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The Implications of Increasing Shareholder Democracy

The Implications of Increasing Shareholder Democracy. 2012 The “Shareholder Spring”. 2011 The “Arab Spring”. Shareholder voting in the Internet age Coho Energy, 1999. Company files for bankruptcy, cancels annual meeting Angry shareholders on Yahoo! message board:

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The Implications of Increasing Shareholder Democracy

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  1. The Implications of IncreasingShareholder Democracy

  2. 2012 The “Shareholder Spring” • 2011 The “Arab Spring”

  3. Shareholder voting in the Internet age Coho Energy, 1999 • Company files for bankruptcy, cancels annual meeting • Angry shareholders on Yahoo! message board: • David Marx, real estate appraiser, aka “Stockmeister7”: “I would vote for a new CEO and I have 125,000 shares toward that end. Who else would support this. Please post your vote and the number of shares you have to vote for a replacement.” • J.D. Davis, header of truck driver’s union controlling 742,000 shares: “Stockmeister you have our total support and proxie. Let’s get together on this and oust the guy. It’s time he got a job driving a forklift.” • 13,000,000 shares, or 52% outstanding, are pledged to Stockmeister7. Judge names him head of the shareholders committee in Chapter 11.

  4. Is anything wrong with this? • Violates anti-fraud proxy disclosure rules • Solicits votes for an election that will never be held • CEO is not elected by shareholders • No elections are held by companies in Chapter 11

  5. What’s interesting about this • Internet dramatically reduces time and cost required for shareholder communication • Seems to resolve “collective action problems” that are the rationale for limited shareholder participation in governance

  6. Shareholders Elect / delegate Managers Board of Directors Monitor day-to-day

  7. Shareholder voting is changing • More direct involvement in governance • Say-on-pay • Majority board elections • [Proxy access] • Regulatory reform to improve transparency • End of “broker voting” in 2010 (c. 15% cushion) • Publicity of mutual fund votes • Aggressive tactics by active investors • “Empty voting” • “Loan to own”

  8. Why should we care? 1. The good reasons: • Surprisingly large effects on value of equity and debt • Effective communication channel with management 2. The troubling reasons: (a) Very frequent shareholder voting may be destabilizing (b) Weaknesses of technology and regulation create opportunities for vulture investors

  9. Votingand the value of the firm

  10. Stock +3.2% = $3 billion gain in market cap Pandit’s 2011 pay: - $1.6 mm salary - $5.3 mm bonus - $7.8 mm options - “retention award”

  11. Shareholder value impactwhen a takeover defense proposal passes • All votes 0.01% • 60% or less 0.21% • 55% or less 0.94% • 52% or less 1.62% • 51% or less 2.21% Most vote outcomes are easy to forecast; close votes implicitly show the value of governance changes Source: Cunat, Gine & Guadalupe (2011)

  12. These results are surprising • Large magnitude • The proposals are non-binding • Management can greatly influence the outcome • Management can “surrender” and avoid the value loss

  13. Votingas a channel of communication

  14. Director elections in the U.S. Average “Yes” vote: 94.3% Disclosed conflict of interest: -2.1% Attendance problem: -14.0% ISS "No" recommendation: -18.7% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Source: Cai, Garner and Walkling (2009)

  15. Real effects • Director resignations: no clear pattern • CEO dismissals: One standard deviation drop in voting for outside directors increases CEO turnover by 121% • CEO compensation: 1% reduction in votes for a comp. committee member reduces CEO pay by $143,000 in the next year.

  16. Example: News Corp. in 2011 James R. Murdoch 35% 65% Lachlan K. Murdoch 66% 34% Natalie Bancroft Andrew S.B. Knight Arthur M. Siskind David F. DeVoe For Sir Roderick I. Eddington Against Viet Dinh K. Rupert Murdoch 14% 86% John L. Thornton Peter L. Barnes Jose Maria Aznar Chase Carey Joel I. Klein James W. Breyer -100% -50% 0% 50% 100%

  17. Example: News Corp. in 2011 James R. Murdoch 35% 18% 65% Lachlan K. Murdoch 20% 66% 34% Natalie Bancroft Andrew S.B. Knight Arthur M. Siskind David F. DeVoe For: public Sir Roderick I. Eddington Against: public Viet Dinh Murdoch family K. Rupert Murdoch 14% 39% 86% Prince al-Waleed John L. Thornton Peter L. Barnes Jose Maria Aznar Chase Carey Joel I. Klein James W. Breyer -100% -50% 0% 50% 100%

  18. Example: News Corp. in 2011

  19. Example: Bank of America in 2009

  20. Weakness of regulation and vote-counting technology

  21. Management-initiated propoalsFrequency of vote outcomes around 50% passage threshhold Source: Listokin (2008).

  22. Over-voting • 3% to 4% of all votes cast are legitimate “over-votes” • Securities Transfer Assoc. in 2005 studied 341 companies, and found over-voting at all 341 • Generally caused by stock lending by brokers, without attributing lent shares to a particular client • Stock lending will increase voter turnout • Will impact elections with a quorum requirement, such as bylaw amendments Source: Smith (2012)

  23. Proposals that appear to have passed only due to Over-votes Source: Smith (2012)

  24. How accurate are corporate elections? • Not very. +/- 5% is the consensus. • Inaccurate shareholder lists • Incomplete ballot distribution • Irregular vote counting by subcontractors • Seems to be the consequence of an archaic system designed for a world of paper share ownership • Important not only for identifying the “winner,” but for enabling shareholders’ signal to management to be read clearly Source: Kahan and Rock (2007).

  25. Manipulation of elections via“Empty voting”

  26. Empty voting through the stock lending market Source: Christoffersen, Geczy, Musto and Reed (2007).

  27. Empty voting: more complex exampleMylan Labs’ 2004 bid for King Pharmaceuticals Source: Kahan and Rock (2007).

  28. Empty voting: observations • Some of these strategies appear unbelievably cheap and low-risk. • Some temporary owners of voting rights may vote against the company’s best interests. • Remedy seems to be better disclosure, but that alone may not stop all moral hazard problems.

  29. Empty voting: the backlash • Many major institutional investors now recall their shares from the loan market prior to the ex-vote date Source: Aggarwal, Saffi & Sturgess (2010)

  30. Empty creditors • Bondholders have voting rights in Chapter 11 • A bondholder can become an “empty creditor” by using CDS to protect cash flow rights • In a distressed firm, bondholders can displace equity and take its voting power. • Buy distressed bonds / insure through CDS • Refuse to waive covenants; force a default • Inherit shares Source: Subrahmanyam, Tang & Wang (2012)

  31. Debt takeovers Source: Wall Street Journal (2009)

  32. Debt takeovers

  33. The value of a vote

  34. What are voting rights worth? Research into stock lending suggests value is low In nearly all elections, value of a marginal vote is meaningless But sometimes it matters a lot

  35. What are voting rights worth? Zingales’ (1994) study of dual-class shares on the Milan stock exchange: Source: Zingales (1994)

  36. What are voting rights worth?A contingent claims approach By put-call parity, Stock = + call option – put option + bond Compare the value of this synthetic share of stock with the market price of an actual share Source: Kalay, Karakas & Pant (2011)

  37. Put-call parity:Stock = Call – Put + Bond $60 + Call $40 $20 Payoff $0 - Put ($20) ($40) ($60) $0 $10 $20 $30 $40 $50 $60 $70 $80 $90 $100 Stock price

  38. The value of a voteat Heinz’s 2006 shareholder meeting Nelson Peltz addresses the meeting

  39. Trian Partners sought five seats on the Heinz board in 2006

  40. Voting results2 of 5 insurgent candidates elected

  41. Value of a Heinz vote 0.70% 0.60% 0.50% 0.40% 0.30% 0.20% 0.10% 0.00% -0.10% -0.20% -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 -9 -7 -5 -3 -1 1 3 5 7 9

  42. Speculating in vote values(if it were possible) Value of a Heinz vote on June 1: $0.150 Value of a Heinz vote on June 8: $0.238 One-week investment return: 59% Annualized return: = (1 + r)52 – 1 = 1.5952 – 1 = 2.5 trillion %

  43. Lessons learned • Shareholder voting is much more confrontational than in the past • Leads to real changes in boards, compensation, takeover defenses, and share values • Can be very destabilizing

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