solutions: Involvement by Governments The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) The Integrated Coast Guard Network of the Maritime Organisation for West and Central Africa (MOWCA)

27. Solutions: Involvement by Governments • Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF HOA) Operations • United Nations Security Council resolution June 2008, authorising hot pursuit of pirate vessels in Somali waters for the next six months.  This was the direct result of the IMO Secretary-General’s initiative, which was supported by several IMO Member States.

28. Increasing Trends: 3 Key Aspects • Very complex economic and political internal challenges for countries on the top of the list of hotspot areas • Capturing perpetrators – major challenge, Art. 111 UNCLOS Right of Hot Pursuit; lack of cooperation between some regional governments; and lack of resources • Loopholes in the international legal framework that undermines the effective prosecution of perpetrators

29. International law and Maritime Zones Under international law, the rights and obligations of states with respect to attacks against ships are dependent upon where the attack took place • High seas / EEZ • Territorial waters

30. International Treaties Geneva Convention on the High Seas of 1958 and repeated in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 Piracy (UNCLOS) One of the major deficiencies of the international rules concerning the suppression of piracy is its narrow definition of piracy under Art. 101

31. UNCLOS Article 101 Definition of piracy In order to be considered an act of piracy the following 5 elements should be fulfilled: • Illegal act of violence such as robbery, murder, assault, rape • Motivated by private gains • Committed by persons on board a private ship • Directed against another vessel • High seas or outside any States jurisdictions

32. UNCLOS Limitations • 2 ships rule – attacks by crews / stowaways not included • Motivated by private gains – political terrorist type attacks not covered • Most attacks happen in territorial waters; therefore acts are not punishable under Art 105. • Article 111. The Right of Hot Pursuit ends when the fleeing vessel enters its own or a third state’s territorial waters

33. Jurisdiction in the Malacca and Singapore Straits

34. SUA Convention • Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro 7 Oct 1985 • 4 armed Palestinian militants (PLF) hijacked the ship and demanded the release of 50 Palestinian prisoners held in Israel (not motivated by private gains and therefore not covered by UNCLOS) • The gunmen killed a Jewish- American passenger (2 ships rule not fulfilled) • In Egyptian waters (UNCLOS Art. 101 piracy definition only applicable to high seas attack) • Led to the promulgation of the SUA Convention (Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation) or more commonly known as the Rome Convention convention in order fill the gaps left by UNCLOS.

35. Limitations of the SUA Convention • Only applicable within the jurisdiction of States party to it • the decision by the parties to enforce the Rome Convention is ultimately discretionary • The Convention does not provide for any sanctions against parties who fail to fulfil their treaty obligations

36. International law and Maritime Zones Under international law, the rights and obligations of states with respect to attacks against ships are dependent upon where the attack took place • High seas / EEZ • Territorial waters

37. Territorial Waters Within territorial waters, jurisdiction over armed robbers rests solely with the Coastal State

38. IMO MSC The Committee reiterates its request for Member States to provide reports to the IMO on action taken by their governments against incidents reported to have occurred in their territorial waters.

39. ISPS Code IMO FAQ: Will the new security measures imposed after 1 July 2004 help reduce the armed robbery incidents? IMO Reply: Logically it should be so. Chapter XI-2 includes a regulation addressing threats to ships at sea. Thus, at least the international framework has been put in place to address the matter. Now it is up to Governments to implement it.

40. CONCLUSIONS INTERTANKO is deeply concerned over the trend of piracy in the past several years as it constitutes an extremely grave threat to the lives of the crews and the safe operation of ships. International agreements (i.e. UNCLOS and 1988 SUA Convention) that deal with piracy and other acts of maritime violence seem inadequate as a legal basis to protect our crews and ships from such acts. One of the major deficiencies of the international rules under the Geneva Convention and UNCLOS is their narrow definition of piracy.

41. CONCLUSIONS The lack of ratification of the SUA Treaties by countries as well as the lack of proper implementation of these treaties by some party states, mean that the agreement is virtually inapplicable in some areas, and some attacks may go unpunished. Governments need to step up its efforts to crack down on armed robbery incidents in their territorial waters

42. CONCLUSIONS I hope my presentation highlighted the vulnerability of our seafarers to the hostile acts of opportunistic pirates. It is really up to us working ashore to support them.

43. THANK YOU www.intertanko.com www.themaritimefoundation.com www.shippingfacts.com