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Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities, Phase I Report and Phase II Report . Canadian Public Administration Volume 49, No 2 (summer 2006) Ian Greene and David Shugarman Presented by: Mete Yorgan March 24, 2009 Mppal 6120.
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Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities, Phase I Report and Phase II Report Canadian Public Administration Volume 49, No 2 (summer 2006) Ian Greene and David Shugarman Presented by: Mete Yorgan March 24, 2009 Mppal 6120
Article Objectives: • Brief Background to the Establishment of the Commission • Report on Key Findings (Phase I) • Key Recommendations (Phase II) • Assessment of the Recommendations
Background to the Commission • Newspaper allegations 1999/2000: • “hefty fees” paid to advertising firms connected with the sponsorship programs • Connections to Liberal Party • Little work for amounts received • Funds being donated back to Liberal Party? • Two Reports by Auditor General
Background (con’t) • Commission created (2004) due to “enormous public pressure” by Liberal Prime Minister Paul Martin • Commissioner’s Role: • Mr. Justice John Gomery: wide powers to assess: What happened to the funds? • without suggesting criminal liability • who was responsible for the mismanagement of the program? • Advisory committee lead by Donald Savoie (Professor of Public Administration)
Background (con’t) • Final report divided into two Phases, delivered in two stages (October 2005 and February 2006) Phase I “getting to the bottom” of what happenned, who’s responsible? Phase II Recommendations to prevent similar abuses of public trust
Coincidence of Events: • Allan Cutler: demoted civil servant “whistle blower” • Globe and Mail reporter’s inquiry through the Access to Information Act • 2 Auditor General Reports, 2002/2003 • Prime Minister Paul Martin establishing Commission
Phase I Report: Key Findings Purpose of the Sponsorship Program (Liberal gov’t 1994) • Counter separatist sentiment in Quebec • Promote Unity • Main Approach: • Displaying Canadian symbols at public events
Phase I (con’t) • Key Findings: • Invoices were submitted and paid – for work that was never performed • Portions of money paid out came back to agents charging special commission fees • …and back to the Liberal Party of Canada in Quebec • Audit findings of “non-compliance” were not adhered to (i.e Ernst and Young)
Phase IThree Main Reasons for Mismanagement • Program directed from the PMO • departmental procedures and safeguards bypassed • Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) Deputy Minister’s failure • to oversee and manage middle manager’s abuse of spending … within own department • Program operations were deliberately kept secret
Phase I: Conclusion • “far too much administrative control was ceded to private sector communication agencies • “program began without attention to rules, guidelines and criteria and without any appropriate oversight”
Phase II: Key Recommendations Eighteen recommendations for restoring accountability in the decision-making processes of government (Nineteenth–call on government to respond within two years) Three Categories: • The role of deputy ministers and the Clerk of the Privy Council • Parliament and the Public Accounts Committee • The public service, crown corporations, and ministerial exempt staff
Phase II:The Role of Deputy Ministers and the Clerk of the Privy Council • Most controversial: represent a major shift from existing practices. Recommendation highlights: • Open competition for deputy minister positions • Deputy Ministers/senior public servants be accountable to “public accounts committee” (not through the minister) • Role of Clerk of the Privy Council abolished…new role “Secretary to Cabinet” representing the public service to the government
Phase II:Parliament and the Public Accounts Committee Recommendation highlights: • “Substantial” increase in funding available to parliamentary committees to conduct research; especially the Public Accounts Committee • Registrar of Lobbyists report directly to Parliament with regards to enforcing the Lobbyists Registration Act
Phase II:The Public Service, Crown Corporations, and Ministerial Staff Recommendation highlights: • “shorter and simpler” statement of values for the public service; to be known as the Public Service Charter • Rules adjusted to ensure fair and competitive procurement procedures • Destruction of public records by public servants as an offence • Crown corporation appointments to be based on merit
Assessment Gomery Report’s “ambivalence” to the significance of the mismanagement of the sponsorship program. • “there is no reason for the public’s confidence in the integrity of our democratic institutions to be shaken” (Phase II Report) • mismanagement of the sponsorship program “subverted and betrayed” the public trust in its government (Phase I Report)
Rhetoric vs. Law • Public service accountability addressed in the past via: • Glassco Report (1962) • Lambert Commission (1979) • Public Service 2000 • La Releve 1997 However: Has unethical conduct in the public service been improved? Rhetoric is not enough: “Measures not to be taken through the law and through a reformed system of checks and balances”.
Conclusion: Proceeding with the Recommendations • Has Gomery gone too far? • i.e. Phase I may cause friction between ministers and deputies; the recommendations are too radical? • Gomery recommendations are worth proceeding with: • Image of politics and public service require overhaul to restore public confidence • Avoidance of future scandals