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Pourquoi l'intervention échoue dans les états échoués ( Pas le Mali, mais ça pourrait être)

Pourquoi l'intervention échoue dans les états échoués ( Pas le Mali, mais ça pourrait être). Will Reno Professor of Political Science & Director, Program of African Studies, Northwestern University. A conflict of our time. Migration. Overlapping international dimensions.

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Pourquoi l'intervention échoue dans les états échoués ( Pas le Mali, mais ça pourrait être)

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  1. Pourquoi l'intervention échoue dans les états échoués(Pas le Mali, mais ça pourrait être) Will Reno Professor of Political Science & Director, Program of African Studies, Northwestern University

  2. A conflict of our time

  3. Migration

  4. Overlapping international dimensions

  5. The bigger picture: Varieties of states Early national states in Europe guerilla rebels Industrializing states  urban insurgency Periphery state-builders  Maoist “liberated zones” Periphery Patronage states  fragmented rebels How can I explain the appearance of strong cohesive armed groups like Islamic State?

  6. High Modernist State Construction

  7. Failed Modernism Ministère de la Défense, Bagdad

  8. Political Risk Coups d’état in Africa, 1956-2001 42 of 48 countries (87.5%) had “military interventions” in politics Successful coups in 30 countries (62.5%) Multiple coups in 18 countries (37.5%) Chance of incumbent death or exile in coups / attempts, 59.5% Coups d’état in the Middle East, 1950-2001 Successful coups in 9 of 16 countries (56%) Four countries (25%) experience protracted civil conflicts Multiple coups in Syria (6), Iraq (4), and Algeria (3)

  9. Coup Proofing Patronage state networks infiltrate other social networks as a strategy to exercise authority Patronage politics uses violence (“creative tension”) to undermine collective action Reverse infiltration of networks of violence into the state regime; it works if the original hierarchy is maintained Disruption, often externally induced, fragments the state patronage and other social networks  civil war

  10. Multiplication of Security Agencies(the official ones just scratch the surface) Republican Guards (brother) Political Security Directorate (business partner) Public Security Police Defense Companies (Formerly uncle, replaced by brother) Gendarmerie Air Force Intelligence Directorate (Business partner) Military Intelligence Directorate General Security Directorate (Friend of president’s deceased brother-in-law) Intelligence Service (father’s cousin) Shabiha (paramilitary, established by father’s cousin & brother) Popular Committees National Defense Forces Jaysh al-Shibi

  11. Conflict Trend: The rise of “non-state” armed actors Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, http://www.acleddata.com/agents-of-violence-in-2014/

  12. The Reality of State Collapse

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