THE ROLE OF HUMAN ERROR IN ACCIDENTS AT GERMAN LEVEL CROSSINGS

1. THE ROLE OF HUMAN ERROR IN ACCIDENTS AT GERMAN LEVEL CROSSINGS Jan Grippenkoven

2. German Aerospace Centre (DLR e.V.) Institute of Transportation Systems Residence: Braunschweig and Berlin Since: 2001 Employees: At present circa 120 employees from various scientific disciplines Fields of Research Railway Systems Automotive Traffic Management

3. German Aerospace Centre (DLR e.V.) Institute of Transportation Systems Range of tasks: Basic research Creating concepts and strategies Prototype development Fields of Research Railway Systems Automotive Traffic Management Life Cycle Management Testing and Validation Rail Human Factors Railway Operations Safety

4. Example • “Train crashes into car - driver killed: On Tuesday morning, 3rd January, a 42-year-old man was killed in an accident with a train. As the police reported, the driver ignored the warning light, bypassed the closed half-barrier and was hit on the middle of the rails by an approaching regional express (...) first investigations revealed that the safety systems were intact and active. (…) Suicide could be ruled out.” (EckernförderZeitung, January 4, 2012)

5. Example • “Car hit by train – driver killed: On Monday 28 June, a 40-year-old man drove on the Bahnhofsstraße in the direction of Midlum. Just before the crossing he was distracted and overlooked the red warning light at the level crossing (…). The driver was immediately dead. The train was not ready to drive afterwards and had to be evacuated. (…) The railway was cleared 2 ½ hours later.” (Nordsee-Zeitung, March 17, 2010) Source: Police

6. Resposibility for Level Crossing Accidents • 94% of all collisions between road users and rail vehicles in Germany originate from misconduct on the part of a road traffic user • Train drivers usually have no chance to avoid the accident Source: Deutsche Bahn AG

7. Layout of German Level Crossings

8. Layout of German Level Crossings

9. German Level Crossing Protection and Criticality

10. Protection at German Level Crossings • 22.200 levelcrossings in Germany (2005) drehscheibe-foren.de bplaced.net Source: DB AG, Bahnübergänge im Spiegel der Statistik 2005 dreilicht.de staehlernestrassen.de

11. „Stupidity Knowsnobarriers“ (Seehafer, 1997)

12. Classificationofhuman error

13. Classification of Human Error Framework • Framework is necessary to gain deeper insight into the underlying mechanisms of errors of road traffic users in level crossing accidents (Wickens & Hollands, 2000)

14. GIDAS - CategorisationGerman in Depth Accident Analysis • Based on analysis of numerous accidents, a specific modification of Rasmussen‘s error categorisation (1982) was formulated for the automotive domain • Five error categories were defined

15. Methods of Accident Analysis • A total number of n=51accidents were analysed (2002-2012) (initial sample 126 accident descriptions) • 75 reports had to be excluded because of insufficient detail of description • Sources reviewed: • Official EBA accident reports (EBA - German federal railway authority) • Police reports • Newspaper articles • Exclusively reports from accidents in Germany • Identification of the safety layout • Accidents were assigned to one of the five GIDAS error categories

16. Results

17. Results – Accidents according to Protection • Distribution of level crossing accidents in the sample over the different protection systems

18. Layout of German Level Crossings • 22.200 level crossings in Germany drehscheibe-foren.de bplaced.net Source: DB AG, Bahnübergänge im Spiegel der Statistik 2005 dreilicht.de staehlernestrassen.de

19. Results – Comparison of Error-types • Types of human error leading to accidents at level crossings with and without half-barrier protection

20. Results – Analysis of Error Distribution • Level crossings with barrier protection systems show a highly significant unequal distribution of assigned error types (Χ²=24.5; df=4; p<.0001) • Level crossings with barrier protection systems show a highly significant unequal distribution of assigned error types (Χ²=27.38; df=4; p<.0001)

21. Conclusion – Influence of Protection on Errors • Most accidents occur on level crossings with a light signal and on level crossings with half-barriers • The error type leading to the accident differs between the two safety layouts: Half-barriers planning errors (deliberate bypassing) Light signals  information admission (overlooking, unattentional blindness)

22. Suggestions • Three suggested ways to reduce the amount of accidents at level crossings: • Improvement of physical barriers • Psychological approach of modifying risk perception • Approach of alternative activities

23. Conclusion – Preventing Violations Improvement of physical barriers • Russian level crossing protection system (Quelle: Pelz) (Galimov et al., 1996)

24. Conclusion – Raising Awareness Psychological approach of modifying risk perception • Risk = Probability of occurrence xseverity of consequences • Additional perceivable evidence of a train actually approaching: • acoustic signalling • digital display (especially in the case of two trains following each other) • Providing a viable notion of the severity of consequences www.railsafety.co.nz de.wikipedia.org

25. Conclusion – Avoiding Impatience Approach of alternative activities • Drivers should be given the opportunity to pass time in an attractive or useful fashion • Trashcan placed besides the road • QR-codes that can be read by smartphones and lead for example to mini-games, that might also have an educational character insidesocal.com

26. Current / Future research

27. Eyetracking study with car drivers approaching level crossings

28. Future Activities – Multi Sensor Tracking Station

29. Thankyouforyourattention

30. References