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Less Prison + More Policing = Less Crime How Criminology Can Save the States from Bankruptcy

Less Prison + More Policing = Less Crime How Criminology Can Save the States from Bankruptcy. Lawrence W. Sherman Jerry Lee Centers of Criminology Universities of Cambridge and Pennsylvania April 21, 2010. Summary.

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Less Prison + More Policing = Less Crime How Criminology Can Save the States from Bankruptcy

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  1. Less Prison + More Policing = Less CrimeHow Criminology Can Save the States from Bankruptcy Lawrence W. Sherman Jerry Lee Centers of Criminology Universities of Cambridge and Pennsylvania April 21, 2010

  2. Summary If criminal justice policy were based only on current evidence of its cost-effectiveness, we would have • Less money spent on prison • More money spent on police • Fewer Serious Crimes, Less Total Harm • Fewer states threatened with bankruptcy

  3. Cost-Effectiveness of Prison? 1. General Deterrence? Unknown 2. Specific Deterrence? Unknown (Weak evidence of No Effect, or Net Increase) 3. Incapacitation: Wasted on Many. • Most people want “Willie Hortons” in prison • Relatively few people in prison are “Willie Hortons” • Many “Willie Hortons” get probation, parole • Only Virginia has adopted risk-based sentencing • Even Virginia fails to use seriousness as key factor

  4. Cost-Effectiveness of Police? • General Deterrence: Hot Spots Patrols (displacement debate) Traffic and minor crime enforcement Possibly total N of police • Incapacitation Serious Repeat Offenders • Situational Crime Prevention: POP • Specific Deterrence: More diversion, less court

  5. Less Crime? Lock Up The Worst, Manage the Rest • Lock Up The Worst: Less Serious Crime • Manage the Rest: More Surveillance by Police with probation & parole • Criminal Events vs. People Who Commit Crime 1. Individuals  Events in Hot Spots 2. Police presence deters events 3. POP alters causal structure of events • Crime Victims Prefer Diversion, Also Reducing Crime

  6. Criminologists at Work Daniel NaginJoan Petersilia Richard BerkDavid Weisburd Frank CullenAnthony Braga Kate BowersChris Koper

  7. Outline • Premises • Key Concepts --“Push-button” Policy Systems -- Crime Harm Index (CHI) -- Risk-Based Policies --A General Theory of Crime, Prisons & Police • Evidence on Prisons • Evidence on Policing • Who Can Push the Buttons? How?

  8. 1. Premises: What Criminal Justice Needs People Need Criminal Justice to • Protect them from loss of liberty to be secure • Hold offenders accountable for their crimes 3. Cost taxpayers as little as possible This Requires a System of Criminal Justice that • Produces consequences for every decision that are • Predictable, based on good evidence, and • Chosen democratically, by managing the system

  9. 2. Key Concepts A. “Push-Button” Policy Systems B. Crime Harm Index: CHI C. Risk-Based Policies D. General Theory of Crime, Prisons & Police

  10. 2. a. “Push-Button” Policy Systems

  11. Contrast Before Keynes • Case Studies • Trends • Histories • Explanations • Micro-level studies • Little intervention • No “buttons” to push • Economy beyond control After Keynes • Government has key buttons • Pushing can help a lot • Which ones to push? • When to push them? • What effect predicted? • How do buttons affect each other?

  12. Push-Button Criminology Case-by-case crime policy now “Laissez-Faire” Interventionist policy: more control of trends Key buttons to push: prisons, police, probation & parole Pushing wrong buttons, case-by-case: research evidence shows --Too much prison for too little benefit --Not enough optimizing of police Pushing right buttons requires system policy Guided by a general theory

  13. A General Theory Macro-economics: --societies as the unit of analysis --not individuals --not transactions 2. Rates across societies: --Independent variables (causes) --Dependent variables (effects) Money  Employment

  14. Neo-Keynesian Economics Causes (Independent) • Money supply • Interest Rates • Tariffs • Taxation • Deficits Effects (Dependent) • Employment • GDP • Gross National Happiness (Bhutan): --crime --disease --mortality --inequality

  15. Macro-Criminology Causes (Independent) Prison Police Probation/Parole Effects (Dependent) Crime Detection Rates Crime Harm Index (CHI)

  16. 2.b. Crime Harm Index ( CHI )? • Not UCR Index—Challenge to BJS! (US Senate) • Like Consumer Price Index (CPI) • CHI Elements weighted according to formula • Sum of each (Crime X Cost = Cost per event) Divided by Population (CHI per person) • Murder = $5 million, Burglary = $1,000 • British Crime Survey uses some costs of crime • Could also be based on public opinion data • Limited to reliably counted categories

  17. Beyond Neo-Classical Deterrence Assumptions that • All crimes cause equal harm • All offenders commit crimes of equal harm • All prisons prevent equal harm per inmate • All police deter equal numbers of crimes • General, not specific, deterrence rules most • Punishment never escalates crime, just deters

  18. BAD “Push-Button Criminology”

  19. Total Incarceration Rate

  20. Non-Police Data: Different Trend(BJS—NCVS)

  21. Police Count  Crime Count

  22. Not Complex Enough for CHI • Prisoners vary highly in risk of “Willie Horton” crimes • Incapacitation effects on Crime Harm Index vary by risk level of people imprisoned • Imprisonment effects on CHI vary by age, first offense, etc. • Police impact on CHI varies highly by what they do • Especially vary in allocating time by risk level to 1. places 2. offenders 3. victims • Theories of CHI Must Focus on Risk of Serious Harm

  23. 2.c. Risk-Based Policies • Police • Prosecutors • Sentencing; Prisons • Parole and Probation

  24. (Distribution of Violent Offenses in Tokyo) Peaks and Valleys of Crime

  25. A “Hockey Stick” CumulativeCurve:The “Power Few”

  26. Normal Distribution

  27. Extreme cases put low-risk people in prison “Just in case” No Prediction  More False Positives ---------------------------- Response Assumes Normal Curve Increases dosage for all, not few Rising Prison Rates Not needed if responding to the “power few” The Willie Horton Problem: Over-Prediction of High Risk

  28. Risk-Based Policy:Foundation of Cost-Effectiveness • Pew Trust Report • RAND 1982 Report on Selective Incapacitation • Idea rejected by 1986 NAS Report on Error • False positives too high for values • But prison rate has tripled • False positives are embedded in sentencing • Actuarial Risk could get them out, not put them in

  29. Based only on Prior Charges, Residence, Age, Sex—no PSR Nothing qualitative More like a short-term weather forecast Based on huge samples E.g., 30,000 in Philadelphia Journal Royal Statistical Society, Series A, 2009 Richard Berk Since 1986: New Generation of Risk Forecasting

  30. Clinical vs. Statistical Forecasts • Since Meehl 1954 Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction • Statistical Prediction beats Clinical • Most contests before statistical learning • Cheap supercomputers • “Data mining” that assays every possible pattern of precursors • Identifies best prediction combinations

  31. 2-Dimensional Risk—or More? Seriousness Low High Low 1 2 Frequency* High 3 4 *Not probability (prevalence)

  32. Geoffrey Barnes (2007) 2-Year Berk Forecast Test, Philadelphia APPD Cases High Risk (2%) Neither High nor Low Risk (38%) Low Risk (60%)

  33. High Risk 2% vs. Bottom 60% Two Years From Forecast Date Charges for Any Offence 8 X more Charges Serious Offence 10 X more Charges Murder or Attempt 75 X more

  34. Group Average Number of Charges for ANY Offense Within Two Years of Probation Start 18.1 High Neither Low 7.75 2.25

  35. Average Number of Charges for SERIOUS Crimes Within Two Years of Probation Start 3.13 High Neither Low 1.28 0.30

  36. Average Charges for MURDER or Attempted Murder Within Two Years of Probation Start .375 High Neither Low .033 .005

  37. Total Charges:High Risk 2% Over 2 Years For every 100 Offenders: --37 charges of murder or attempted murder --318 charges of serious crime (murder, rape, robbery) --1800 charges for all crimes

  38. 2.d. A General Theory of Crime, Prisons & Police • The higher the proportion of inmates who are high-frequency and high-harm, the more cost-effective prisons will be in lowering CHI. • The higher the proportion of police time spent on high-risk places, victims and offenders, the more cost-effective police will be in lowering CHI. • The more low-risk offenders police hold accountable for their crimes without using prison, the more cost-effective police at reducing CHI.

  39. 1. Prisons The higher the proportion of inmates who are high-frequency and high-harm, the more cost-effective prisons will be in lowering CHI. NB: Prisons would have to have many fewer inmates to become more cost-effective

  40. 2. Police Time The higher the proportion of police time on high-risk places, victims and offenders, the more cost-effective police will be in lowering CHI. NB: a. Just adding police is not predicted to cause less crime or harm b. Reductions in crime harm could come with even fewer police, depending on their focus

  41. 3. Police Dispositions The more low-risk offenders police hold accountable for their crimes without using prison, the more cost-effective police will be at lowering CHI. NB: If police stop using arrest and prosecution where tested alternatives are available, they will be more cost-effective without spending more money.

  42. My Title is Not Quite Right • Less prison, more police = less crime? • Not necessarily • Easier to say it that way • But risk-based policy is crucial • Theory of cost-effective CHI effects depends on it • Thus, conditional on optimizing risk-based allocations, • More prison could, with More Police = Less Crime • But More Prison would not Cost Effectiveness

  43. Taking Cost Into Account • Prison rate hits diminishing returns quickly • Very few offenders per 100 seem worth locking up • Look at the evidence: prisons and police

  44. 3. Evidence on Prisons If we use risk analysis, • Who Goes to Prison? • Who Doesn’t? Preliminary analysis in Philadelphia suggests • half of all sentenced to prison are low-risk, yet • half of all high-risk offenders not given prison

  45. Nagin and Cullen, 2009Crime and Justice Vol. 38 Daniel Nagin Frank Cullen “Special” Effects of Imprisonment on the Imprisoned: • 5 Experimental studies of custody  more crime • 11 Matching studies juvenile custody  more crime • Propensity Score Matching  mixed effects

  46. 4. Evidence on Police:Clear effects, More on Costs Needed a. Places 1. Hot Spot Patrols 2. Problem-Oriented Policing 3. Displacement b. Offenders High-frequency, high-harm • Dispositions Youth offenders Domestic Violence Restorative Justice

  47. Campbell Collaboration • Systematic Reviews • Many with meta-analyses • Peer-Reviewed • NIJ support (UK, Holland, Canada, Sweden) • Chinese and English versions • Norwegian Government website: www.campbellcollaboration.org

  48. a. Policing Places • Anthony Braga review: Increasing police in high risk places reduces crime & disorder there • Koper & Mayo-Wilson: policing gun crime places  less gun crime • Weisburd, et al: Problem-Oriented Policing POP  less crime & disorder • Displacement: Weisburd, Bowers, others

  49. b. Policing High-Risk Offenders Two Randomized Controlled Trials: Police Foundation (Washington) RAND (Albuquerque, NM)

  50. c. Detection, Dispositions, Accountability Campbell Reviews: • Juvenile Prosecution: Petrosino et al 2010 • Domestic Violence: NIJ experiments • Restorative Justice: UK, Australia, US • Shapland, et al 2008 Cost effectiveness on RJ in UK = 8 to 1 return

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