Thierry G. JACQUES Marine Environmental Management Section MUMM 2006

1. MUMM - Management Unit of the North Sea Mathematical Models RBINS - Royal Belgian Institute for Natural Sciences National North Sea Contingency Plan: the Shaping of Operational Arrangements Thierry G. JACQUES Marine Environmental Management Section MUMM 2006 http://www.mumm.ac.be/ http://www.mumm.ac.be/

2. The Shaping of the Plan • Setting the scene – the history • Legal foundations • Features of the response strategy • Operational arrangements • Conclusions

3. Rotterdam, Hamburg 1. Setting the scene Antwerp Dover Strait 65 km of coast

4. The eighties: 19 accident alarms • 1981 World Dignity 100,000 t crude • 1982 Jumpa containers, toxic • 1982 Saint Anthony 38,000 t crude • 1982 Molesta fuel • 1982 Benetank 3,000 t heavy fuel • 1983 Sterling 55,000 t crude • 1984 Mont-Louis nuclear reprocessed • 1985 Stamy fuel • 1985 Contract Voyager dangerous drums • 1986 Staffortshire light petroleum gas • 1987 Herald of Free Ent. 5 dangerous lorries • 1987 Olympic Dream 2,100 t gasoline • 1987 Skyron 137,000 t crude • 1988 Borcea fuel • 1988 Seafreight Fariway 3 dangerous lorries • 1988 Anna Broere 550 t acrylonitrile • 1988 Westeral dangerous containers • 1989 Paul Robeson grounding • 1989 Perintis 5.8 t lindane

5. Mont Louis 1984: building awareness • 30 50-t cylinders of UF6 • just off limits, out of control

6. 1987 HFE > 100 different chemicals From passive to reactive:1988 North Sea Plan approved

7. The nineties: 29 accident alarms British Trent(1993)

8. 1990 Bussewitz 14,000 t ammonia 1990 Thomas Weber 221 dangerous drums 1990 Viva fuel 1991 Tomisi fuel 1991 Globel Ling fuel 1991 Clipper Confidence Pb concentrate, Cu, Zn 1991 Grete Turkol ethylbenzene 1991 British Esk naphtha 1992 Jostelle fuel 1992 Atlantic Carrier fuel 1992 Nordfrakt 3,252 t lead sulphide 1992 Long Lin fuel 1992 Amer Fuji fuel ……

9. … • 1993 Fleur de Lys fuel • 1993 Alexandros fuel • 1993 Zaphos 68,000 t condensate? • 1993 Sherbro bags pesticides • 1993 Hyaz fuel • 1993 British Trent 24,000 t gasoline • 1993 Aya fuel • 1994 Shoeburyness 90 M14 mines • 1994 Elatma 1,378 t NH4 NO3 • 1994 Ming Fortune 38 t sodium chorate • 1995 Carina oil • 1995 Spauwer capsizal, oil • 1997 Bona Fulmar 7,000 t gasoline lost • 1997 Mundial Car oil • 1997 Vigdis Knutsen oiletanker • 1999 Ever Decent containers toxic

10. 1994: • MUMM signs first oil recovery contract • MUMM obtains first compensation for .be!

11. 2. The Legal Foundations • 1987: law on the territorial sea • 1989: new Bonn Agreement • 1990-95: intl. concertation on the EEZ regime • 1990-96: continental shelf treaties (FR, UK, NL) • 1998: law ratifying UNCLOS • 1999: law on the EEZ law on the marine environment: - Strict liability of the polluter - ex officio intervention o/b if needed - compensation for environmental disruptions

12. The 2000’s: getting at it!

13. Buying oil combating equipment • Strict liability for remediation From reactive to offensive and operational!

14. 3. Special features • The driving force behind was Science Policy • Five federal departments have authority • Principles: - Strict liability of the polluter - compensation for environmental disruptions - ex officio intervention o/b if needed 2005: Coast Guard Structure

15. (features and goals) • to maximize enforcement capabilities • to pool resources • (there is no dedicated response vessel) • to co-ordinate in a single structure • (good sense) • to make the Environment central: • NEBA

16. 4. The Operational Arrangements • 1988: the North Sea Alarm Plan • who is responsible • how to alarm them and when • where to go … but not what to do ! • 21.06.2005: oiled birds • 21.01.2005: shore cleanup • 10.08.2006: operations at sea

17. Action at sea: the philosophy • The Fed. Dept. Env. takes the lead • The Navy takes command at sea • MUMM evaluates impact (NEBA) • Step by step development of the intervention

18. 7 phases: alarm assessment initial counter-mesures choice of strategy intervention follow-up debriefing 3 scenarios: S1: danger of poll. S2: confirmed S3: major Action at sea: the structure

19. the assessment • Search for information in one location • Site-specific modelling (natural processes, behaviour of the pollutant) • On scene monitoring • Aerial guidance

20. role of the scientist (worse case scenario, scaling, monitoring methodology)

21. the strategic options • Mechanical recovery • Chemical dispersion • Mechanical dispersion • Do nothing (+ monitoring) • Requisitions • International assistance operations, methods, communications etc.

22. How good are these plans? • They are sound, professional instruments But • they are coined to deploy existing means they are typical Tier 1 instruments • Tier 2 (Rampenplan) and Tier 3 (internl.) require further elaboration

23. What do we miss? Public Affairs Safety Health Science Environment Technical Legal OSC Support Staff & Advisors Deputy OSC Operations Logistics Finance Planning

24. Public Affairs Safety Health Science Environment Technical Legal OSC Support Staff & Advisors Deputy OSC Planning Logistics Finance Operations PublicAffairs Safety Science Finance Logistics Lead Agency Support Staff & Advisors OSC Operations Area 1 Operations Area 2 Operations Area 3 Operations Area 4 What we miss

25. What do we miss to fulfill the needs of Tiers 2 & 3?The Future • Strong technical support for the co-ordinators OSC-AR • IMO/OPRC contingency organization • administrative, financial, legal support • centralized logistics • organizational support for volunteers • 2 oil-recovery vessels (inshore, offshore)

26. 5. Conclusions • The alarm procedures are sound • We have a professional approach • We have a potential structure (Coast Guard) • The IMO doctrine should be implemented • The ops plans must be scaled up to Tiers 2 & 3 • Technical advice must be made explicit in the plans • The pooling of resources must be made effective to ensure the availability of specialized vessels

27. The End